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Summary 
 
The objective of this research is to understand and explain the implementation process 
of transposed EU legal acts in Albania. As the country gets closer to EU membership, 
implementation challenges have increased, representing a major obstacle. The 
contribution of the analysis and findings of this study are both practical and theoretical. 
On one hand, it aims at reaching some sound conclusions on the factors that affect 
implementation performance and attempts to formulate possible recommendations for 
the Albanian case. On the other hand, it also contributes to the vast area of 
implementation studies by enriching it with an unexplored case, that of Albania.  
The study explores the policy implementation process by analysing the policy design 
stage and its shortcomings as the main argument. More specifically, it is focused on 
understanding the role of three factors when policies are drafted: administrative and 
coordination capacities, the effectiveness of involvement of non-state actors, and the 
contribution of EU representatives and expertise. Because of the theoretical propositions 
and the nature of the variables, the type of approach adopted is qualitative research. The 
strategy of inquiry, a single case study, makes use of two main methods: triangulation 
and process tracing. Accounts from participants are triangulated in order to grasp 
differences in their understanding of the process and the formal procedures followed. 
Process tracing is used to analyse and understand the policy from the drafting stage to 
its practical implementation.  
Four policy areas or acquis chapters were selected for the study: free movements of 
goods, competition policy, food safety, and environment. For each sector, specific EU 
legal acts were chosen as a sample to be explored in depth throughout the policy cycle. 
Based on the findings from all four areas, the study draws broader conclusions and 
implications on the policy implementation challenges facing the country. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
Albania was the last European country where communism collapsed after the fall of the 
Berlin Wall. The wind of change that spread throughout Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE) arrived in late 1990 in Albania, when students took to the streets and started 
protesting.  
In this general atmosphere, Western Europe and the United States were seen as the 
future and at the heart of the Albanian people's ambitions. What the regime had 
prohibited now became the aspiration. The European model was so attractive for 
Albanians that the most famous slogan in the 1990s’ protests was “we want Albania to 
be like Europe”.
1
 The communist and post-communist elite opened the country up to the 
world and started establishing diplomatic relations with European countries once again. 
However, it was only after the Labour Party
2
 (LP) lost the election in 1992 that the 
country started its path towards the European Union (EU). Albania engaged in 
diplomatic and economic relations with the EU by signing an agreement for economic 
and trade cooperation with it. This agreement aimed at increasing trade flows between 
the two and at laying the foundation for a political orientation of Albania towards the 
establishment of a functioning democracy and free market economy by harmonising its 
legislation.  
In the first half of the 1990s, Albania continued to successfully profit from EU 
assistance, and its institutions engaged in numerous urgent reforms. However, the 
events of 1997, the civil unrest caused by the collapse of fraudulent financial 
companies, represented a major step back for the country on its European path.  
Since the 2000s, Albania has been back on track in the European integration process 
thanks to the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP). After the Thessaloniki 
summit (2003) declared a clear membership perspective for the Balkan region, Albania 
signed a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU in 2006. This new 
structural agreement implied considerable assistance from the EU side and progressive 
alignment with the EU legislation and standards from the Albanian side. Since then, the 
country has moved forward with adopting and transposing the acquis in its domestic 
legislation. In June 2014, Albania became officially a candidate country for EU 
                                                 
1
 In Albanian "E duam Shqipërinë si gjithë Europa". 
2
 The ruling party during the communist regime in Albania was called the Labour Party. 
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membership. However, in spite of the progress made, the country has encountered 
several difficulties in its integration process with the EU, especially in relation to the 
implementation of transposed legal acts. 
 
1.1 Scope of research  
This study seeks to explore and explain the implementation process of EU legal acts in 
Albania. Albania has engaged in the European integration process for many years now, 
and its legal approximation agenda has developed quite quickly since 2006. The country 
has recorded a satisfying performance in terms of the alignment of legislation with the 
EU acquis, but full implementation has not always been effective. Although the country 
now has some years of experience in adopting EU legal acts, implementation has been a 
major problem and a real obstacle to the advancement of the EU integration agenda. 
This research project aims to analyse the implementation of the acquis and explain its 
patterns in Albania, focusing on the process from adoption to implementation. 
Implementation theory has developed extensively in recent decades and has occupied a 
major place in the policy analysis field. Different approaches and theoretical 
conclusions have been explored within this area of study. The field was enriched and 
became more complex when EU compliance and enlargement studies crosscut with 
studies of the general implementation framework. The specific characteristics of EU 
functioning, the top-down approach adopted, and the increased number of actors 
involved in the process have made policy implementation in the EU more challenging to 
understand and explain. A further difficulty is represented when the analysis involves 
countries with considerable obstacles in terms of institutional capacities for 
implementation, such as post-communist countries in general and Albania in particular. 
This is why it is really important to use findings and theoretical work from other 
experiences in order to understand and explain ongoing processes in these countries. 
The study analyses in depth the case of Albania’s challenges deriving from EU 
integration process commitments in terms of adopting the acquis. Based on theoretical 
conclusions from previous similar studies and adapted to the Albanian case, it aims to 
provide an account of the adoption and implementation cycle of EU legislation, with a 
particular focus on patterns and the interaction of the institutions and actors involved. 
As mentioned earlier, since the number of actors involved in the process is quite high, 
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the study aims to construct an institutional mapping and tracing that can help to better 
understand Albania’s specific characteristics. It also explains interaction procedures and 
practices and how they influence the quality of the process and its outcome in terms of 
implementation. By exploring different policy areas, the study’s results aim at 
representing broader conclusions on compliance and implementation patterns in 
Albania.  
This topic is important in different respects. First, as mentioned earlier, an 
implementation deficit has become a major obstacle for Albania in its aspiration for EU 
membership. In spite of the training, assistance, and commitment of the actors involved, 
implementation challenges are increasing. The country’s agenda of legislative alignment 
with the EU will become very intense in the coming years, when accession negotiations 
will be opened. Therefore, this research and its findings can assist decision-makers who 
are in charge of ensuring the smooth and proper implementation of EU directives in 
general. Second, understanding implementation in the Albanian context can help in 
addressing shortcomings, especially in the most problematic policy areas. Since the 
content of the research is related to some specific important fields, it can be further 
followed up on with interested actors for research and policy purposes. The study can 
become a reference point in such an unexplored though very important topic. Third, this 
project is important because of the importance that implementation has gained in public 
debate in Albania. Implementation is one of the most frequently mentioned concepts in 
reports, analysis, and public discourse in the Albanian public sphere in general. 
Politicians, EU representatives, journalists, etc., constantly refer to the implementation 
of legislation and its importance. However, most of the arguments used for explaining 
implementation performance are often based on common knowledge, personal 
experiences/perceptions, or monitoring reports (which state the situation but do not 
explain the reasons). Research projects and studies that explore the topic in depth have 
not been developed, so this topic and this thesis are important for understanding more 
about the process in Albania by using theories explored in other similar countries. If 
discussed and disseminated adequately, the results and conclusions from this study 
might help by shedding light upon the main challenges that Albania faces in the process 
of implementing EU legal acts and building a discussion on how to overcome the 
obstacles.  
The main sources used for this project included policy implementation literature, studies 
on EU accession and enlargement, official documents from Albanian and EU 
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institutions and organisations, in-depth interviews with relevant actors, etc. A more 
detailed explanation of the research framework and methods used in the study is 
provided in Chapter 3. 
 
1.2 The implementation problem and the main argument of the thesis 
Albanian governments have consistently included the European integration agenda in 
their political platforms, and a broad national consensus has always been strong on this 
matter. Despite the commitment and political will displayed, however, the process has 
been slow and often undermined by domestic factors. This is why Albania is often 
reported to be lagging behind in the integration process, especially in the 
implementation of the acquis. The bigger problems at the beginning of the process were 
mostly related to poor institutional capacities. This became more visible after the SAA 
was signed and commitments increased. What followed was an intense period of 
adopting EU legal acts but very slow and difficult implementation. This is why the 
implementation deficit deepened, especially after 2006. This has been particularly acute 
in areas such as environment, transport, agriculture, food safety, intellectual property 
rights. These areas are characterised by intense work in aligning legislation but have 
achieved poor results in terms of practical and effective implementation. Despite 
technical and financial assistance from the EU and other donors, the implementation 
and enforcement of legislation have been major problems for several years now. The 
progress report issued by the European Commission (EC) each year stresses repeatedly 
the need to improve implementation and strengthen the capacities involved in the 
enforcement of legislation. In the 60 pages of the 2013 progress report for Albania, the 
word “implementation” is used approximately 140 times.  
This tendency increased especially after the SAA entered into force in 2009. Previously, 
the EU, in its recommendations, was more focused on the need to adopt EU acts and to 
align legislation. This was also reflected in the first National Plan for Approximation of 
Legislation (NPAL) in 2005. Later, when the adoption of legislation was going quite 
smoothly, the gap between adopted acts and implemented ones increased, so focus of 
the EC shifted towards monitoring implementation. This is why, after the SAA was 
signed, the new plan, the National Plan for the Implementation of the Stabilisation and 
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Association Agreement (NPISAA),
3
 focused more on implementation. Thus, after 
producing good amounts of legislation, the need to implement them was urgent. This 
problem has been identified not only in relevant reports, such as the EC progress report 
on the country, but also in political and public rhetoric and discourse. In the Albanian 
public debates, an expression used quite often to describe the situation is: “the quality of 
laws adopted is good, but implementation is bad”. This expression is frequently used in 
the media by analysts, politicians, and citizens in interviews, and it has become a 
broadly accepted fact. But is this general observation correct? It is true that 
“implementation is bad”, as explained earlier. The application and implementation of 
laws are of course affected by many factors, from political stability to capacities and 
resources. However, there is a widespread perception, as implied in the statement above, 
that the quality of the legal drafts is not one of the factors and thus not an issue for 
implementation. This opinion is mainly based on the fact that transposition is seen as a 
sort of “copying and translating” legislation from the EU and therefore the quality is 
somehow ensured by the standards that EU countries adopt for themselves.  
The central argument of this thesis is that the key to understanding implementation 
failure lies in the stage of designing the policies and legal acts that aim at the 
transposition of EU legislation. Tracing and studying the policy process from the 
inception phase until its official approval can reveal important elements for explaining 
what determines implementation outcome. The fact that this legislation is adopted from 
the EU acquis does not guarantee the quality of the process from translation to drafting 
and approving. Several factors have an impact on the outcome of the final proposed 
draft. The capacities of the actors involved, their understanding of the process and the 
legal act, their coordination and interaction with other institutions, and the different 
stakeholders involved in the relevant field are just some of the elements that can directly 
affect the implementation stage. Based on the procedures, performance, and 
characteristics of the policy design process, the result might be a badly drafted legal act 
with weak provisions and planning for the implementation stage. Therefore, as the 
central argument of this study claims, it is essential to study and understand the process 
before adoption of the legislation to properly explain its implementation.      
 
                                                 
3
 The NPISAA covered the process until 2014. 
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1.3 Structure of the study 
The study comprises eight chapters, excluding the introduction, and its structure reflects 
the approach assumed in terms of the research strategy and cases chosen.  
Chapter 2 explores literature that covers implementation analysis and related theories. It 
starts with early scholars of implementation studies in the 1970s and moves on to the 
main debates that followed in the 1980s. In particular, the chapter discusses the top-
down and bottom-up perspectives and tries to explain the different theoretical positions 
in the field and how they have shaped the main arguments of later authors. At the end of 
the chapter, I focus more on implementation related to the EU accession context and 
then, more specifically, on literature on the Albanian case. 
Chapter 3 is the core part in terms of explaining the research framework of the study 
because it focuses on the research approach and design adopted. The first part discusses 
the theoretical framework used, drawn from the literature review chapter, and 
formulates the respective theoretical proposals to be explored in the Albanian case as 
the main guiding independent variables. This is followed by a detailed outline of the 
strategy of inquiry and of how the research project has been organised in terms of policy 
areas and participants. It concludes with a detailed account of the methods used and the 
difficulties faced during the development of the project. 
Before moving to the analytical part of the thesis, Chapter 4 describes and analyses the 
institutional organisation of the European integration process in Albania, which is 
necessary to better understand the context. It starts by explaining the main institutional 
framework for bilateral engagement between EU and Albania and then enters into the 
description of the domestic side of the organisation. First, it explains which are the main 
domestic institutions involved and what are their competences in relation to the process. 
It follows with an explanation of the organisation of the inter-institutional coordination, 
which is key to the core argument of the thesis. Thus, joint structures and the 
coordination system are explored by giving brief descriptions of the work of this 
framework. Last but very important, the chapter analyses institutional involvement in 
the adoption and transposition of EU legal acts by tracing the formal process from one 
institution to another and by explaining the formal steps of adoption. 
After Chapter 4, four analytical chapters follow, based on the policy areas selected and 
explored: free movement of goods (Chapter 5), competition policy (Chapter 6), food 
safety (Chapter 7), and environment (Chapter 8). All the chapters have very similar 
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approach and structure. They start with a brief general background of the sector, by 
analysing developments regarding the acquis adoption and implementation situation in 
Albania. Although the general methodology used is common to all policy areas, as will 
be explained in Chapter 3, what follows is an account of peculiarities and distinctive 
elements concerning the methodology and the research process for each field. The core 
part on the findings and analysis follows, where the gathered data on the selected case 
studies and the theoretical propositions formulated in Chapter 3 are discussed. In each 
chapter, the last section draws conclusions on implementation based on findings and 
discussions concerning the research outcome in the selected area.  
Chapter 9 develops the overall conclusions of the study. It considers the findings of 
each policy area by discussing the more general and final conclusions of the research 
project. It explains the outcomes on the basis of the theoretical propositions in the 
Albanian case and spells out the consequences of the findings of the study for a better 
understanding the process. It elaborates some implications that this study might have for 
the field of study and the related theories. In addition, it assesses the experience of 
implementation in Albania and gives some concrete recommendations that can help 
with the process. The chapter concludes by giving some suggestions on potential 
directions for further research regarding the implementation literature in general and the 
Albanian case.   
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW ON IMPLEMENTATION 
The implementation of legislation and policies is a complex process. It becomes even 
more difficult when pre-designed agendas, suggested by external actors, are adopted in 
countries with limited institutional capacities and difficult legacies in terms of lack of 
stability and democracy, such as Albania. As Smith (1973) has argued on this point, 
developed countries have an incremental nature to their policies, meaning that they do 
not require drastic change when introducing new policies and legislation. Developing 
countries do not have that kind of basis to start with. They lack constructive legacies 
and patterns; they have little time and an overloaded agenda when major change is 
aimed at (Grindle and Thomas 1991). All these elements constitute the background of 
the patterns that implementation faces in Albania as well. 
In this chapter, I will explain the main theoretical background and framework of the 
study, by reviewing the most relevant theories and literature where the thesis is based. I 
start with the policy implementation theory since its beginning, in the 1970s, which has 
influenced all following works on implementation. The top down and bottom up debate 
follows. This discussion and its main contributors help in creating the framework for 
this study, since most of its variables are extracted from it. Matland's model, which 
follows, is also very useful for framing the approach assumed by the study. Its main 
characteristics are explained and a discussion on adapting it to the Albanian case 
follows. At the end of the sub chapter there is a discussion on new approaches of 
implementation studies, which focus on institutions, agencies and governance. The 
chapter continues into the EU policy implementation and compliance research. After the 
general conceptualisation and the explanation of EU’s role in non member countries, the 
focus is on domestic changes influenced by EU pressure and about how these factors 
can influence implementation. This section focuses on the organisation of the 
transposition process, on administrative capacities and the role of non-state actors. A 
brief review of compliance literature on Albania concludes the chapter.  
 
9 
 
2.1 Policy implementation theory and analysis 
2.1.1 The first wave of implementation studies 
Implementation studies began to rise and expand in the 1970s, when they were mainly 
concentrated around the Pressman and Wildavsky findings of 1973 and the later 
editions. In their study, they tried to analyse why a labour policy of the American 
federal state was not implemented efficiently in Oakland, despite broad political 
support. They argued that effective implementation is impossible in most cases because 
it requires the cooperation of a large number of actors in the process. All these actors try 
to influence implementation according to their interest. This work on implementation 
analysis represented a new approach within this little-developed field. The degree and 
strength of veto players’ presence, the complexity of policies, the administrative 
capacities of bureaucratic officials, and the level of information available were some of 
the main variables considered of great influence in the implementation process. These 
factors have been developed further and have been expanded and used in the later 
models. Apart from being the pioneers of the field, Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) are 
most known for the emphasis given to the difficulties of reaching agreements between 
multiple actors at the top of the policy process. The complexity of coordination in the 
design and implementation of policies is a crucial aspect, which has been inherited in 
the other models that followed. This specific aspect of implementation affects all the 
process and might determine the policy outcome as well. It is considered as one of the 
most important variables when studying implementation. In the same line, according to 
Jackson (2001), implementation theory is about studying the relationship between the 
structure of the institution through which individuals interact and the outcome of that 
interaction.  In the process of interaction, different patterns might affect the result, in 
terms of designing and implementing public policies. In order to study these patterns, 
institutional coordination and relationships between the actors involved in the chosen 
case study or context, need to be explored and understood. This part concerns my 
research work as well, since it is necessary for understanding implementation 
performance even in the Albanian context. As will be explained in the following 
sections, coordination between the different actors involved in the process has been a 
constant variable for implementation since the beginning of the research work for this 
field and it continues so even in the more recent models on implementation and 
compliance with the EU. 
10 
 
Not only does the study of relations between involved actors help in understanding the 
design of the policy, but it explains also policy effectiveness in terms of 
implementation. Smith is another early scholar who has initiated the exploration of the 
field, especially in this direction. In his work, Smith (1973) has argued about the 
importance of the consultation process with the interested or affected parties in the 
policy process. His point is related not only to the effectiveness of a policy depending 
on consultation, but also on how this affects the legitimacy of decision making (which 
again would influence the effective implementation, going around in a sort of circle). 
According to Smith, each policy in itself is an attempt at inducing change in patterns of 
interaction between individuals, groups and institutions. Therefore, apart from 
coordination, interaction and consultation with interested parties have been included as 
important variables since the early days of implementation studies.  
Smith managed to structure all his claims in what became a well-elaborated model and 
an important reference in implementation studies. Despite the criticism towards his 
model in the following decade, it remains one of the first attempts to give some 
structure to this vast field. In his model, Smith (1973) described four main components 
of the policy implementation process, which determine the performance of 
implementation and which need to be explored in order to explain its patterns:  
first, the idealised policy, which is about the content of the policy and its goals, focusing 
mainly on the design of the policy;  
second, the implementing organisation, which considers the institutions and actors 
directly involved in the implementation process. This factor was further elaborated by 
other authors, shaping what has been called administrative studies;  
third, the target group, objective of the policy. Smith elaborates the importance of this 
component in terms of the degree of organisation, institutionalisation, experience, etc. 
of the interested group; 
last, environmental factors, which are related to the context and the specific conditions 
and characteristics of the country. 
These categories helped to structure and develop further what Pressman and Wildavsky 
had started. Most of the authors of implementation studies based their work on this 
model and its components. The added value of Smith’s work in the field is not limited 
to structuring and describing these variables, but also suggests how to focus research on 
the tension between these four components. He claimed that in order to understand and 
explain policy implementation, it is necessary to study how these four elements are also 
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related to each other and how they interact with each other, in terms of fulfilling 
necessary conditions for a policy to succeed in implementation. Despite the fact that 
Smith’s model has been criticised for assuming a rather simplistic and linear approach, 
this last point about the tension between the factors and interests involved, suggest a 
more complex view of his model. 
 
2.1.2 The top-down and bottom-up debate 
After Pressman and Wildavsky’s debut in the field and Smith’s model, one of the most 
prominent scholars of implementation is O’Toole. During the early 1980s, 
implementation studies expanded considerably. In his work of 1986, which is 
considered to be one of the main assessments of the implementation literature, O’Toole 
(1986) reviewed more than 100 hundred implementation studies. In these works, he 
collected references to over 300 key variables related to implementation. O’Toole’s 
account confirms the width of this field and the vast amount of theories and models 
developed. This is why, Matland (1995) claims in his work, that in implementation 
studies, no more variables are needed and that this literature needs structure. 
As mentioned, this field of study had already known some structuring previously 
(Smith, 1973), but it was only in the 1980s that it could finally be concentrated, thanks 
to the division of most of the relevant scholars into two main schools of thought: the 
top-down and bottom-up. After this, different approaches and variables gained new 
perspective. A third group developed later, as an attempt to combine the first two. The 
top-down and bottom-up approaches seem to structure the explanation of 
implementation in different ways by setting up different clusters of independent factors 
and variables.  
Top-down models (Van Meter and Van Horn, 1975; Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1981; 
1983) see the starting point of the process in the authoritative decision-making of 
mainly central and high official actors. This has led to the concentration on variables 
that can be manipulated at the central level. More specifically, Van Meter and Van Horn 
(1975) have developed 6 clusters of variables that need to be explored in order to 
understand and explain implementation: policy standards and objectives; the resources 
and incentives available; the quality of inter-organisational relationships; the 
characteristics of the implementation agencies, organisational control; the economic, 
social and political environment; the disposition or ‘response’ of the implementers, 
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involving three elements: their cognition (comprehension, understanding) of the policy, 
the direction of their response to it (acceptance, neutrality, rejection) and the intensity of 
that response. These variables are largely used in other later models as well, especially 
in those dealing with top-down theory. As Matland (1995) sums it up, top-down 
explanations for analysing and improving implementation performance can be 
synthesised in four simple suggestive elements or rules:  
first, policy goals should be clear and consistent (Van Meter and Van Horn, 1975). This 
is entirely linked to the policy design stage, where, according to this model, elite’s and 
policy makers’ discretion and influence plays the most crucial role;  
second, the number of actors should be minimised (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973). 
Following the early studies suggestions, the less people are involved in the process, the 
more successful implementation will be. The top-down approach considers this an 
important element, which has been developed further in terms of veto players and their 
role in implementation;  
third, the extent of change necessary should be limited (Mazmanian and Sabatier, 
1983). In order to avoid tension and obstacles to implementation, top-down scholars 
suggest focusing on the policy by limiting any structural or related change;  
fourth, implementation responsibility should be placed in an agency sympathetic to the 
policy’s goals (Matland, 1995). Institutions sometimes resist policies and try to maintain 
the same patterns and advantages. This becomes even sharper when agencies have a 
different vision and point of view to those of the policy makers and political elite. For 
this reason, the top-down approach recommends avoiding possible deviations in 
implementation by preparing ahead the process on the top and engaging friendly 
agencies. 
This group of suggestions, derived from Matland’s account of top-down works, tries to 
address implementation issues focusing only at the top. This model has been criticised 
for different reasons. First, top-downers do not deal with the policy-making process as a 
whole. By neglecting the initial phases of the policy formation they fail to capture the 
many barriers that implementation carries on from early stages, such as coordination, 
participation of interest groups, street level bureaucrats, etc. Second, the top-down 
approach considers implementation as a purely administrative process. With emphasis 
on clarity of rules, they tend to divide administration from politics. They assume that 
once the input exists, everything is purely administrative and the process rolls smoothly. 
Third, top-downers see low level actors as obstacles to successful implementation, 
13 
 
elements to be controlled, and not as active participants to the process. This narrow 
point of view fails to capture the larger picture of implementation, especially when 
dealing to complex policies (Hjern and Hull 1982; Lipsky 1978). 
By contrast, the bottom-up model argues that a more realistic understanding of 
implementation can be obtained by looking at a policy from the viewpoint of the target 
population and the service deliverers (Berman, 1978; Hjern and Porter, 1981; Hjern and 
Hull, 1982; Lipsky, 1978). Most advocates of this approach argue that implementation 
problems result from the interaction of a policy with the micro level institutional factors. 
The central actors cannot impose any direct influence at this level. Therefore, 
environment and contextual elements might dominate the rules created at higher levels, 
and policymakers will be unable to control the process. Once they have designed the 
policy, implementation can be explained only by exploring the lower stages. The 
bottom-up approach theorists have also reached a conclusion that, if local, or the so-
called street-level, implementers do not have the freedom and possibility to adapt 
policies to domestic conditions, implementation is likely to fail. They argue that there 
cannot be a theory of implementation which is “context free” (Palumbo, Maynard-
Moody and Wright, 1984). Since it is at the micro level that policy affects people 
directly, then street-level bureaucrats must be involved in order to understand and 
interpret goals, strategies and expected outcomes of policies. Lipsky (1980), in his book 
“Street-level bureaucracy”, discusses how the discretion of street-level bureaucrats, 
their autonomy and resources can play a major role in implementation, as proper policy 
makers in the field. Lipsky claims that the decisions of street level bureaucrats, the 
routines they establish, and the instruments they invent to cope with uncertainties and 
pressures, effectively become the public policies they carry out and are crucial to 
understanding the policy process. 
As we can see, while the top-down model has a tendency to present suggestions and 
advice in terms of managing the process, the bottom-up version is more oriented 
towards the factors that have caused difficulties in pursuing successful implementation. 
For this reason, bottom-up research usually has a strong inductive nature. Its main 
finding or recommendation is the need for a flexible strategy that permits adaption to 
local realities and contextual factors (Maynard-Moody, Musheno, and Palumbo 1990 in 
Matland 1995). This model offers a more comprehensive framework for understanding 
the implementation process in depth. The importance of the role of street level 
bureaucrats in interpreting and adapting policies to the context, seems an interesting 
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variable to be explored in the Albanian efforts for implementing EU legislation. 
However, there are some shortcomings in its assumptions as well.  
There are two main groups of criticisms to bottom-up models. The first one deals with 
legitimacy issues. Since street level actors are not elected and not vested with popular 
mandate, their discretion and flexibility in the implementation process should not serve 
as a focus for designing policy. They are not entitled to interfere with the process, 
especially when altering the policy goals. As Matland (1995) points out, this autonomy 
might be adequate when the goals of the policy designers and the implementers are the 
same, but if they differ in a considerable amount, flexibility might lead to policies which 
fall short of official goals. Therefore, the role of street level bureaucrats needs to be 
explored widely, in terms of easing implementation from one side, but also in terms of 
the degree of the shift in policy goals, due to the level of flexibility.  
The second criticism is about methodology. Bottom-up authors try to capture 
perceptions and therefore rely on different interpretations of the actors involved for 
explaining implementation performance. This neglects the fact that central actors 
structure the goals and strategies, available resources, etc. Thus the decision to give 
space and flexibility belongs anyway to central actors. This suggests that the bottom-up 
approach is not sufficient for explaining the process and its outcome, since it dismisses 
the central actors, even regarding the role and influence they have upon lower levels. 
Although these approaches seem to cover the main features of implementation, there 
has been wide discussion and criticism of them, mainly based on their simplifying 
tendency and rejection of each other’s assumptions. Despite the fact that they both offer 
interesting explanatory factors, a combination of the two perspectives seems to reach a 
better position in terms of explanatory power (Elmore 1982). Reconciliation of the two 
approaches has been attempted by either specifying in advance the policy objectives, 
detailed means and goals, and outcome criteria, called 'forward mapping' by Elmore 
(1982) or specifying the behaviour needed to be changed at the lowest level, named 
'backward mapping' (Matland, 1995). This allowed the consideration of the views of the 
target groups and local implementers. A combination of the two approaches was also 
seen when interest groups were made the unit of analysis. Advocacy coalitions are 
groups of policy advocates who share the same set of beliefs and goals (Sabatier 1986). 
When scholars tried to study their impact in implementation processes, it was 
unavoidable to include both approaches in the analysis, since they interact with both 
levels. 
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Elmore’s forward and backward mapping approach, mentioned above, includes the 
analysis of both levels – high and low (Elmore, 1982). Beyond mixing up the two 
schools of thoughts and claiming the importance of micro implementers and target 
groups, Elmore’s model has been criticised for lack of explanatory power. It has not 
been considered a theoretical model in the traditional sense. There are no causal 
relationships involved or hypothesis formulated in his work and thus, it can only offer 
an interesting discussion about the two models. 
Another attempt to mix the two main models has been pursued by Goggin et. al (1990). 
They have elaborated a communication model of intergovernmental policy 
implementation that considers implementers as part of a communication network. They 
refer to three main variables: constraints from the top, constraints from the bottom, and 
specific factors dependent on decisional results and state capacity. Goggin et al put 
communication at the core of this model and state that information is perceived 
differently. If there is distortion, these contextual specific conditions can affect 
interpretation. Grindle (1980) also puts emphasis on the importance of context when 
analysing the policy process. This approach is very useful for explaining the Albanian 
case, especially in terms of communication, understanding and interpreting rules and 
procedures within and between different institutions and actors.  
 
2.1.3. Matland’s model 
One of the most important and relevant approaches for this study has been formulated 
by Matland (1995). He has done an interesting work in synthesising and structuring the 
main aspects of the two models and in developing his own model. From my perspective, 
his ‘ambiguity-conflict model’ is a very useful framework for exploring implementation 
in different contexts, since it offers a valuable structure in terms of variables and 
explanations. He has developed a mixed model, based on two pillars: policy conflict and 
policy ambiguity.  
Policy ambiguity refers to the quality of the design process of policies and its outcome. 
Ambiguity can be about goals and means. This relates directly to administrative 
capacities and other variables that affect performance of institutions. Top-down 
approaches have a clear position in this point: policy goals should be clear, otherwise 
they lead to misunderstanding and uncertainties, which might cause implementation 
failure. However, this approach might be misleading. As Matland argues, quoting from 
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Regan (1984), in the policy formulation stage of a policy, goal conflict and ambiguity 
can often have a negative correlation. Ambiguity can limit conflict – the clearer the 
goals at the upper levels, the higher the probabilities of conflict at the lower levels. 
Matland explains this point further by claiming that:  
“As the policy became more explicit, existing actors became aware of 
threats to their turf and acted to limit the scope and range of proposed 
policy changes to maintain existing patterns of bureaucratic power 
and structure. Under other conditions, ambiguity is often a 
prerequisite for getting new policies passed at the legitimating stage. 
Many legislative compromises depend on language sufficiently 
ambiguous that diverse actors can interpret the same act in different 
ways” (Matland 1995, p. 158). 
As related to policy means, ambiguity exists especially when there are uncertainties 
about the role and competences of the different actors involved in the process or when 
the complexity of the context makes it difficult to identify instruments to be used 
(Matland 1995). Even in this case, it is not clear whether ambiguity can be eliminated in 
the policy design process and if this elimination would produce better results  in terms 
of implementation. Exploring this matter in the policy process of Albanian context 
becomes necessary for understanding in depth implementation, especially at the policy 
design stage. There is no doubt that ambiguity affects the implementation process. 
According to the degree of ambiguity, several variables might be altered, such as the 
possibility of monitoring lower levels’ activities, the uniform understanding of the 
policy in the different stages, the role of environmental factors, the number and nature 
of actors involved, etc. (Matland, 1995).  
Policy conflict is linked to resistance towards a certain policy, where veto players, 
interest groups and other actors cause tension and conflict which can serve as obstacles 
to the implementation process. As Matland (1995) puts it, conflicts arise when actors or 
organisations that see a policy relevant to their interests, have different views on policy 
goals or planned activities for the implementation of that policy. The degree of the 
conflict depends directly on the degree of incompatibility of views and on how actors 
perceive their stake in the process. Policy conflict would affect even the cases when 
there is delegation to sympathetic agencies, if there is clash with their goals, which 
might result in little support for implementation. There is an ongoing debate between 
top-down and bottom-up scholars about whether conflicts in implementation can be 
manipulated or not. While the top-down approach sees manipulation of conflict as 
possible, bottom-uppers see conflict as an independent variable or as a given (Berman, 
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1978). Despite this debate, some policies are inevitably contentious due to their nature 
and discordance they bring in terms of values. This might become relevant in processes 
where policies are adopted from outside normative powers, such as the EU, and 
transposed in challenging environments, when there is resistance.   
By combining these two elements in their respective degrees (high and low), Matland 
(1995) has generated four implementation perspectives/scenarios. Based on the degree 
of ambiguity and conflict involved in the policy process, the four types of approaches to 
implementation that can explain different contexts, according to Matland, are: 
the political approach is used when conflict is high and ambiguity is low. In this case, 
outcomes and implementation are entirely determined by the central actors and the 
power. Policies are clear, but political conflicts do not permit their implementation and 
enforcement. This pure top-down approach helps in explaining implementation in 
countries with developed administrative capacities, but with political tensions between 
different groups or institutions; 
the symbolic approach is used when both conflict and ambiguity are high. The outcome 
in this scenario depends on the strength of local coalitions and local actors. 
Implementation can succeed depending only on the strength of the different groups 
involved in the process; 
the administrative approach is used when both conflict and ambiguity are low. The 
result in this model is determined by the resources. Other than that, there is no obstacle 
to successful implementation;  
the experimental approach is used when ambiguity is high and conflict is low. This is 
similar to a mix model of top-down and bottom-up approaches, where outcomes are 
decided by the contextual conditions.  
Matland’s model offers interesting points which will be used in this study, as a 
framework with potential explanatory power. Drawing also from his model, theoretical 
propositions will be used for exploring the Albanian policy process and for explaining 
implementation patters, as described in Chapter 3.  
 
2.1.4. Other main developments in implementation studies 
In the previous sections, the core theories and models on implementation were 
reviewed. As Gunn (1978) claims in his book “Why is implementation so difficult?”, 
there is no prescriptive or perfect model for implementation. However, by exploring the 
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main views and variables focused on explaining the implementation process, it is 
possible to build a theoretical framework for different cases and contexts (Barrett and 
Fudge 1981). The theoretical approach of the study will draw some of its structure from 
the theories reviewed in the previous sections. Implementation theories evolved further 
during the 1980s and after, thus bringing into the wider picture some new features, 
related especially to organisational elements is necessary for completing the design of 
the study. Although a good part of these recent elaborations have just developed further 
the notions explained above, others offer new approaches to implementation, especially 
in terms of institutional mechanisms. In this section, I will explain three other ‘minor’ 
approaches to implementation, which have tried to enrich the body of literature and 
which are useful for my research design as well. 
First, Ruhil and Teske (2003) have based their work on explaining the role of 
institutions in shaping policy and claim that different institutional structures and rules 
are likely to generate different public policy outputs. Ruhil and Teske’s position points 
out the importance of regulatory decisions within institutions and how they can have 
direct impact on the policy process. These decisions are made by institutional actors and 
thus their involvement in this stage needs to be explored. In the regulatory approach, 
more recently, Staronova (2010) has contributed by focusing on new mechanisms that 
help the policy process, such as Regulatory Impact Assessments (RIA). Staronova, by 
looking into the institutionalisation of this practise, explains three fundamental 
dimensions of the RIA: a)  Regulatory issues addressed, such as identification of the 
problem, of objectives of the intervention, policy options available, monitoring and 
evaluating; b) Identification of the impact in the related areas, which means 
quantification of costs and benefits, eventual mutual tradeoffs; c) Consultation process, 
concerns the modalities in which affected parties are identified and then involved into 
the policy making process (Staronova, 2010). The study of these elements and how they 
are adopted in each context is important for understanding institutional processes and 
policy mechanisms.  
Zubek and Goetz (2010) point out also the importance of resources, especially when 
adopting complex policies. They claim that rules and institutional effects are dependent 
on resources. In elaborating this ‘resources dependency theory’, the authors discuss the 
link between the successful quest for resources and an organisation’s power. March and 
Olsen (2006) have explained institutions as ‘a relatively enduring collection of rules and 
organised practices, embedded in structures of meaning and resources’. Thus, apart 
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from the other parts of this definition which have already been explored, these new 
approaches towards the policy process bring a new perspective on the role of resources. 
This becomes even more evident in poor countries, lacking of financial and human 
capacities. The types of resources that Zubek and Goetz (2010) refer to are multiple, 
such as human, financial, physical, informational, organisational trust, organisational 
legitimacy, etc. It is difficult to quantify each of these, and more difficult to analyse 
their impact in the policy process. However, they are part of the explanatory variables 
that constitute implementation studies in general. 
Second, agencies and networks have been included in the research literature as an 
important piece of the implementation puzzle. As Montjoy and O’Toole (1979) have 
observed, policies are implemented by organisations and thus, we need to study 
different scenarios where mandates for implementation are given to a single agency or 
different ones. What they suggest is a well structured approach, related to inter-
organisation aspects of the policy process.  
As Scharpf (1978) has argued, policy formulation and policy implementation are 
inevitably the result of interaction between a plurality of separate actors with different 
interests, goals and strategies. He has developed an approach in which coordination and 
collaboration are given a central role (inter-organisation theory). In this context, the 
focus that Scharpf’s work on the need for specific type of coordination and the 
examination of factors facilitating or impeding it, is part of the theoretical design of the 
study. Coordination and interaction between different structures and actors is key for 
explaining implementation as well. Following up Scharpf’s point on the importance of 
networks, Smith (1993) has elaborated further the concept and has explained why 
networks are crucial to the policy process. Networks facilitate the establishment of a 
consultative style of government. The presence of consolidated networks of involved 
actors reduces policy conflicts and encourages compromise. In addition, this approach 
will help in predicting policy making and knowing in advance policy interventions by 
the stakeholders. In return, this will help the institutional organisation of the government 
itself, by improving its coordination. This is what Bardach (1998) also supports, when 
he argues on the role of cooperation between agencies and different networks. He 
claims that one of the most difficult tasks in the policy process is getting agencies to 
work together. Each of them represents different interests, backgrounds and informal 
aspects. 
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With reference to implementation agencies, Hogwood and Gunn (1984), in their work 
“Policy analysis for the real world”, have argued on how agencies’ coordination can be 
an obstacle to implementation success. In the presence of a single implementing agency, 
in order to succeed, it needs not to depend on other institutions in its activities. If other 
institutions are involved, then the dependency relationships should be reduced as much 
as possible. This approach based on dependency has been developed by the authors 
exploring four different views: structural, procedural, behavioural and political. In all 
these approaches, the nature of agency involvement in the process is seen as one of the 
crucial variables that explains implementation.  
Third, new directions in implementation research have pointed to governance 
implications. The last approach I have chosen to consider is a relatively new field, 
derived from implementation theories, which is the concept of governance in the 
context of implementation. Hill and Hupe (2009) are two of the most prominent 
scholars that have developed a theoretical framework for governance. First, they base 
and focus their work on the differences in policy styles and organisation of 
administration. Although this looks more useful for cross country comparative works, 
there are some interesting elements that relate to my study as well. They claim that the 
so called public-administrative style of a country or institution needs to be explored in 
order to understand implementation and the type of governance ruling the policy 
process. This investigation needs to include especially an analysis of the differences in 
terms of approaches that institutions have towards regulatory policies. Hille and Hupe 
have elaborated a very interesting framework that tries to structure operational 
governance responses at the different stages, based on the differences between inputs, 
outputs and outcomes. Table 1 offers an interesting summary of the authors’ 
conceptualisation of governance and how activities can result in terms of management 
for each stage. 
Hille and Hupe’s scheme is very clear when looking into the first stage, but it is a bit 
vague in the other two stages, especially in terms of the result of operational activities. 
The ‘management via inputs’, which is the most relevant for this study, creates an 
opportunity for completing further the research design by including these (already 
mentioned) variables in a more structured way, directly connected to governance and 
implementation performance. 
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Table 1 Modes of operational governance (adapted from Hill and Hupe 2009) 
Operational activities Enforcement  
(Management via inputs) 
Performance  
(Management via outputs)  
Managing policy processes Making mandates explicit Creating interfaces 
Managing inter-organisational 
relations 
Creating clarity on tasks and 
competences. Taking care of 
sufficient resources 
Enhancing contract compliance 
Managing (external and 
internal) inter-personal 
contacts.  
Enhancing motivation and 
internalisation. Realising 
compliance to standard operating 
procedures, 
Enhancing and maintaining 
service orientation. Rewarding 
target compliance. 
Central management 
mechanism 
Rules Contract 
 
Policy processes, inter organisational relations, inter personal contacts and the type of 
central mechanism have been mentioned and discussed above, but in Hille and Hupe’s 
work these are explained more thoroughly and related directly to their implications. 
When it comes to the outputs and outcomes stages, the authors’ suggestions do not offer 
a consistent mode of explanation, since the impact described is rather unclear and does 
not always relate directly to the operational activities. However, their work offers a 
good path for this study and generates some interesting trajectories for its research 
design.  
 
2.2. Implementation and Compliance with the EU 
As we have seen in the previous section, implementation theory has changed through 
decades, by including new elements that are related to society and institutional 
developments. In this context, the increase of the European Union’s role in shaping 
institutional dimensions of the European countries, has further contributed in enriching 
the field by creating a new 'branch', namely, EU compliance literature. This area has 
become important in an incremental mode: the more the EU legislation expanded, the 
more focus scholars have given to compliance and implementation in the EU. The 
expansion of research in this direction has had a useful impact for practitioners too, 
because, as has been argued by Knill (2006), ‘from analysing potential implementation 
deficits, it becomes possible to draw conclusions about improving the design of future 
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policies (concerning policy objectives, allocation of resources, structures of 
coordination, control of subordinate administrative agencies)’ (Knill 2006, p. 361). 
In this section I will explain how implementation studies have been used in the EU 
context and the main theoretical works and variables used by scholars. In addition, I will 
look into the role of the EU itself in this process and the specific involvement of its 
institutions in pressuring for effective implementation in non member states. The 
section also explores the domestic responses to compliance and the internal factors that 
influence practical implementation of EU legislation, especially in terms of institutional 
framework, administrative capacities and regulatory approach adopted in a country. The 
last part of the section is more focused on the role of domestic non-state actors in the 
process of compliance and implementation.   
 
2.2.1. Implementing the acquis 
Before looking into the factors and patterns of EU policy implementation, it is necessary 
to discuss and define what compliance with the EU is and, more specifically, what is 
implementation in the context of EU policies. Many times we find ambiguity in this 
area and different concepts are confused, such as transposition, adoption, 
approximation, compliance and implementation. The purpose of this section is to 
distinguish between the different meanings and uses, based on the main debates in the 
literature, and then explain the concept used for this study. 
As Bardach (1977) has explained it in his work, The implementation game, 
'Implementation is a process of assembling the elements required to produce a particular 
programmatic outcome'. With specific reference to EU accession, Bursens (2002) has 
identified four consecutive stages that the implementation of European regulations 
encompasses:  
1. Formal transposition (or adoption) 
2. Practical application (implementation) 
3. Enforcement/control 
4. Outcome/results 
Most of the scholars in the beginning of EU policy implementation studies have focused 
on formal transposition of the acquis. As Grabbe (2006) has pointed out, ‘formal 
alignment with the acquis in legal and institutional terms was the most measurable 
dimension of the accession process, because observers could count how many laws had 
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been rewritten or introduced’ (Grabbe 2006, p. 32). For this reason, implementation is 
often used as synonymous with transposition, but, as Giuliani (2003) argues, this does 
not explain whether we are looking at the legal aspects of incorporating the acquis in 
the national legislation or to the actual achievement of the goals of the original EU 
policy. However, the dichotomy presented by Giuliani is also misleading. He tries to 
depict compliance as ‘achievement of the goals’, which suggests a discussion on the 
outcomes and results of a particular policy, whereas we will see that compliance is the 
in-between stage. 
Cini (2003) makes a distinction, which is useful for this study, between legal 
implementation and practical implementation. She associates legal implementation with 
the formal process of transposition, while, on practical implementation she claims that it 
is about 'ground or street-level implementation, involving direct application of the 
legislation, and not just its translation into domestic law' (Cini 2003, p. 353). In her 
work, Cini has explored further the implementation issue, enriching the debate between 
top-down and bottom-up approaches in the EU context, and by offering a useful 
distinction between three different conceptions: indirect implementation, direct 
implementation, and executive rule making. Although these concepts are mainly 
developed for the EU (member states) context and, therefore, are not directly relevant 
for this study, the conceptual explanations she gives are important for understanding the 
complexity of "multi-level exercises", such as in the case of EU policy making. Cini 
(2003) has pointed out that the complexity of EU directives provides one of the keys to 
understanding implementation, when transposed to national level. Complexity, without 
adequate information and explanation of implementation mechanisms, can lead to 
implementation failure.                                
In relation to complexity, Falkner et al (2005) have also argued that ‘the multitude of 
actors involved at various levels and stages of an EU Directive’s life cycle offer 
numerous possibilities for shortcomings in implementation and application’ (Falkner et 
al 2005, p. 11). It does not relate to only one stage, it is the outcome of a multi-phase 
process, including law-making at domestic level (which may involve adopting new rules 
or adapting existing ones) and control of these laws with regard to their application in 
practice (Falkner 2010). This approach has made Falkner one of the main contributors 
to EU policy implementation studies. She considers the implementation process as 
divided into two major phases: transposition into domestic law, and enforcement, 
encompassing monitoring and application. The second phase needs more attention, 
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since legal transposition is not followed up properly in many cases. More specifically, 
Falkner et al (2005, 2007) have focused their work on the lack, or distortion, of 
compliance, which is an important aspect that explains the deficit. According to Falkner 
et al, non compliance can be due to domestic opposition (intentional non compliance) or 
inability (unintentional non compliance). For the second case, she concludes that the 
main factors that explain non compliance are the different interpretations of the acquis, 
administrative problems and political instability.  
More specifically, Falkner et al (2005; 2007) elaborated an explanatory framework for 
transposition and implementation failures of EU Directives. They argue that non-
transposition can happen due to inertia or stalemate. The first one is linked to two 
issues: inefficient public implementation structure and lack of societal activism. An 
inefficient or paralysed (as Falkner et al call it) public implementation structure can be 
due to general lack of capacities, misunderstanding or misinterpretation of directives, 
administrative overload during the time of transposition, lack of proper monitoring, etc.  
Lack of societal activism of private actors (who are important for pressing for 
successful transposition and implementation) can be linked with lack of capacities of 
these actors or because of lack of access to relevant authorities or structures. This would 
leave them reliant on the national or European courts’ decisions as the only option for 
influencing correct implementation and enforcement of EU directives. 
Falkner et al (2005) point out some minimal requirements that countries need to fulfil in 
order to guarantee proper implementation and enforcement of directives. First, 
coordination and steering capacities are crucial. The number of actors involved, their 
organisational form, hierarchical framework, etc., are important elements that can 
determine the outcome in terms of implementation. The second minimum requirement 
is pressure capacity. On this second element, Falkner et al (2005) focus more on 
resources for pressure and sanctions. The important thing is the probability of non 
compliers being punished and thus the focus is on number of inspections, resources of 
inspectors, fines applied, etc. The third element concerns availability of information. 
Here non-state actors play an important role. They can fill in the information gap for 
citizens, where state actors fail to do so. Implementation is uncertain in countries with 
weaknesses in information provision (Falkner et al 2005).  
Knill (2006) has elaborated further the concept of implementation referring to the 
differences between the stages of compliance with the EU. He distinguishes between 
formal transposition and practical transposition. In formal transposition, the focus of the 
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study is about the legal and administrative provisions of European law into the national 
legal and administrative problem. Thus, this perspective considers more the formal 
adoption of legislation without looking into the implementation. The criteria used for 
studying this process are mainly the timeframe of adoption, completeness of the 
transposition and the correct integration into the regulatory context of the case study 
(Knill 2006). On the other hand, the study of practical transposition, according to Knill 
(2006) tries to reveal and explain the process in the next stage, by focusing on the 
national regulation practice which includes mainly the regulatory style and the study of 
organisational and administrative structures. In this case, other criteria are used for 
exploring the process, such as the correct application in practice and the adherence to 
legal guidelines (Jensen 2007).  
Another important concept which is directly related to compliance is ‘rule adoption’, 
elaborated by Schimmelfennig (2008) Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier (2004, 2005),  
other relevant contributors to this field. What Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier call ‘rule 
adoption’ is also a complex process of transposition of EU law into domestic law, which 
requires the restructuring of domestic institutions according to EU rules or the change of 
domestic political practices according to EU standards (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 
2005). In their work, they analyse main factors that link conditionality and policy 
implementation. 
When arguing about new modes of governance in the EU compliance field, Tanja 
Börzel considers EU policy effectively implemented only when certain conditions are 
met. First, the directive has been incorporated correctly into national legislation, by 
resolving possible clashes with national rules (formal implementation). Second, the 
administrative resources have been provided to meet the policy objectives and to put 
them into practice (practical application). Third, when effective monitoring of 
authorities has been set up (Börzel et al, 2007). 
These different views and conceptualisations of EU policy implementation point to a 
very similar ground in terms of definition. For compliance with the EU, the legal act 
needs to be translated into practical implementation of EU policies and not stop at the 
legislative transposition stage. Therefore, in order to understand and explain 
implementation, it is necessary to explore the phase between formal adoption of EU 
policy into the national legislation, to actual enforcement in practice.  
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2.2.2. The EU’s impact on accession countries’ implementation performance 
In the process of EU integration and compliance of non member countries, the role of 
EU institutions is particularly relevant. Many authors (Epstein and Sedelmeier 2008; 
Featherstone and Radaelli 2003; Grabbe 2001; 2002; 2006; Haughton 2007; Hughes et 
al 2004, 2005; Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2010; Linden 2002; Pridham and Agh 
2001; Schimmelfennig 2008; Trauner 2009; Vachudova 2002; 2005, etc.) have 
elaborated the concept of conditionality and how it operates in exercising pressure for 
change in non member countries. There are several ways in which the EU assists and 
influences in these cases. First, it works by providing models in terms of legislative and 
institutional templates that the country needs to adopt (Aggestam et al 2008; Bagenholm 
2006). Second, the EU provides generous financial aid through its programs, which 
include technical assistance as well. Third, EU institutions have elaborated a well-
structured framework of benchmarking and monitoring of the process in the specific 
country. Other programs include advisory services and twinning projects, which have 
proved to be efficient in previous enlargements. Last, but not least, conditionality is 
exercised by allowing the EC to function as gate keeper for the accession to negotiations 
and the advancement to the later stages towards membership (Grabbe 2005). Related to 
this last point, Mayhew (2000) has argued that "the best way to achieve implementation 
of the acquis in the candidate countries is to give a clear perspective on accession rather 
than the confused messages, which are being sent today. If it is not clear that accession 
is going to take place in the near future, there will be less enthusiasm to implement parts 
of the Community acquis, which are not in the interests of the candidate country while it 
is outside the EU" (Mayhew 2000, p. 11). With the help of these mechanisms, the EU 
Commission has increasingly stressed the need for effective implementation of EU 
policies, not just formal adoption. As Grabbe (2005) has observed: 
“The implementation stage is critical to understanding how the EU 
affected policy and policy-making in CEE: it is the interface between 
domestic and foreign policy, and it determines the impact of 
conditionality. The EU’s influence on detailed policy formation and 
implementation is mediated by domestic actors; determining the 
manner and the extent of this mediation requires empirical enquiry” 
(Grabbe 2005, p. 63). 
Grabbe’s model argued for an expansion of the framework by including the 
implementation phase, moving beyond its current focus and shifting to the phase 
between process and outcome. This shift of the focus towards implementation has 
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brought more detailed attention to technical issues and has raised the awareness on the 
complexity of EU policies and how to simplify the process and assist non member 
countries.  
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005) have enriched this debate on EU influence in 
the policy compliance process by elaborating the models of external incentives and 
lesson drawing. There are different opinions on the direct impact that incentives given 
by the EU have on policy implementation, especially in the different stages of 
accession. However, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier’s model points out the role of 
external incentives as a major driving force towards compliance, when other conditions 
are met (capacities, no veto players, etc.). Andonova (2005), in a paper on 
Europeanisation of environment policy, has developed further Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier’s point and has explored the role of external incentives in adopting and 
implementing environment policies. According to Andonova, especially in the 
accession stage, lesson-drawing attitudes and social learning of the national 
administration play important roles in terms of successful implementation. Following 
this argument, research has shown that the social learning-type impact that EU policy 
mechanisms bring is important in smoothing the accession process and improving the 
efficiency of massive rule adoption in the accession countries (O’Hagan 2004). 
These arguments vary across policy areas. As Toshkov (2008) has explained, sectoral 
differences in transposition lead to asymmetric adaption. Areas of negative integration, 
such as Internal Market, adapt faster to EU rules, whereas areas of positive integration, 
such as environment, lag behind. Transposition of trade directives is considered 
‘negative’ integration because it is about removing existing barriers rather than applying 
a new regulatory regime (Toshkov 2008). This is an important difference, which needs 
to be taken into consideration especially when building the analytical framework and 
research design of a research study. 
Another interesting analysis on how the EU influences compliance in non member 
states has been offered by Börzel (2002). She has conceptualised an ‘EU push and pull’ 
model that can explain the direct and indirect role of the EU in the implementation 
process. Accoding to Börzel, the EU interacts with three different types of actors in a 
non-member country which need coordination: administration, non-state societal actors 
and companies. The EU provides all three groups with legitimacy (by supporting them 
in the public opinion and recognising them), financial and technical assistance 
(available for the groups in different modalities) and twinning programs (which vary 
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between the groups). At the same time, by offering these instruments, the EU influences 
policy implementation indirectly by improving policy makers’ work, through societal 
actors and companies. According to Börzel, apart from what the EU provides for public 
administration, the latter receives services from societal actors and companies as well 
(information, expertise, and legitimacy).    
 
2.2.3. Domestic factors and responses to compliance 
Domestic reaction and adaption to the changes required from transposition and 
implementation process has attracted considerable focus in recent years. Risse and 
Börzel (2003) have discussed possible 'misfits' between European level and domestic 
processes, policies and institutions. They argue that the degree of this misfit is translated 
in adaptation pressures, which is positive for policy compliance. However, certain 
conditions need to be fulfilled in order to have the expected results from adaption 
pressures. There should be appropriate institutions that can facilitate change by 
responding to these pressures. The degree of adaption pressure determines the extent to 
which domestic institutions will have to change in order to comply with transferred 
policy and its rules (Börzel 2002). Consequently, ‘these mediating factors enable or 
prohibit domestic change, and they account for the empirically observable differential 
impact of Europe. Europeanisation might lead to convergence in policy outcomes, but at 
best to clustered convergence, and continuing divergence with regard to policy 
processes and instruments, politics, and polities’ (Risse and Börzel 2003). Confirming 
Risse and Börzel's view, Knill (2006) has concluded that "implementation performance 
of EU policies is not affected by the choice of instruments per se, but by the degree of 
institutional adjustment pressure resulting from EU policies for national arrangements" 
(Knill 2006, p. 364). Knill argues that the degree of institutional change required can 
determine implementation performance. Implementation deficit probability increases 
with the extent to which EU policies require changes in strongly institutionalised 
domestic regulatory styles and structures (Knill 2006). The level of resistance of already 
established structures can influence considerably the implementation process. This is 
why it is important to understand the level of institutional resistance to the domestic 
policy-making actors who struggle to undertake necessary institutional changes.   
In his book “The Europeanisation of National Administrations”, which represents a 
considerable contribution in this area, Knill (2001) has explored the dimensions of 
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administrative change due to EU pressure. In order to understand the direction and the 
degree of domestic change, among other things, he suggests to study the allocation of 
competences. This means that it is necessary to analyse whether, due to EU influence, 
there is more centralisation or decentralisation, and if there is more fragmentation or 
concentration of competences. Knill has linked these patterns in his model, which he 
uses to explain domestic change in public administration. His framework offers 
interesting variables, especially for scholars who are focused on the institutional 
dimension of EU processes. However, he does not provide exhaustive comparative 
evidence that connect the pattern of domestic change to EU conditionality.  
Falkner et al (2005) have also returned to the importance of institutional fit or misfit, 
drawing on Knill’s work to explore the degree of compatibility or incompatibility 
between European policies and national administrative structures and traditions, 
including established interaction patterns between state actors and interest groups. They 
suggest that domestic change of these components is dependent also on the ability and 
flexibility of national institutions and actors to adapt. They debate with previous 
positions of other scholars who believed that, in the context of domestic adaption, 
starting from scratch would facilitate change, adaption and transposition.  Falkner et al 
reject these conclusions, despite the fact that different scholars have reached these 
results. They start by quoting and arguing the idea of Kenneth Hanf (1991), who 
claimed that 'it is easier to implement a directive where no prior statutory rules are in 
place than in the presence of an established legislative system. Implementation is 
facilitated by the fact that governments can begin from scratch. They have more 
troubles in reorganising their established systems to bring them in line with EU 
requirements’ (Falkner et al 2005). Following this argument and borrowing a phrase 
from Fritz Scharpf, it seems that planting new trees should be easier than rearranging 
old forests. However, as Falkner et al point out, the literature offers different 
perspectives on this issue. Therefore it is interesting to explore it in the Albanian case. 
In the discussion about domestic changes from EU pressure and the impact on 
implementation performance, overall there seem to be four areas which are crucial to 
understanding compliance: a) institutional design and coordination of the 
implementation process, b) administrative capacities, c) regulatory framework, and d) 
the role of non-state actors. 
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a) The choice of institutional design in the implementation process plays an important 
role for the outcome of a policy. New democracies had to create and consolidate a 
sustainable set of institutions that creates the framework for political games which 
influence the policy output. Policy output, consequently, is dependent on interaction 
between formal institutional structures and actor constellation in a given regime (Jahn 
and Muller Rommel 2010). The first key word is coordination of the process. Once it is 
decided that a policy is to be transferred, institutional and actor related factors interact 
to shape the process and coordination is crucial (Unalan 2009). We have already 
explained previously about the role of coordination design and patterns in the early 
implementation studies, but, in the context of transposing EU policies, it is necessary to 
review some additional concepts deriving from more recent work. In general, as 
Steunenberg (2006) points out, the current literature on the EU tends to emphasise the 
EU legislative coordination stage in which policy is shaped by the interactions between 
the core European institutions and/or member states. However, such view is not entirely 
accurate because it does not explain how the ambitions formulated in Brussels are then 
implemented in the national administrations (Steunenberg 2006). Especially in terms of 
institutional coordination, policy implementation performance varies according to the 
type of coordination. Dimitrova and Toshkov (2007) claim that there are obvious causal 
mechanisms linking coordination of EU integration processes within the executive and 
compliance with EU law. Falkner et al (2005) also argue that implementation problems 
of EU legislation are often caused by administrative coordination problems, such as lack 
of cooperation between ministries in charge of preparing parts of the legislation. 
Disagreements within inter-ministerial working groups are reported as an obstacle to 
implementation (Falkner et al 2005). 
Coordinating work with EU actors can provide useful technical assistance and expertise 
in EU law to the line ministries. This would also affect the information flows between 
the government and the EU, and between governmental units, since they would adapt to 
the coordination system chosen. A good system of coordination can facilitate settling 
conflicts between different parts of the executive, which is a common pattern in 
accession countries. The consolidation of smooth coordination would bring other 
consequent benefits to the policy implementation process such as improving the focus 
and priority assignment from policy makers and it would also provide monitoring and 
early warning systems for the overall level of implementation within the country. Good 
coordination of EU policy making (between the different institutions involved at 
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domestic and European level) is not a sufficient condition for transposition, but a 
necessary one (Dimitrova and Toshkov 2007). 
Steunenberg (2006) is one of the implementation scholars to have explored the role of 
coordination mechanisms in the EU policy implementation process. He argues that since 
it is normal to have differences in views between the higher level players and between 
the different levels, this might lead to political or administrative deadlock. This is why 
coordination systems are influential to the process. Furthermore, Steunenberg (2006) 
claim that coordination mechanisms allow lower-level players to draft an implementing 
policy, which provides these players with discretion. But the degree of discretion of 
lower-level players is not equal to the degree of discretion provided by the EU directive. 
Lower-level discretion is thus further shaped by national coordination mechanisms, 
going down even to the street level bureaucrats or inspectors. He suggests that if the 
contents of a directive implies the adoption of only one or more ‘lower-level’ 
instruments (such as Ministerial Orders or Government Decrees), transposition could 
take place within the framework of single-player coordination (Steunenberg 2006). This 
is why Steunenberg (2006) and Steunenberg and Toshkov (2009) argue in favour of 
single player and centralised coordination. They point out that single player 
coordination is better capable of adapting a directive to domestic preferences than is 
multi-player coordination. Single player coordination can avoid deadlocks and can 
provide more opportunities for a flexible transposition, which would allow actors to 
adapt the directive to their preferences (Steunenberg 2006). Although their view is very 
interesting, some policy areas need interaction and coordination between different 
actors, thus it is not possible to apply this mechanism to all adopted directives. 
In one of her more recent works, Falkner (2010) stresses the fact that, before EU 
accession, while non member states usually have new domestic coordination structures 
to improve administrative capacities to transpose EU directives and to coordinate 
responses to the European Commission’s units controlling transposition deadlines 
(Dimitrova and Toshkov 2007; Zubek 2005), the same has not been accomplished when 
it comes to institutions in charge of securing the application and enforcement of the 
standards laid down in the law (Falkner 2010). In this sense, policy implementation 
depends on the need of reforming the state institutions in terms of coordination 
resources and organisation. The appropriate institutional design and coordination needs 
to affect all levels of the policy process, from the policy maker to the inspector. 
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b) On the other hand, the second topic, administrative capacities, is a well explored 
variable in the implementation literature and it is considered to be the most influential 
factor for EU policy implementation, especially in post-communist countries. There are 
several works that have argued for the importance of capacities in different settings and 
approaches. Hille and Knill (2006) have concluded that implementation performance is 
mostly affected by administrative capacities and less from other possible variable, such 
as veto players or interest groups. In their findings, they claimed that practical 
implementation is more about bureaucracy than politics. Having a well consolidated and 
stabilised public administration is a major concern when studying implementation 
process in terms of state capacity (Knill 2001). In the case of EU accession, this is 
related mainly to the administrative capacities that are engaged directly with adopting 
and implementing EU policies. In order to face the challenges coming from EU 
integration, the largest share of the burden falls on the public administration and its 
capacities (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005). The administration performance is 
important in all stages of policy adoption, from the transposition, to implementation 
(Thomson, 2009; Toshkov, 2008). This element becomes even more important for the 
Western Balkans despite improvements due to EU assistance. As Fagan (2010) argues, 
state or governmental capacity is still the main factor that explains implementation 
performance. 
For non member states such as Albania, the European Commission constantly points out 
the need for establishing a professional civil service as a crucial requirement for EU 
membership. For this purpose, the EC has developed a guideline on the necessary 
administrative capacities needed in the accession process (EC 2005). The new civil 
systems that have been adopted, in many cases, have not been the results of domestic 
driven reform, but rather the results of EU conditionality (Dimitrova 2002). Dimitrova 
(2002) claims that administrative capacity building under the instructions of the EU may 
not lead to the creation of stable institutions. She argues that this might happen for two 
reasons: first, in the case of administrative capacity the EU does not have a strong and 
coherent model. Second, the institution building process might not succeed because it 
does not include the preferences of domestic political actors, which can not exercise a 
veto as they would in case of member states. And this can prove to be damaging for 
policy implementation because, as Dimitrova (2002) explains further, "experiences with 
implementation in the EU show that actors sometimes try to win back at the 
implementation stage what they lost at the decision-making stage" (p. 186). As 
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Maniokas (2009) argues, when policies are transposed, applied and enforced, it is 
mainly due to a well-functioning administrative system designed for this purpose during 
the pre-accession phase. 
With reference to compliance with the EU, Hille and Knill (2006) claim that 
peculiarities of national bureaucracies play a central role in shaping processes of 
Europeanisation and implementation of EU policies in general. Greater financial 
resources allow a prompter and more comprehensive implementation of policies 
because civil servants, their training, their computers and their offices, cost money. 
Falkner et al (2005) highlight another implementation problem presented by EU policies 
for national administrations: the ambiguous wording of legislative measures. The 
potential lack of clarity and consistency in EU directives makes it difficult for national 
administrations to understand and interpret them. This creates the basis for further 
incomprehension at the lower levels when the policy will be designed and adopted. 
Therefore, the capacity of public administration to understand the complexity of EU 
directives is a relevant factor that influences implementation. 
c) Regulatory patterns and frameworks are also domestic factors that influence 
implementation directly. When an EU directive is adopted, policy makers need to 
design policies to implement its requirements. In this process the regulatory style of the 
administrative and institutional actors might have an important impact on 
implementation. Toshkov (2008) claims that regulatory quality has had positive effect 
on transposition and implementation. The type of regulation acts adopted, their 
coherence and uniformity throughout the public administration, their efficiency, 
potential conflicts with other regulations, need to be explored as they are suggested to 
embed potential explanatory power for understanding EU policy implementation 
performance. 
When discussing domestic change patterns, Knill (2001) has elaborated different 
scenarios for regulatory interventions, which need to be taken into account in the study 
of policy processes. He has built two ideal types of administrative styles: intervening 
and mediating patterns of regulations. The two models differ according to the patterns 
they represent in terms of deductive or inductive style, hierarchical or non hierarchical, 
substantive or procedural, detailed or flexible. The intervening regulatory style presents 
deductive patterns, where regulatory attitude is based on a quasi top down approach, 
where the regulatory approach is preset and somehow adopted from best practices and 
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borrowed models. It is firmly hierarchical, which present clear competences and 
organisation of the process. It is substantive and detailed in its content, leaving no room 
for discretion. By contrast, the mediating model of regulations is characterised by an 
inductive regulatory style, which is an approach that leaves more room for adaption and 
discretion of the actors involved in the process. It is non hierarchical and flexible, which 
permits to solve potential problems emerging in the transposition and practical 
implementation process (Knill 2001).  
Although Knill has provided a useful framework for analysing regulatory patterns, his 
approach relates mostly to institutional change rather than its impact in the EU policy 
implementation process. Therefore, his two types model needs to be revised further and 
related to the influence it might have in policy compliance. Regulatory patterns might 
partly explain implementation performance at the different levels of the policy process. 
As Falkner et al (2005) have suggested in the case of street level bureaucrats, they need 
a more, putting it in Knill’s words, 'flexible regulatory approach' and non hierarchical 
style in order to have not only the necessary resources but also the pressure capacity 
(such as sanctions). However, Falkner et al's conclusions point out that the type of 
regulatory procedure and style is not determinant for the policy implementation process. 
According to her findings, there is little evidence that the regulatory framework chosen 
by national institutions can explain different patterns of compliance. Apart from the fact 
that Falkner et al’s findings are not validated in other studies (Ruhil and Teske 2003), 
her conclusions might not be the same in the case of cross policy analysis. Therefore, 
when looking into single case studies, such as in this project, regulatory framework can 
be relevant.  
d) Last, but not least, an important domestic factor in response to compliance with the 
EU is the role of non-state actors in the implementation process. As mentioned 
previously, the literature of the involvement of non-state actors in the policy process is 
vast and many scholars have provided several variables that connect their activities to 
policy implementation. Interest groups and non-state actors in general play an important 
role in decision making and implementation of European policies. Lampinen and 
Uusikyla (1998) refer to corporatist settings of interest intermediation when elaborating 
further this concept. Neocorporatism considers a cooperative relationship between 
government and non-state actors as necessary for stability and predictability when 
policies are implemented. This arrangement would increase the stability and degree of 
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institutionalisation of policy networks at the national level and set more rigid rules for 
inter-organisational negotiations. Thus it can be assumed that a high degree of 
corporatism can improve the conditions for implementation (Lampinen and Uusikyla 
1998). 
As Knill has observed, "implementation more often implies complex interactions 
between public and private actors and organisations at the national, regional or local 
level, with potentially diverging interests, beliefs and perceptions with regard to the 
underlying policy problem" (Knill 2001, p. 362). Therefore, the bargaining process 
becomes relevant. Jacoby (2005) argues that change can be better explained if we 
analyse the level of openness of the policy-making process in terms of involvement of 
non-state actors and in terms of influences by other international actors. He points out 
that these elements affect the process especially in cases when social-learning 
mechanisms are crucial to the transposition process. 
Interest groups and other non-state actors exert pressure on reluctant public 
administration to fulfil EU requirement (Börzel 2002). They can push for 
implementation. In addition, as Degnbol-Martinussen (1999) claims, when external 
pressure groups are excluded from the policy design and decision making phase, they 
might oppose effective implementation and enforcement, impeding the achievement of 
the policy objective. In this way, governments fail to predict the costs of designing 
policies without consulting stakeholders. Some best practices from other countries have 
suggested the creation of mandatory monitoring committees with interest groups 
representatives for main directives and policies. 
Knill (2001) has contributed to this debate as well. He points out that the dimension of 
administrative style is not only affected by aspects of regulatory intervention which 
define the rules for public/private interaction, but also by institutionalised relationships 
shaping the interaction between administrative and societal actors. Thus it is important 
to study the type of relations that these actors have established with institutions. In this 
perspective, Knill has built a model that depicts patterns of these relations, which he has 
called administrative interest intermediation. It tries to explain the different patterns of 
interaction and relations by exploring whether the type of intermediation is legalistic or 
pragmatic, adverbial or consensual, formal or informal, closed or open, privileged or 
equal access. By analysing these characteristics, it is possible to understand the impact 
that non-state actors can have in the policy implementation process. Of course, as 
explained in the above sections, their influence will also depend on their capacities, 
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coordination and level of expertise. But with specific reference to EU policy 
implementation, the role of non-state actors is very important and needs to be taken into 
account when studying compliance. 
 
2.3 The Albanian case and the contribution of this study 
2.3.1 Literature on EU accession and compliance of Albania 
After the fall of communism and the beginning of democratic transitions in Central and 
Eastern Europe, EU studies literature on the area started to develop rapidly. This 
development was much slower for the Western Balkan countries which represented 
some sort of periphery, mainly due to their instability and conflicts, and therefore, 
literature was much more focused on nationalism, state building, ethnic conflicts, 
minorities, etc. However, since the early 2000’s, this region was included more in EU 
accession and integration works. When considering relevant literature on Albania, it can 
be depicted as the periphery of the periphery, because there is a considerable gap in EU 
accession and implementation studies regarding this country. This makes it very 
difficult to work on the country, but it makes it also interesting and challenging to 
explore it as a case study. 
However, there are some interesting works which offer interesting perspectives of the 
Albanian case (Bianku 2003; Hoffmann 2005; Kellerman 2008; O’Brennan and Gassie 
2009). The most relevant for my study is the research work of Arolda Elbasani (2004; 
2009). Her work is mostly based on domestic change in Albania due to EU pressure and 
the civil service reform. She tries to analyse the effects of enlargement in a challenging 
environment such as Albania, focusing on public administration reform in post-
communist Albania. Diverging from the classic Europeanisation literature, she has used 
the bottom-up approach, by exploring the role of domestic agencies in downloading and 
sometimes mitigating European transfers in the national arena. As Elbasani claims, 
"evidence from the case study shows that governing actors have used EU enlargement 
as a means to further their strategic goals – they have preferred to talk the talk of reform 
in order to reap the benefits associated with EU integration and broader external 
assistance, but also resist implementation of new rules that curtail the political control of 
the state and the ongoing system of spoils built throughout the post-communist 
transition. The EU’s broad thresholds on administrative reform and the weak association 
37 
 
between monitoring of progress and rewards have left ample space for the governing 
actors to merely pay lip service to the EU prescriptions, while getting full control of a 
politicized administration" (Elbasani 2009, p. 14). 
In a previous work, she focused on both the external and domestic factors that 
determine the mechanisms of norm adoption in Albania. She explored external 
conditions and the intervening domestic variables that induce a logic of consequentiality 
or appropriateness in domestic change (Elbasani 2004). Although her work is focused in 
a different direction from my study, it provides some good points of discussion 
especially about public administration reform and the explanations of its capacities. 
Albania still suffers from not having a properly elaborated and implemented civil 
service reform. Studies and reports show that legislation on the civil servants’ status is 
not implemented adequately and there are several cases brought to court for unfair 
termination of contracts due to political interferences (Elbasani 2009). Being constantly 
under pressure and uncertain about the career future, influences the performance of 
public administration officials and policy makers when dealing with the EU challenges. 
The administration performance is important in all stages of policy adoption, from the 
transposition, to implementation. This is why it is crucial to try to understand its 
influence in the whole process. There are only few reports and studies that assess 
Albanian public administration in terms of capacities, mainly EC (2011), Elbasani 
(2009), and few other from Sigma program and the World Bank. Although these studies 
do not offer an explanation of variance between the different sectors of the country, they 
provide an assessment of the general conditions and characteristics of bureaucratic 
administration in Albania. Unfortunately, this is the general extent of existing studies on 
the case of Albania, with very few research academic works and few good reports and 
evaluation papers. This applies even more to the implementation issue. Apart from 
sporadic studies that touch upon the subject (such as Vurmo 2008), most is reduced to 
reporting without exploring in depth the topic. 
 
2.3.2 Contribution of the study 
It is obvious that implementation studies and EU compliance research has developed 
massively in the last decades. Therefore, theory formulation approaches to research 
work face important challenges, since there is an already extensive ground that has been 
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covered. However, this study has few advantages in its attempt to bring something new 
to the field.  
First, the Albanian case is poorly explored. Placing Albania in the map of EU accession 
and implementation literature makes a contribution by filling the gap that exists about 
the country. As mentioned previously, there are few studies which deal with the 
integration process and domestic change in general, or with public administration 
reform. Therefore, the fact that I have adopted a single case strategy by exploring in 
depth the Albanian case, might open new perspectives for further research based on this 
work. By developing this sector based framework, the study can be used for other 
sectors in Albania or other countries similar to Albania.  
Second, although this study aims at exploring some main theoretical propositions that 
have been adopted and used for other countries (as described in Chapter 3), there are 
some particular elements concerning chosen framework and the approach adopted. 
Interaction between actors and the differences in their understanding of the process are 
isolated in the strategy of inquiry in order to grasp as best as possible the role and the 
importance that they have in the process. This choice has the potential to bring new 
insights for implementation studies, especially on factors which might have been 
undermined in past works. 
In addition there are some peculiarities related to the Albanian case. In this work 
implementation theories are applied to a country which has recently gone through 
radical changes from a harsh totalitarian regime to democratic transition. Although there 
are plenty of similarities with other post-communist countries, there are also many 
elements that distinguish it due to isolation and dictatorship. Albania is also interesting 
due to the fact that its population is massively in favour and very enthusiastic about EU 
membership (around 90%). Since some variables used in other cases refer to political 
and population support for EU as explanations for success or failure in implementation, 
in this study those elements are ruled out. Albania is a rare case where there is almost no 
scepticism among the population and non-state actors, and there is no political party 
which does not support EU accession. Thus the case represents a different scenario from 
other studies, since it explores implementation problems in a very favourable 
environment in terms of support and therefore narrows down the observation to few 
variables. In addition, since most of the compliance literature is focused on member 
states of the EU, this work can give contribution by applying those frameworks in more 
challenging environments and drawing some conclusions on the differences. 
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Last, empirical findings that will come out from the gathered information and analysed 
data can bring interesting arguments not only for explaining the Albanian case, but for 
understanding other similar challenging contexts. Especially when exploring differences 
between policy areas, I think that there is room for researching and bringing modest 
contribution to the broader literature. Since the EU compliance field in the context of 
enlargement is affected by continuous change, due to developments inside and outside 
the EU, this study can represent an opportunity for enriching literature and offering a 
research structure for exploring other candidate countries and other policy areas.  
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CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
As described in Chapter 2, the literature on policy implementation is broad and has 
developed several theoretical propositions and has identified many variables. It becomes 
quite a challenge to structure and use them in a specific study. The same applies to 
theories on compliance with EU rules, which is even more specific. It requires a well 
thought-out and elaborated theoretical framework and a research design that can really 
bring an insightful contribution to the area.  
In this chapter I explain the research framework of this study and the methodology used. 
First, the main research question of the study is explained and discussed. According to 
the type of inquiry that the study requires, I explain the research strategy chosen: 
qualitative research. More specifically in terms of strategy, the chapter proceeds with an 
explanation of the case study approach adopted and why it is the most effective strategy 
for understanding in depth the policy implementation process in Albania. A brief 
discussion on the role of the researcher and its implications follows. This part depicts 
the general ground where this study is developed and argues about the appropriate 
approach for exploring the Albanian case. 
As this project requires a research approach that takes into account the multiple 
variables involved in the analytical framework, I explain specifically the variables and 
the theoretical approach used, drawing on the literature review in Chapter 2. In addition 
I discuss how the main theories are used in this study, what are the theoretical 
propositions to be explored in the Albanian case, and what is to be expected in terms of 
results. 
As regards the organisation framework of the inquiry, I explain the main techniques and 
instruments used for the chosen approach and strategy methods. This part is more 
dedicated to the operational framework of the study, the sample policy areas and the 
timeframe of the study are elaborated and discussed thoroughly. I explain the choice of 
the specific sectors and how they will be used for the analytical part of the study.  
The last important part of this chapter concerns the methods used. After explaining the 
methods chosen and their relevance, I describe more specifically each component, 
focusing more extensively on the interviews and analysis process. At the end of the 
chapter, there is a discussion on limits, constraints and ethics considerations for the 
study.  
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3.1 Research framework and strategy adopted 
Considering the vast amount of literature and the specific characteristics of this little 
explored country, this study has adopted a combined theoretical framework and 
approach. Falkner et al (2005) have also used pluri-theoretical approach, by combining 
inductive and deductive reasoning. I have adopted a similar strategy. The study will 
start from a deductive perspective, by deriving a set of theoretical propositions from the 
already discussed literature. These propositions will be explored and analysed in the 
Albanian case and will constitute the core of the analytical part of the thesis. The 
inductive part is linked to the generation of findings and conclusions based on the 
Albanian case, which will be developed as considerations and discussions in relation 
with the already existing literature. 
From the literature, it emerges that the policy design stage and interaction between the 
different actors involved are crucial for implementation. Possible inefficiencies in 
planning and designing the legal act and the policy have a direct impact in the 
implementation stage. This statement is the main theme and core argument in terms of 
the research framework and theoretical position adopted in this study. From here, and 
based on the literature, explanatory factors and theoretical propositions are formulated. 
Thus in order to understand the policy design stage’s impact on implementation, the 
following questions will need to be answered in relation to their influence in the 
process: How is the policy design process developed and coordinated? What is the role 
of non-state actors in the process?  How are street level bureaucrats involved? What is 
the role and impact of EU representatives in the process? Exploring and finding the 
answers to these questions and, more important, analysing how these elements influence 
the policy implementation process is the core part of the analytical framework of the 
study.   
 
3.1.1 The main research question 
As introduced in the Chapter 1, the main scope of this study is to understand and 
explain the implementation challenges that Albania faces in the accession process to the 
EU. Thus the main research question it asks is: Why is Albania experiencing difficulties 
in implementing EU legislation? As EU progress reports show, Albania seems to be 
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performing relatively well in some policy areas and much worse in others. Of course 
there are some clear factors that explain general attitude to compliance. However, they 
fail to give a full and in depth perspective on the process especially across areas.  
Drawing from the concept of policy implementation and compliance, which was 
explained previously in Chapter 2, the dependent variable of the study is practical 
implementation of transposed (EU) legal acts. This means that what I try to explore and 
explain is, first, how the policy design and implementation process is taking place in 
Albania, and, second, why it is experiencing shortcomings which then results in an 
increased implementation deficit. Understanding the reasons of failure/success of final 
application of these legal acts in the Albanian context, by exploring how the process is 
developed and how actors involved interact, is the crucial part of the study. Practical 
implementation is distinguished from the other stages of compliance, such as adoption 
and transposition, and is related to effective implementation of the directives on the 
ground. In order to understand this final stage, it is important to explain the process in 
terms of policy design and institutional interaction.  
Although some areas might reflect good performance in terms of the adoption of EU 
directives, effective implementation is not taking place, as EU Commission points out 
repeatedly in its progress reports on Albania. For this the EU has been able to provide 
measurements, indicators and benchmarking in particular policy areas. Monitoring is a 
key mechanism that the EU uses in accession countries and thus its evaluations of 
policy compliance are very useful for this study. The EC progress report gives regular 
and clear indications of the performance in the different areas, even by "covering 
implementation of individual policies, so they implicitly judged the performance of 
lower-level officials within the ministries" (Grabbe 2005, p. 73). The European 
Commission provides a set of indicators that it uses each year in the Country Progress 
Report, where it provides an analytical framework for quantifying transposition and 
implementation. These indicators have been used largely in other important studies 
(Hille and Knill 2006) and they are considered to be good instruments of monitoring 
and evaluating countries progress. They measure progress in the implementation of each 
directive, by assigning them different levels (such as some progress, good progress or 
no progress). There might be room for debate and discussion about the methodology 
used from the European Commission in assessing these countries and their progress. 
However, since the EU evaluation on directive implementation is considered to be “the 
last word” in determining country’s success or failure in policy compliance and the 
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accession process, EU assessment’s indicators provide a good ground for basic 
reference for the dependent variable: the practical implementation performance. Thus 
when directives are considered for the sample case studies, I trace the process and cycle 
from adoption to implementation (failed or successfully implemented, according to EU 
evaluation and then confirming it through documents and interviews).  
From there, I try to reconstruct the different stages backwards, as it will be explained 
later. The operationalisation of the variable consists in understanding first its status, if 
implemented in practice or not. This is why for the sample fully complied directives 
will be selected (where possible), in order to analyse implementation when the legal act 
has been fully transposed into the Albanian legislation.   
 
3.1.2 The choice for qualitative research 
As the literature review showed, there is a vast amount of works that has studied 
transposition and adoption of legislation across the EU members and other accession 
countries. They adopt mainly comparative approaches and assess quantitatively the 
process of adopting EU legislation in different sectors and countries. According to Cini 
(2003), implementation rates vary across policy areas and therefore it is not easy to 
generalise across countries. Although there are interesting findings on causal 
relationships between adoption performance and contextual factors of the countries, 
cross country comparative studies fail to capture how domestic factors might influence 
the successive step: practical implementation of EU policies. As explained earlier, 
failing to understand and to analyse this stage, not only makes it harder to explain causal 
relations and factors, but also influences directly the other two stages: enforcement and 
outcome of policies. 
The type of approach more appropriate for this study requires is qualitative research and 
its related methods. This project is focused in the exploration of processes and the 
understanding and perceptions of the participants of their activities and the rules that 
govern their work. For this reason it is necessary to adopt a strategy that can help 
exploring in-depth the topic. Therefore, a qualitative research approach is the most 
appropriate. Qualitative research can provide context, understanding, depth, comparison 
and description of a certain process (Burnham et al. 2004). It is suitable for exploring 
people’s subjective experiences and the meaning they attach to them (Marsh and Stoker 
2002). As Silverman (1995) puts it, qualitative research is to say a lot about a little 
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problem. In order to understand implementation, this study is also an attempt to 
document the context and the process, in this case, from documentary analysis and the 
point of view of the participants. It will seek to provide additional explanatory insights 
to explain what drives actors to engage in the policy transfer process, how political 
change in institutional arrangements comes about, how power is structured in 
institutional arrangements, how rationality and power influence the process and how the 
process dynamics shape outcomes (Unalan 2009). As Bryman (2008) points out, in 
order to capture the process, we have to understand the meaning of the process for the 
actors involved. This approach completes the purpose and content of the propositions 
that will be raised and it is more appropriate for understanding in depth the process of 
design and implementation of policies in this case.  
Interaction and communication between the three main groups of participants (see 3.2) 
involved in the study requires an explorative approach based especially in their 
understanding and meaning they give to the specific part of the process such as, 
procedures, institutions, regulations, hierarchies, etc. In this context, it is necessary to 
the study to capture possible distortions that might be present in the process which 
could help explaining trajectories, variances and results in the implementation process 
of the different areas. Understanding policy adoption and implementation in Albania, it 
is not only about written rules and processes, but also how they are perceived, 
interpreted and put in action. And qualitative research offers this opportunity. 
Qualitative inquiries are also well known for being flexible and this is an added value 
for the type of research I am pursuing. They study people in their natural context, 
processes involved and outcomes. From this they try to capture meanings and causes 
(Hammersley 2008). As Cassell and Symon (1994) remind us, qualitative approaches 
are more appropriate when research is focused in organisational processes and trying to 
understand experiences. They seek to describe, decode and come to terms with the 
meaning, not the frequency, of phenomena occurring (Van Maaney in Cassel and 
Symon 1994). Although quantitative research data provide strong basis for correlations 
and sound findings, in order to look in depth and understand and explain the nature of 
processes and interaction between different actors, a qualitative approach is more 
suitable. 
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3.1.3 A case study 
According to Creswell (2007), there are five main approaches to inquiry when dealing 
with qualitative research: Narrative research, Phenomenological research, Grounded 
theory research, Ethnographic research, and Case study research. Considering the 
characteristics of this study, explained above, a case study approach is the most 
appropriate instrument for reaching the objectives proposed. In order to understand in 
depth and explain the process of policy implementation I chose this strategy, because, 
putting it in Yin’s words, “a case study is an empirical enquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin 2009, p. 18). 
This definition describes best the purpose of my research work and brings further 
elements to the process of research design of my study. Since I am studying a process, 
the understanding in-depth of interaction between institution, actors, regulations, etc. is 
a major instrument for explaining implementation and reaching conclusions for the 
Albanian case. The development of an in-depth exploration, description and analysis of 
my case requires a challenging task of choosing and using different methods during the 
field work such as observation, interviews, archives, documents and material analysis. 
When analysing and explaining the different kind of case studies, Yin (2009) argues that 
there are three types of case studies used for research purposes: explanatory or causal 
case studies, descriptive case studies, and exploratory case studies. The research 
question of my study is about understanding and explaining the process of policy 
implementation. In this research, in order to study explanatory factors, which are crucial 
in order to understand why Albania differences in terms of implementation across the 
different policy areas, an explorative approach is as well necessary. Therefore, the study 
assumes and includes elements from both exploratory and explanatory case study. 
The research consists in a single case study, focusing on a cross-sector approach for the 
Albanian implementation process. For this reason, variables which are appropriate for 
cross-country comparison, cannot offer variance and therefore cannot provide 
interesting findings for the purpose of this study. More specifically, with factors such as 
political support and willingness, public support for EU integration process, communist 
legacies, independence from political pressure, cultural factors, etc. there seems to be 
little possibility for exploring and reaching conclusions in terms of differences between 
sectors. Although these variables are very important in explaining implementation 
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patterns of a country compared to other countries, they can give us poor results and 
arguments when comparing between sectors within the same country (Jahn & Muller-
Rommel 2010). These factors cannot explain differences of policy performance in terms 
of failure or success, since it is believed that they work almost in the same direction and 
depth in all sectors.  
The choice for case study strategy requires variables which aim at in-depth exploration. 
Rather than looking to political aspects of implementation, this study requires looking 
into institutions responsible for implementation, coordination and organisational 
capabilities, and involvement of non-state actors. The political factor influences most 
the first stage, formal adoption of the directives or legislation (where there can be 
conflict or veto players). In the case of Albania this factor does not constitute evidence 
for influencing the policy implementation process, since there is an overall strong 
support for all aspects related to EU membership, among all political parties, institutions 
and broader population. Problems are rather related to the quality of the policy adoption 
stage and its impact in implementation. Putting it in terms related to Matland’s model, 
policy ambiguity is a more appropriate explanatory element which, thanks to the case 
study inquiry, will be explored indirectly through analysis of institutional coordination 
and interaction. 
 
3.1.4 The role of the researcher 
In particular for this kind of research approach, the role of the researcher is crucial in 
trying to avoid bias and subjective interpretations. An important part of the study itself 
is about subjective interpretations of individuals at the same stages of the process. 
Findings and conclusions would be unreliable if the researcher’s point of view was 
heavily included in the analysis and in the descriptions of participant’s accounts. There 
are many factors that influence the conduct of social research. Personal beliefs, values 
and feelings of the researcher might influence in different degrees almost all 
components of research: choice of area of study, formulation of research question, 
choice of method, research design, analysis, interpretation of data and conclusions 
(Bryman 2008).  
When analysing and interpreting the data there should be much attention in 
distinguishing between, what Silverman (2004) calls, emic and etic concepts. More 
specifically, there should not be confusion between concepts deriving from the 
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conceptual framework of participants (emic), thus their views and understanding, and 
concepts deriving from researcher’s own framework (etic). As Bryman (2008) puts it, 
methods are not neutral tools. However, this impact can be reduced sensitively by using 
most appropriate techniques and methods, such as a larger sample, in depth exploration, 
double checking and triangulation of information and sources, etc. Most of these are 
included as instrumental part of this study. 
There are some possible advantages and potential disadvantages related to the 
researcher’s role in this specific case. I have been working on topics related to the EU 
integration process in the previous years and in the late stages of the writing process of 
this dissertation. However, before starting the research I had knowledge from outside of 
the practical world of the process, from a broader engagement as a policy researcher. 
This study is focused more on not only exploring the formal aspects of the 
implementation process and related procedures, but also trying to capture policy 
elements in terms of how they are understood and perceived by the involved actors. 
Before this study I had worked mainly through documentary analysis, without having 
inside information on the interaction patterns involved in the process. I think that this 
lack of information in terms of informal aspects of participants’ work will help in 
having less bias from preconceived opinions and will increase the possibilities of 
capturing realities as they happen. Although there is a potential risk for channelizing 
and interpreting accounts according to previous information, I think that through 
methods such as triangulation and through in depth interviews of participants from 
different backgrounds, such risks can be reduced.  
 
3.2 Independent variables and theoretical propositions 
The theoretical framework where the study is based includes elements from the top-
down and bottom-up debate, which aim at giving a more coherent and full picture of the 
policy implementation process in Albania. Drawing from Matland’s experimental model 
and more recent developments in implementation theory, which were explained earlier, 
a set of themes is structured in the analytical framework of the study, in the following 
sections. EU policy implementation and compliance literature findings will also be 
integrated in the variables’ structure, with particular reference to Falkner et al’s work. 
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However, the root of the framework lies within implementation studies, which are then 
adapted and enriched in the case of compliance with EU. 
There are many models and variables in implementation research which are useful for 
this study. From administrative capacities, to political stability, to level of directives’ 
ambiguity and discretion, deadline of transposition, number of ongoing transposition 
processes in a ministry’s unit, number of transposition actors or agencies, involvement 
of interest groups, all these elements affect the nature of policy making and 
implementation (Kaeding 2008). Most of the variables have been used for cross-country 
comparative analysis and therefore will not be considered sufficient as part of the 
research design in this study, but only for descriptive purposes when writing about the 
context. In order to study cross-sectoral implementation patterns, drawing from the 
theoretical ground of authors reviewed in previous chapter, I have identified three main  
themes that can be translated into variables that influence, which might shape and 
explain EU policy implementation in Albania. Therefore, the independent variables of 
the study are: domestic institutional capacities, the degree of involvement of non-state 
actors in the process, and the nature of cooperation with EU institutions (Falkner et al 
2005; Grabbe 2005; Knill 2001; Ruhil and Teske 2003; Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier 2005;).  
Each of these independent variables has a specific impact on the implementation 
process and, consequently, on the level of practical implementation. They also provide a 
good interaction between top-down and bottom-up models, and Matland’s model. From 
a preliminary overview of the Albanian case, they seem to offer interesting explanation 
and variance across the different sectors. With reference to the above explained 
framework, what follows is an explanation of each of these factors and the consequent 
theoretical propositions are formulated. Theoretical propositions are largely used in case 
study research, in order to explore and explain a particular research problem. As Yin 
(2009) suggests, in order 'to have a sufficient blueprint for your study, theoretical 
propositions are needed. These can be considered as a story about why acts, events, 
structure, and thoughts occur' (Yin 2009, p. 36). 
There are of course different strategies for developing a case study. In this research 
project I rely on the use of theoretical propositions. As suggested by different authors 
and well formulated by Yin (2009), an effective way for exploring case studies and 
explaining processes is through making initial theoretical statements (theoretical 
propositions) which derive from literature and then explore your case in those directions 
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in order to reach and compare findings that can give explanations. What follows is an 
explanation of the three variables and the consequent propositions based on theoretical 
works explored in this area. 
 
a) Institutional capacities. According to a considerable chunk of the literature, 
administrative capacities, in general, have the most reliable explanatory power for EU 
policy implementation performance and process. The impact of administrative 
capacities will be investigated in the implementation process of specific areas and 
directives in Albania. Exploring some important aspects related to capacities might also 
help in explaining variance between sectors. In this context, the concept of strength of 
bureaucracy elaborated by Falkner et al (2005) can bring some useful suggestions. The 
way in which this variable will be operationalised and studied is depicted below.   
As it emerged from the literature review, coordination and institutional organisation of 
the process of adopting and complying with EU directives is one of the most important 
aspects that influences implementation (Kassim et al. 2000; De la Rosa 2005; Wolczuk 
2009). Central coordination is crucial to the process but also agency based 
implementation arguments have found validation (Steunenberg 2006).  In addition, 
institutionalisation and a clear division of competences and dispute settlement 
procedures, play an important positive role for the implementation process. This 
includes the role of street level bureaucrats as well, in terms of formalised interaction 
with the centre. It emphasises the need for unified rules and procedures concerning 
administrative practices but also the regulatory approach adopted. From this point of 
view, Albania suffers from a poor consolidated regulatory pattern which is unstable and 
heterogeneous between institutions. In the context of EU compliance and the 
complexity of EU directives, the literature suggested that the capacity of desk officers
4
 
to understand properly EU legislation and have a common interpretation of them, 
affects directly the policy design process and, thus, the implementation stage. This will 
be another explored element in order to understand its impact in implementation. 
As we could elaborate from Knill (2001) and other authors, the degree of institutional 
resistance to policy and administrative change can determine the path of implementation 
process. In this perspective, we discussed the debate on new institutions versus old ones 
and how different authors have diverging conclusions on the impact of this 
                                                 
4
 Desk officer refers to a policy maker in a specific department in public institutions. 
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characteristic in implementation. This will be analysed in the Albanian case, in different 
policy areas and sectors. On the basis of this discussion and focusing on the factors 
which have been extracted by theories and previous studies on implementation, the 
following proposition has been formulated: 
TP1: High centralisation of coordination and clear division of 
competences in the EU acquis adoption process improve implementation 
performance. 
This proposition, which has been derived from previous theoretical work and findings 
from other countries, will be explored in the Albanian case. Analysis of data gathered 
can bring interesting findings and conclusions which can contribute to broader 
discussions in the relevant theoretical field. 
 
b) The role of non-state actors. As emerged from the literature review, non-state actors 
constitute an important part of the implementation process. Involving local 
organisations and actors in developing agendas might be a very good instrument in 
order to increase efficiency and legitimacy of the decisions taken and adopted agenda. 
Implementation practices and strategies need to be discussed with experts and different 
actors in order to avoid making the wrong choices which would affect implementation 
(Borghetto and Franchino 2010). Including non-state actors in early stages of policy 
formulation might become a source of success for implementation. Not only would this 
improve the level of information and expertise necessary for formulating policies, but it 
would have an impact on the credibility of the implemented directive. This is relatively 
easy in countries with high degree of corporatism. For this reason they neglect the 
formulation stage and deal mainly with the implementation phase and consequences 
(when it’s ‘too late’, in the case of other countries such as Albania). When interest 
groups are not involved in the formulation process, they might attempt to influence the 
practical implementation stage (by resisting it).  
However, this depends also on the capacities of these groups (Falkner et al 2005). The 
organisational and coordination capacities of non-state actors influences their effective 
participation in the policy design stage and thus in implementation. In the case of 
Albania, interest groups, in general, are poorly organised, with low efficiency in terms 
of articulating properly their interests and advocating to the relevant institutions. In 
addition, there is often conflict and division between different organisations which 
operate in the same field or sector. They rarely have regular and active membership. 
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Exploring this element in different policy areas might give interesting data in terms of 
its influence in implementation, since it affects their substantial participation.  
With the information that non-state actors possess from the field and with a more direct 
knowledge of problems, they can give direct contribution in improving the policy 
content for an effective implementation. This will also depend on two other factors: 
their technical capacities and practical involvement in the process. Interaction between 
desk officers and non-state actors has intensified from the 2000’s in Albania. However, 
there is a distinction between formal involvement and real participation. Different 
institutional forums and councils have been set up in order to provide access for non-
state actors to have their say, but the nature of interaction differs in the different cases. It 
is interesting to notice that, in contrast to the literature on other countries, preliminary 
research work on Albania suggests that in some cases even formal involvement is 
important, in terms of broadening participation and improving the legitimacy of the 
decision making process, sharing information and easing the implementation stage 
(decreasing resistance). However, this will be explored in the selected policy areas. For 
the purpose of analysing in depth these elements and their role, the relevant theoretical 
proposition is formulated as follows: 
TP2. Lack of substantive involvement of non-state actors in the policy 
design process negatively affects the policy design and implementation 
process. 
This theoretical proposition summarises effectively the discussion described in the 
literature, which was reported in Chapter 2. Exploring these factors in the Albanian case 
might give interesting perspectives, especially when comparing different policy areas. 
Conclusions will then be integrated in the broader discussion on theoretical review of 
the above statements in the final chapter. 
 
c) The role of EU officials involved in the process. EU institutional actors play also an 
important role in the design of the implementation process. Organisation work and 
coordination with EU officials remain crucial elements, according to many authors 
(Dahl 2007; Dimitrova and Toshkov 2007; etc.). Enhancing communication between the 
government and the European Union representatives is another matter of coordination 
which can be considered an important factor for implementation performance. The 
research aims to explore how specific conditions and requests from the country are 
taken into consideration from EU officials, how much they interact with the 
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counterparts when they elaborate the strategies (Kohler-Koch 2003) and, most 
important, how this affects implementation of adopted EU legal acts. Many of the 
assistance and planning mechanisms provided by the EU fail to succeed just because 
they are designed at their headquarters in Brussels and applied to a variety of local 
settings (Elezi 2013). The background and the specific conditions can determine the 
performance of complying with Europe (Giuliani 2005). This can be avoided through 
increasing communication and coordination between Albanian policy makers and EU 
officials of the respective desks, and through more direct involvement on the ground. 
The involvement of EU officials in specific projects or in the policy process is 
considered as a positive form of pressure towards institutional actors at all levels, since 
monitoring and evaluating is supposed to be more rigorous. Working closer with 
Albanian policy makers helps in coordinating work and improving their understanding 
of the process. Rather than ‘ticking boxes’, a more pro active approach of EU officers in 
assisting the Albanian counterpart might avoid problems that might be transmitted from 
the policy design stage to implementation. 
This also relates to the understanding of EU actors of the institutional set up and nature 
of the process in Albania. Coordination with Albanian structures in terms of decisions 
on adoption and approximation is also important: the need for an understanding of the 
specific context of the country and its requirements. The ability and capacity of EU 
officials, who cover Albania, to grasp the situation and the problems of the country 
might affect the nature and content of the contribution and assistance they provide. In 
addition, this capacity can also influence domestic policy agenda of the candidate 
country, in terms of priority rankings among policy areas and measures. The perceived 
importance that EU actors attribute to a policy intervention might influence the design 
and implementation stage of that policy. Additionally, this might help in filling the gap 
in their knowledge of the country and thus ameliorate the successive programming of 
EU projects. The following theoretical proposition will be explored in the Albanian 
case: 
TP3. Implementation is more likely to succeed when EU actors are        
directly involved in assisting and monitoring the transposition process. 
This third element concerning explanation of policy adoption and implementation in 
Albania aims at giving a more comprehensive picture of the process, by including the 
role of EU as a dynamic actor that can influence implementation directly. This aspect 
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has not been developed largely in the literature and it becomes quite important when 
researched in challenging contexts such as post-communist Albania.  
The theoretical propositions formulated constitute a structured approach which serves 
different purposes. First, since most of these explanatory factors have been used 
successfully in previous case studies for other countries, they will help in exploring the 
Albanian process in depth. By including in the picture different aspects and actors 
involved, the outcome expected will be an interesting account and explanation of 
shortcomings related to policy adoption and implementation. This approach will give a 
more comprehensive view of the process and will identify problems and patterns within 
the process. 
As regarding the specific propositions raised, there is no doubt that the biggest element 
in terms of research and exploration concerns the first proposition: institutional 
capacities in coordinating the process with clear division of competences. Public 
administration is directly responsible for implementation of EU legal acts and related 
policies and thus main influencing factors rely within its organisation, coordination and 
functioning. From preliminary observations, before starting the actual data gathering, I 
expected to find that the low level of centralisation in organising the process has some 
impact in the process. Since most of the process is ‘top-down’, centralisation would 
appear to be an effective approach for smooth adoption and implementation of EU 
policies. However, this would require a proper analysis based in empirical facts and 
appropriate data gathered on the ground. The same applies to the level of uniformity 
among competences and procedures within public administration. From an institutional 
point of view, "speaking the same language" should help for better coordination among 
institutions and affect directly the quality of legislation adopted and its implementation 
provisions. As regarding the discussion about "old versus new" institutions, I think there 
might be interesting findings in the case of Albania. Although there have been previous 
studies in other countries arguing strongly in favour of one or the other (in terms of the 
efficiency of implementing EU legal acts), there is no in-depth research yet in Albania 
since several new institutions have been in place only for a few years. Thus this study is 
a good opportunity for enriching the literature with its findings on this issue, specifically 
for Albania, but drawing conclusions for contributing to the broader area of study as 
well. 
In relation to the second factor (on the role of non-state actors), I think that the 
exploration of this proposition will generate interesting findings in the Albanian case. 
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Effective participation of non-state actors is seen as an important instrument for 
ensuring implementation of policies. However, this will depend on their capacities but 
also on the institutional opportunities given them by state actors, for ensuring their 
effective and substantive participation. What would be an added value on this part is the 
more inductive approach which might generate additional discussions that can lead to 
further research. This work will also be a good opportunity for better understanding the 
‘world’ of non-state actors in Albania, their perceptions and interaction with public 
institutions in general. 
The last proposition concerns the role of the European Commission itself in adoption of 
implementation of the acquis in the country. As with the previous propositions, this is 
poorly explored in the case of Albania. Although other studies have been able to look 
into the EU’s role from a critical point of view, this research aims at exploring EU 
actors’ impact on the ground, with specific focus on implementation. The specific 
proposition raised is based on a mix of elements coming from the literature but also on 
preliminary work done on Albania. I expect that exploration of this proposition might 
generate more discussion than the previous ones and will require a more in depth 
analysis. However, I think this will be overcome during the fieldwork where methods 
used will provide a comprehensive approach for exploring this element. 
Finally, apart from exploring the abovementioned propositions, the study results will 
also help in understanding the whole process better and in identifying gaps in the 
coordination system, based also on interaction between the different groups of actors 
(state officers, non-state actors, EU representatives, etc.). Since this interaction is 
becoming more intensive in this stage of the process, the results expected would bring it 
to light in a more detailed account and will help for building further research projects. 
 
3.3 Approach and design of inquiry 
The design of this research project involves three main components: practical 
implementation (dependent variable), factors, actors and procedures that influence this 
process (independent variables and theoretical propositions), applicative sample for 
exploring propositions (selected sectors and directives). The first two have already been 
explained previously and the sample will discussed in the next section. However, before 
discussing the sample, it is important to clarify the way this research inquiry is 
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organised with the aim of exploring the process as accurately as possible and producing 
valuable data, findings and conclusions.  
 
3.3.1 Strategy and organisation of the inquiry 
The research inquiry of this study is driven by a two levels approach. The first tries to 
explore the process based on documentary data checked against accounts of participants 
who are asked about their understanding and their work within the process. Thus, after 
looking into the broader formal description of the process of adoption of the acquis 
(Chapter 4), this will be triangulated with participants’ experience and practical 
interpretation on the ground. The second level or layer is related to the specific cases 
used as samples, thus specific policy areas and selected adopted directives. Not only 
will the the propositions be explored for each of the transposed policies chosen in the 
sample, but participants’ accounts based on reconstructing the process and tracing it 
through the different stages will help in exploring interaction between actors, their 
understanding and how it impacts the outcome of the policy process.  
By exploring the four chosen policy areas which will be described in the sample below, 
the study will seek to analyse the role of independent variables in the implementation 
process and explore the theoretical positions linked to them, first, in general for the area 
and, then, more specifically for the respective policy. There are two main inquiry 
methods used for achieving information necessary for explaining implementation: 
process tracing and triangulation. Despite the fact that they are often called “methods”, 
in reality they are more considered and used as research techniques and instruments for 
inquiry.  
As explained above, process tracing will be used for rebuilding the process as it happens 
in reality between the different actors and policy areas. As Falkner et al (2005) suggest, 
process tracing of implementation history is one of the most appropriate tools developed 
in the case of EU accession. Through a descriptive and analytical approach, the study 
will try to build a map of the process from formal adoption to (practical) 
implementation. This strategy will be followed in parallel, by triangulating the formal 
and procedural point of view, and the accounts and perceptions captured through the 
interviews. The process of tracing the origin of the implementation problem should start 
at the top, asking how policies are designed. As we know, transposition and 
implementation of each EU policy adopted is assigned to a responsible Albanian 
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institution. This institution plans, prepares, adopts and implements necessary measures 
required from that legislative act. Reconstructing this path of institutional decisions and 
legislative processes only helps to identify a tracing approach, without assessing the 
process qualitatively at this stage, but rather by trying to understand if there is a 
standardised line of procedures and practices that Albanian authorities apply from 
adoption to full implementation. For each of policies (directive), the same set of 
variables influencing the process will be explored, grasping variance (Herieter 2007) 
and understanding the impact of the variables in each of the areas. 
Triangulation is more related to ‘double-checking’ information given by the different 
actors involved in the process and their interaction patterns, in order to explore its 
impact in the policy design and implementation stage. The triangulation strategy is used 
for exploring differences and variances in understanding and meaning that the three 
different groups of participants give to the same process (Parsons 2005). As Yin (2009) 
points out, multiple sources of evidence are needed in case study research in order to 
construct validity. While rebuilding the process through their accounts in the interviews, 
a cross check and analysis for the answers on the same questions will be developed. The 
possible and potential differences that might occur will be an important part of the 
analysis and conclusions chapters. Triangulation of data is very important in case 
studies and in qualitative research in general. It helps to achieve convergence of 
evidence (Yin 2009) and thus discover facts that explain processes. In this study 
triangulation plays an important role in explaining patterns of the policy design process 
and interaction between different institutional actors, which then can explain 
implementation performance.  
The diagram below (Figure 1) shows the interaction framework built as part of the 
research design and which constitutes the main research map of institutional interaction 
for the study framework. The study will explore patterns and nature of interaction 
between institutions’ representatives within the process, in order to understand the role 
of the selected variables and explain how policy design and implementation is affected 
by them. In addition, grasping the variance between policy areas might give important 
information than can be used to further elaborate the theoretical propositions used.  
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Figure 1 Institutional interaction framework of the policy process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Policy makers are in the centre of this interaction flow. They are the main actors in 
charge of designing policies to be adopted and thus they constitute an important focus of 
the study. Their role is crucial to the design and implementation process. By using a 
broad set of methods (see 3.4), coordination and interaction patterns in the diagram will 
be explored and their impact in implementation will be analysed. Exploring propositions 
for the different areas will also mean looking into specific case studies (EU legal acts 
adopted) which have been traced and explored for the entire adoption and 
implementation cycle. This will help to explore in depth the area and to identify 
potential elements influencing implementation (beyond the factors embedded in the 
propositions), as well as consolidating the findings and final conclusions of the study. 
 
3.3.2 The policy areas 
EU integration and accession process affects almost every sector within each country. 
The acquis communautaire covers most of policy areas and is divided into chapters, 
according to what EU legislation deals with. For the case of accession countries, the 
acquis is structured in 35 chapters. Compliance with the relevant acquis is monitored 
through the SAA structures and, as already explained, the EU Commission which 
publishes the Progress Report for evaluating progress and performance in the different 
areas. In terms of EU policy compliance, implementation effectiveness varies across 
EU officials Ministry of EU integration 
        Policy makers/ Desk officers 
Street level bureaucrats             Non-state actors 
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policy sectors (Knill 2006). For the purpose of this study four main policy areas (acquis 
chapters) have been selected as sample. They represent important sectors in the process 
of complying with EU policies and encompass considerable extent of EU legal acts. The 
selected areas are: free movement of goods (Chapter 1), competition policy (Chapter 8), 
food safety (Chapter 12) and environment (Chapter 27). There are several reasons for 
selecting these policy areas: 
First, these areas represent some of the most important parts of the acquis. They include 
a large number of directives or regulations
5
 where technical difficulties and capacities 
for adoption and implementation are present more than in others. They are also 
interrelated and cross cutting at some degree, thus they do not represent completely 
different set up and scenarios (otherwise they might be other difficulties on comparing 
and drawing conclusions).  
Second, some of these areas have been identified by the EC reports as main challenges 
for Albanian institutions in their compliance efforts with EU legislation. They are a 
crucial part of the SAA and the relevant national plan for implementing the agreement 
and thus it is of broader interest for different audiences (not just academic) to 
understand challenges faced in these sectors. The number of citizens and organisations 
which are directly affected by decisions taken in these areas is large and thus exploring 
the integration and legislation approximation process is important even in terms of 
general interest about country’s European path.  
Third, referring to the research design of the study, these chapters offer a good 
opportunity for exploring all propositions in an exhaustive way. They represent different 
institutional legacies and background history, with a mixture of new and old 
institutions. Areas such as free movement of goods and competition policy are new, 
since they were not developed, institutionally, until 25 years ago when the communist 
regime collapsed. By contrast,  environment and agriculture were very much present but 
with a different institutional set up compared with today (there are old institutions still 
in place but also new ones approved and established in recent years). Thus these latter 
sectors have some older institutions with a strong organisational background, large 
number of employees and with firm ties to previous practises and legacies.  
In addition, legislation in these areas is not adopted and implemented only by central 
institutions such as line ministries, but we can find related implementation and 
                                                 
5
 In the area of Competition regulations are issued and not directives. 
59 
 
enforcement agencies with street level bureaucrats and inspectors, which make the 
sample appropriate for exploring the propositions and generating interesting findings 
and conclusions, by grasping implementation variance according to agency organisation 
characteristics. 
Patterns, procedures, rules and interaction in institutions in each of the areas will be 
explored from an implementation inquiry perspective.  The aim of this part is to identify 
variance between coordination methods, processes, regulations, procedures and 
perceptions that rule in each administrative branch in these four sectors. Moreover, the 
way in which each section interacts with the Ministry of European Integration, non-state 
actors, street level bureaucrats and EU officials, when designing policies for 
implementing EU policies, will constitute an important part of the in-depth exploration. 
These differences are part of the explanatory framework for the dependent variables and 
will be explored in the main propositions. As mentioned earlier, the study will go 
further in depth and, by using process tracing method it will explain and analyse the 
implementation process of legislation in these policy areas, based on specific directives 
or legislation adopted. The aim of this part is to further explore the patterns of the 
process and capture elements from real cases. The transposed directives chosen for each 
area will be explained in the design section of each analytical chapter. 
 
3.3.3 Timeframe used for the study 
There have been several agendas and strategies throughout the years in terms of 
complying with EU requirement and it is not a purpose of this study to explore all of 
them. First of all, it would be very difficult to analyse all these periods, not only for the 
quantity of research and amount of work that it requires, but also because they differ 
considerably from each other. Those stages were developed in different political and 
economic contexts, especially when we compare the first period (1992 – 1997) with the 
late 2000s. Second, in some areas Albania has been engaged with the EU much later 
and thus it would be quite difficult to draw conclusions for compliance and 
implementation in general.  
The timeframe used for this study will focus will be in the years 2006 – 2011
6
. In 2006 
the Stabilisation and Association Agreement was signed between Albania and the EU. 
                                                 
6
 There is one exception to the timeframe concerning the selected directive on Environment which was 
transposed with two stages in 2011 and 2012. 
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The Stabilisation and Association Agreement marked a qualitative new stage in bilateral 
relations of Albania with the EU, entailing significant new obligations and engagement 
for the country in many areas. In most cases cooperation has focused mainly on 
priorities related to the EU acquis in the relevant fields, with Albania committing to 
gradually introduce EU acquis in its legislation, to implement related policies and to 
cooperate with the EU on joint policy objectives (Council of the EU 2006a; 2006b). 
This agreement has also offered a clear path and roadmap for Albania, by describing 
specific objectives and timeframes for adoption. Five years from the entry in force of 
the agreement, Albania had maintained a good pace in the process of adopting EU 
policies and aligning its legislation to EU directives. However, the country had not 
recorded a satisfying performance in terms of proper implementation of directives, in 
some of the main policy areas (EC 2011; 2012). Reports that monitor and evaluate the 
situation every year claim that the implementation stage has been the weak point of 
Albanian performance toward EU membership. 
The reason why this period is most appropriate for this study consists in the fact that, in 
this timeframe, adoption of EU legal acts has been intensive. In 2007 Albania 
elaborated and adopted the National Plan for Implementation of the SAA where all legal 
acts to be transposed were planned. Thus it offers a clear mapping of the adoption 
process and a sound basis for starting research. Before that, there were only few sectors 
included in the bilateral projects and in the previous agreement of 1992 (which did not 
focus on acquis transposition). The SAA includes all chapters of the acquis and the 
country is required to demonstrate progress in all areas. Therefore, it is more 
appropriate methodologically and much easier to reach sound conclusions about 
implementation patterns.  
For explaining implementation performance, in several reports, the finger has been 
pointed mostly to the increase of administrative capacities required for facing the 
challenges deriving from the SAA and acquis adoption. When responding to Albania’s 
application in 2011, the Commission had to give arguments on its position by 
identifying in detail the problematic areas for implementation. This is also useful for 
this study. Therefore, this timeframe provides an appropriate period for exploring 
theories and relevant propositions, since it constitutes the only period when 
transposition and implementation have been planned and happening in a programmatic 
way. 
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3.4 Methods 
Due to the research design and framework of the study, different qualitative methods are 
used for exploring in depth the case. The main are: documentary analysis, participant 
observation and interviews. The data gathering is also based on extensive notes taken 
during 10 months of fieldwork.  
Documents were related to institutions’ strategies for EU integration, action plans, EU 
Commission progress reports, regulations concerning the sample fields and directives, 
internal procedures of institutions, communication notes between involved actors, 
working group meeting’s proceedings. The purpose was to observe and study how 
information and regulations were adopted and applied from one stage to the other. The 
principal sources were mainly internal documents in the Ministries, communication 
papers between the ministries and the Ministry of European Integration, agendas and 
schedules of meeting with interest groups. Other sources were mainly related to official 
public documents, such as strategies, action plans, meeting proceedings, surveys, etc. 
Other studied documents were research papers, books, and reports which were 
published relating to the specific sectors. The documentary analysis stage was the first 
part of fieldwork. In order to research and explore in depth the process of 
implementation and the role of actors involved, it was necessary to be informed as much 
as possible on the background information of the sectors, institutional structures, their 
legal interrelation, procedures, etc. Although documents were an important part of 
analysing the process formally, they do not ‘speak for themselves’ too much and, 
therefore, cannot fully explain relations and context but can only acquire meaning 
according to research strategy and methodological assumptions (Burnham et. al 2004). I 
used documentary analysis for capturing the formalities of the process, in order to 
compare and complement the interview and observation data.    
Participant observation is a well known method used in qualitative research. It consists 
in the participation of the main researcher in the working place or the environment 
where the studied process is taking place. For this purpose I participated in several 
meetings that policy makers have held with interest groups between 2011 and 2012. 
This technique has been defined as “a process in which an investigator establishes a 
many-sided relationship with a human association in its natural setting for the purpose 
of developing a scientific understanding of that association” (Loftland in Burnham et al 
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2004, p. 222). During his/her involvement the researcher observes and records 
interaction of people in that context. The result is a detailed description of the activities 
and patterns that those involved have manifested. This method is rather complex and 
requires a long term commitment in studying the participants. As Silverman (1995) 
argues about the observation method, one of the strengths of observational research is 
its ability to shift focus as interesting new data becomes available. However, I chose to 
use it as a complementary technique to the interviews rather than as the main method. 
More specifically, due to the fact that the categories of interviewees present different 
accounts and understanding of the process, it was interesting and useful to see the “live 
show”, which were the meetings held between policy makers and interest groups. 
Taking notes on particular aspects of those roundtables such as, interaction, behaviour, 
perceptions, formalities, outcome, etc. would enrich the understanding, interpretation 
and accountability of the interviews. It would complement the analysis of interviews 
with more in depth information and observation. 
I did not assume the role of "full participant" (Burnham et. al 2004), which requires 
playing an active role in the context, but only engaged as an observer. Therefore, I 
participated in their activities but was not involved or integrated in the discussions (even 
when I was asked for an opinion). Permission to observe and take notes was asked to all 
participants. In case this was not possible, I used official proceedings and tried to write 
down what I could remember right after the sessions.  
The limitations of this technique, especially in the way used for my research, is related 
to the fact that the observant cannot capture everything and, if based in partial 
observations, can reach inaccurate conclusions. This method requires a long term 
application in order to produce reliable data and sound findings. In addition, the sample 
was not sufficient. I participated in about only two meetings for each of the sectors. This 
is why the material collected from this method would not be used as main source for 
analysis but rather complement the interviews simply in a descriptive way.  
Interviews are often considered to be the most effective way for obtaining in-depth 
information about policy makers and decision making processes. Semi-structured 
interviews with open-ended questions were prepared for this study. The content of the 
questions reflected the explorative approach bases on the propositions that the projects 
aim to understand in the Albanian case. Before starting the scheduled plan of fieldwork, 
first of all, I set up a pilot stage in order to test the chosen strategy of inquiry and the 
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planned methods in the Albanian context. I used initial findings and observations from 
these preliminary interviews for improving my research strategy and refining the open-
ended questions on the topics to cover and how to explore them.  
Designing and conducting the interviews were two of the most important stages 
regarding fieldwork. The choice to conduct a non-standardised form of interview was 
based on the intention to grasp the interviewees’ attitudes and interpretation of the 
process without constraining them by a standardised set of formal and fully structured 
questions. The interviews were semi structured also in order to permit the participant to 
feel free to express his/her points of view, perceptions, understanding, without any 
constraint in terms of following a precise interview schedule. It is assumed that face-to-
face and individual interviews would provide more valuable, first-hand data that will 
supplement the data collected through assessment of the written records (Creswell 
2007). A carefully selected set of questions was prepared. The questions were 
unstructured, open-ended, i.e. without provided alternative answers, so that the 
interviewees would have a full freedom to answer the question in their own words 
(Bryman 2008). The open ended questions would also create the conditions for a fluid 
conversation, stimulating the in depth exploration of the topic. The content of interviews 
followed the topics that could be extracted from the sub variables of the study. Indirect 
questions related to these elements were included in the interview. Follow-up questions 
were used as a technique whenever the participant deviated from the question and did 
not give sufficient information about the particular section.  
The group of participants
7
 included: policy makers and street level bureaucrats, non-
state actors, EU officials, experts and academics
8
. They all went through the same 
sample of questions, except for the part on the directive where each participant had to 
respond to its own area. Following a general introduction, the interview would then aim 
to explore the work context of the participant, their perceptions of the process, 
responsibilities, etc. After rebuilding and tracing the policy process according to their 
knowledge and understanding, the interview would continue on a more specific issue, 
such as the implementation of a chosen policy. The participants were asked to explain 
the process of designing and implementing that particular policy, and give their 
                                                 
7
 For a full list of interviewed participants please refer to Appendix 1. 
8
 It is important to notice that the information and the opinions received from this last group were not 
included in the analysis chapter as part of the methodology. They were used mainly for double checking 
information, testing the strength of research strategy and collecting suggestions and information from 
outside the ‘triangle system’ (policy makers, non-state actors, EU officials). 
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interpretation of its success/failure and related causes. In this part, participants were also 
asked about their interaction, cooperation and coordination with other institutions 
involved in the implementation process. Rather than having information only on the 
formal aspects of the process, this part tried also to explore in depth the understanding 
of coordination and involvement of other actors. It strived to capture the description of 
the specific process for the chosen policy, in terms of interaction with other interested 
parties.  
Interviews took place in Tirana and in Brussels. Most of them were set in participants’ 
offices and few in public places (such as coffee places, bars, etc.) All interviews were 
recorded, with participant’s permission. Apart from few first round interviews, all the 
others were transcribed.   
Regarding the analysis of data, the interviews were transcribed fully in the original 
language
9
. They were then cross referenced in two different approaches: by institution 
and by position (role). This would help when triangulating and analysing data. Before 
starting the analysis, an overall coding framework was set up in order to facilitate 
matching the patterns registered in the interviews.  
Pattern matching technique was very helpful for associating concepts to actions and 
processes. Yin (2009) has discussed the characteristics of this technique and its uses, 
mainly related to explanatory case studies.  He suggests that if the case study is 
explanatory, the patterns should be related to the dependent or independent variables 
used in the inquiry. Each variable was considered a pattern and the technique of pattern 
matching compares an empirically based pattern (a fact, an event, a rule) with a 
predicted one (in this case it is the result or outcome of the activity related to the policy 
process). The next step of analysis was building the explanation for each of the cases. 
Explanation building is a particular type of pattern matching (Yin 2009). It helps to 
explore further the case study and, most important, to answer the questions of how and 
why something happens. Exploring propositions in the data analysis stage was closely 
related to the repeating of patterns and ideas in the interviews, which would be 
associated with the main explanatory factors/variables. Data was sorted by theme and 
concept and summarised through thematic patterns (Ritchie, Spencer and O’Connor 
2003). These data were used first for exploring preliminary findings and later for 
building the explanation model for the Albanian case, by identifying patterns which 
                                                 
9
 Most of interviews were in Albanian. Only the ones held with EU representatives were in English. 
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matched. Using these frameworks, I developed descriptive accounts and tried to build 
explanatory arguments by looking for patterns and associations, as is usually done in 
these types of inquiries (Ritchie and Spencer 1994). 
The use of this method of analysis facilitated the grasping of participants’ understanding 
and perception of the different aspects of the process. The matched patterns were then 
grouped in categories and checked/triangulated first within the same institution, then 
with patterns of other actors involved, and in the end between policy areas for the final 
conclusions.  The results of the patterns matched and the differences between the 
different participants were used in building explanations regarding the process and its 
outcome, as factors influencing implementation. This reduced error possibilities or 
neglecting important findings. Analysis of the patterns explored helped also in 
expanding further the section on the interpretation of the findings, where the analysis of 
variance between sectors and the elaboration of final conclusions followed. 
 
3.5 Constraints and Limitations 
As in most research projects, there are several limitations and obstacles that can 
jeopardise its effective implementation. In my study there were three kinds of 
constraints and limitations. First, an important limitation was the lack of research 
literature on Albania. Due to its particular isolation and specific patterns, Albania has 
not been very appealing to researchers and there are relatively few works in the 
academic field. This constraint influenced the way I designed the structure of the study. 
For the theoretical background and literature, I referred mainly to studies done on other 
countries and tried to apply them in the case of Albania. By itself, this probably might 
be considered a contribution in the literature, but it represented various difficulties in 
terms of formulating assumptions. It was difficult to build propositions and positions 
with the assumptions based on other cases. I tried to limit the risks from these effects, 
by developing a preliminary stage of fieldwork and a pilot case study. However, this 
represented one of the constraints of this research work. 
A second limitation was related to the kind of research design I pursued and 
implications in terms of fieldwork. I had to undertake a relatively long period of 
fieldwork. This implied almost full immersion in the ground and distance from the desk 
study. The number of participants chosen for the sample and the long in-depth 
interviews (which have lasted an average of around 65 minutes, from 28 minutes the 
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shortest to 105 minutes the longest) made fieldwork and data collection quite a difficult 
task. I had to travel three times in Brussels, since it was very difficult to plan agendas 
with EU officers and, sometimes, some of them would become unavailable 
unexpectedly. In Albania I did a second round of interviews with some of the 
participants. Fieldwork constraints have extended the period of fieldwork and this might 
have limited my capacity to include all relevant information since more than a year had 
passed once I started writing the thesis. I tried to record as many details as possible, but 
this might be a limitation related to the data gathered and how it has been used. 
 Last, as regarding the access to sources, I experienced some initial difficulties in 
finding reports and documents related to public administration activities. Although 
some main documents can be found on official websites of institutions, because most of 
Albanian institutions have developed online platforms for informing the public and 
increasing transparency, internal regulations and minutes of meetings were difficult to 
find. Both formal and informal channels of communications were used, but at the 
beginning of fieldwork this appeared to be a constraint. However, the interview process 
and the 'snowball effect' helped in reducing the risks coming from access restriction and 
provided me with sufficient documentation for building a solid analysis. 
 
3.6 Ethics considerations 
For this research, I went through approval procedures at the Research Ethics Committee 
at the University of Sussex. The most delicate part was about the interviews and the role 
of the participants. For this purpose I prepared an information sheet for all participants, 
where my research was explained. The reasons why and how they were chosen for this 
study were also stated in the sheet. Especially for policy makers (who were the largest 
part of the sample) it was explained that since their job deals with implementing EU 
policies and directives, the information that they could provide would have been very 
useful for the study. Taking part to the research was entirely voluntary. It was up to the 
contacted persons to decide whether or not to take part. Once they decided to take part 
they would be given the information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a consent form. 
If they decided to take part, they were of course free to withdraw at any time and 
without giving a reason (fortunately, this didn’t happen). They were informed that the 
interview would consist in a set of open-ended questions concerning the sector covered 
by their office and, more specifically, the implementation process.  
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In terms of confidentiality, in the information sheet it was stated that all the information 
collected from them was be kept strictly confidential. The recordings and the notes from 
the interview were kept and stored in a secure place, without any reference to their 
names, in full respect to confidentiality and privacy legislation. Anonymity was ensured 
in the collection, storage and publication of research material. If they decided to 
participate, they needed to sign a consent form for this purpose. More than half of 
participants required to maintain anonymity and not to be quoted by name. The 
recordings are stored only in two devices and with secure key codes, as required in these 
cases. The transcriptions are named by codes which correspond to other identifying 
codes and not names.  
There were two aspects related to the most sensitive in terms of ethics and 
confidentiality. First, there were the interviews in specific areas, such as public 
undertakings in the competition policy. Since it is a very political sensitive matter, in 
some interviews or parts of interviews, participants asked not to be recorded. They also 
preferred not to be quoted directly. The same happened with all street level bureaucrats. 
The second issue was related to the participant observation method. As explained in the 
method section, I used this technique in few cases and it proved to be very interesting 
and helpful for my study. Since I was invited as many other persons to these meetings, I 
only explained them about my research and did not request any signature for the consent 
form: first, because I was not recording them, but just taking notes. And second, 
because I would not use the information gathered there for my main data analysis but 
rather for improving my research design and interview structure. Overall, the study did 
not present major ethical issues. 
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CHAPTER 4 INSTITUTIONAL ORGANISATION OF THE PROCESS 
The European integration process of Albania is institutionally organised following the 
SAA provisions and commitments. The objective of the agreement is to establish 
political and economic stability in Albania, strengthen institutions and the rule of law. 
The SAA comprises four main pillars: political dialogue, establishment of a free trade 
area, mutual concessions concerning the movement of workers, establishment, supply of 
services, current payments and movement of capital, and cooperation in priority areas 
such as justice and home affairs (Council of the EU 2006a). The SAA between Albania 
and the EU was signed in June 2006 and entered into force in 2009. This document is 
the main and most important framework for the EU integration of Albania and it still 
guides the whole process. Signing and entry into force of the SAA represented the most 
important milestone for the process, setting up a well-structured framework which 
would guide the country towards membership. 
This chapter explains and analyses the institutional set-up of Albania for the process of 
EU integration, specifically for the adoption and implementation of EU law. It starts 
with a description of the institutional impact that the SAA had in the country and the 
framework built for implementing it. The EU-Albania bilateral structures created to lead 
and manage the process will be explained.  
The chapter then deals more specifically with the main Albanian institutions involved 
directly in the European integration process and their respective roles. It focuses mostly 
on the Ministry of European Integration (MEI) as the main actor in charge for 
coordinating the process. Together with the European Integration Units in each line 
ministry, the functioning of the Ministry of European Integration offers important 
information for understanding implementation of the acquis in Albania. 
After completing the institutional map in terms of explaining the responsibilities of 
actors involved, the chapter focuses on another crucial aspect regarding the 
institutionalisation of the process: inter-institutional coordination. This section aims at 
explaining the framework that has been set up in Albania for ensuring a smooth 
interaction and cooperation between the different institutions involved. This is 
important not only for having a clear picture of all the actors and capacities, but it is also 
necessary for the next sections and chapters, in order to understand the transposition and 
implementation process. 
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After explaining the institutional map of the process, the chapter describes the formal 
process of the acquis approximation and implementation, by tracing the legal adoption 
of legislation and describing the procedures and the process step by step.  
 
4.1 Institutional framework developments under the SAA 
The SAA has been the most important milestone of Albania in its path towards EU 
membership. Since the early 2000s main efforts of Albanian institutions were 
concentrated in preparing and undertaking all necessary measures for the negotiations of 
the agreement and, when these were concluded, for the signing the SAA. Probably the 
most important institutional development related to this preparatory period is the 
establishment of the Ministry of European Integration in 2004. There have been 
different coordination solutions among post-communist countries which have been part 
of the EU integration and accession process. However, having a separate ministry 
dealing specifically with the coordination of this process in a horizontal way has not 
been a common case. Most of other countries have adopted an office or secretariat 
directly under the Prime Minister’s office (Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, 
Macedonia, etc.) or a joint Ministry of European and Foreign Affairs (later in Croatia, 
Montenegro, etc.). In order to give the process full support and the right status, the 
establishment of a specific Ministry for European Integration seemed the right choice in 
2004, while negotiations for signing the SAA were ongoing (Bushati 2011). The choice 
of setting up the ministry implied the establishment of a central coordination with the 
need for adequate capacities and the necessary political leverage and pressure to be 
exercised in its interaction with other ministries. In the section about the Ministry of 
European Integration, a more detailed explanation of its work and its role in 
coordinating the process will be given later in this chapter.  
Figure 2 Main bilateral structures EU-Albania under the SAA 
The Stabilisation and Association Council 
 
The Stabilisation and Association Committee 
 
The Stabilisation and Association Subcommittees 
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In terms of bilateral structures EU-Albania, which were set up after the SAA entered 
into force, a new framework was engaged in the process. With the purpose of helping 
smooth implementation of the SAA and its proper monitoring, the structure of 
cooperation was composed by three levels (as described in figure 2). 
The first level is the Stabilisation and Association Council. This is the highest political 
forum that covers the SAA political issues between Albania and the EU. The Council 
monitors the implementation of the SAA and, since the political dialogue takes place in 
the Council, it discusses any major or sensitive issue that might come up as a result of 
the SAA provisions. More specifically, quoting from the SAA: 
“The Stabilisation and Association Council established under Article 116 
shall regularly review the application of this Agreement and the 
accomplishment by Albania of legal, administrative, institutional and 
economic reforms in the light of the Preamble and in accordance with the 
general principles laid down in this Agreement”  
(Council of the EU 2006a, p. 12). 
The SA Council has the power to take decisions within the scope of the agreement. The 
decisions of the Council are binding for the parties (Council of the EU 2006). In the SA 
Council we find members of the Council of the EU and the EC on one side 
(representing the EU) and members of the Albanian government from the other side. 
The Council meets once a year and it is chaired on a rotation basis for each year: one 
year it is chaired by a representative of the Council of the EU (by Foreign Minister of 
the member state holding the Presidency of the Council of the EU at that moment) and 
the year after by the representative of the Albanian government. From the Albanian 
side, the Minister of Foreign Affairs is the chair and the responsible institution for 
representing Albania in the Council. Other members of Albanian delegation included in 
this format are usually the ministers of European Integration, Justice and Interior, as 
well as chairman of Parliamentary Commission of European Integration. 
The second level is the Stabilisation and Association Committee. The purpose of the SA 
Committee is to assist the SA Council in its duties on the implementation of the SAA. 
The Stabilisation and Association Council can delegate any of its powers and duties to 
the Stabilisation and Association Committee. As foreseen in article 210 of the SAA, 
which set up the Committee, its composition includes representatives of the Council of 
the European Union and of representatives of the EC, on one side, and of 
representatives of Albania on the other. The SAA Committee is chaired by the Minister 
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of European Integration, on the Albanian side. It gathers once each year, usually few 
weeks before the SA Council meeting since one of its tasks is also the preparation of the 
Council meetings. The meetings of the Committee are an important forum where an 
overall assessment of the implementation of the SAA and its provisions take place, by 
reviewing all main areas covered. The representatives of the Albanian authorities 
present the progress made and there are follow-up discussions and recommendations 
from the EU side. 
The third level of the bilateral institutional framework that ensures the implementation 
of the SAA is related to article 121 of the agreement which provides that “the 
Stabilisation and Association Committee may create subcommittees” (Council of the 
EU 2006a). The Agreement had foreseen that before the end of the first year, after the 
date of entry into force, the Stabilisation and Association Committee needed to set up 
the necessary subcommittees for the adequate implementation of the SAA. These 
operational structures would gather once a year and discuss more in detail all relevant 
issues divided into policy areas. The subcommittees are seven, organised by policy 
areas. The yearly meetings of the subcommittees serve the purpose of presenting in 
detail progress achieved from Albanian institutions each year and for ensuring the 
implementation of the SAA and the commitments undertaken. The EU representatives 
use this forum for assessing the ongoing of the SAA and for giving recommendation of 
the successive year. Subcommittees are co-chaired by the Deputy Minister of European 
Integration of Albania and representatives of the EU Commission. Participants are 
representatives of the Albanian line ministries and institutions at the technical level, 
from one side, and persons in charge for the respective areas in the EU Commission on 
the other side.  
These three bilateral structures are responsible for ensuring and monitoring the 
implementation of the SAA between Albania and the European Union. The SAA 
foresees that this arrangement will be operational in two stages. The first one is of five 
years from the entry into force of the agreement (which means by 2014). During the 
fifth year, the SAA Council should evaluate the progress made by Albania and decide 
whether to continue with the second stage of association (Council of the EU 2006a).   
Apart from the above institutional set-up, another format created by the SAA regards 
cooperation between the Albanian parliament and EU parliament. The agreement 
establishes a Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee (SAPC). This 
platform is “a forum for Members of the Albanian Parliament and the European 
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Parliament to meet and exchange views” (Council of the EU 2006a, p. 122). Although 
the frequency of meetings of this committee was not foreseen in the agreement, in the 
last years it has gathered twice a year. Political dialogue takes place in the Stabilisation 
and Association Parliamentary Committee, where members of the European Parliament, 
on the one hand, and of members of the Parliament of Albania, on the other, meet in 
order to discuss most important issues in the European Integration agenda of Albania. 
The Committee is chaired in turn by the European Parliament and the Parliament of 
Albania. Although this forum was conceived as a political platform for improving 
political dialogue and strengthening consensus around reforms needed, in the last years 
it has been used as a political arena for harsh debates and accusations among Albanian 
political parties. This has been heavily influenced by domestic political agendas in 
Albania, which, sometimes, simply transfers to the SAPC in the European Parliament, 
affecting these meetings. However, the committee is a useful opportunity for sharing 
views and recommendations which makes it easier for Albanian representatives to be 
closer to EU developments and their counterparts in the EU Parliament.  
 
4.2 Albanian institutions involved in the process 
The transposition and implementation process in Albania goes through two main 
institutions: the Government and the Parliament. In the government, the Ministry of 
European Integration, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the European Integration 
Units of each ministry, share the respective load of work. However, since the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs has a more political role, in bilateral structures, as explained above, it 
will not be discussed in the thesis. Domestic coordination and organisation of the 
process belongs mainly to MEI and EIUs, and therefore, they will be the main focus in 
the next section. 
As regarding the Parliament, it has of course an important role in the adoption of 
legislation for approximating with the acquis. The Law No. 9252 “On the work of [the 
Parliamentary] Assembly in the integration process of the Republic of Albania to the 
European Union” (8 July 2004) sets out its role in the process as being responsible for 
compiling a complete legal framework, and supporting and monitoring the process of 
approximation of Albanian law with the European Union. The monitoring takes place 
through a formal procedure already established in the above mentioned law.  
The law provides that the Albanian Council of Ministers submits information regularly 
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to the Assembly on the work done regarding the European integration process, 
especially in relation to the SAA. In addition, the Albanian Council of Ministers 
consults first with the Assembly concerning the positions it will hold at the various 
institutions of the European Union.  
More specifically, the Parliamentary Commission of European Integration is crucial to 
the process. According to the Law No. 9252 “On the work of [the Parliamentary] 
Assembly in the integration process of the Republic of Albania to the European Union”, 
this Commission is considered the main actor of consultations for the Council of 
Ministers when taking up positions with various EU institutions. Such consultations are 
mandatory for the Government especially if such positions require the involvement of 
the Albanian Parliamentary Assembly. The Commission is the leading structure in all 
aspects of parliamentary involvement in Albania’s European integration efforts and 
their oversight, including, most importantly, legal approximation.  Cooperation between 
the Ministry of European Integration and the Commission, especially in the process of 
law harmonisation, is very important for ensuring the compliance of the legislation with 
the acquis in particular.  
Although the work of the Parliament is important in this process, most of the acquis is 
approximated through Council of Ministers Decisions (CMD) or Ministerial Orders 
(MO), without going through the Parliament. Therefore, the institutional focus of the 
thesis is the government and other implementing agencies. 
 
4.2.1 The Ministry of European Integration 
As introduced at the beginning of this chapter, the Ministry of European Integration is 
probably the most important institution, playing a leading role in the coordination of the 
EU integration process. The ministry was established in 2004, with Council of Ministers 
Decision no. 580. As the general Albanian institutional framework for the integration 
process, the ministry has also developed and changed during the years.  
In terms of responsibilities, the Ministry of European Integration provides a more 
technical direction and coordination of the process of integration of Albania in the 
European Union. The ministry is responsible for monitoring and advancing the 
approximation of the national legislation with EU acquis. It uses several instruments for 
this, but most important is the National Plan for the Implementation of the SAA. This 
plan is elaborated by the Albanian government under the coordination of the ministry, 
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and it indicates the steps and timeline for fulfilling SAA commitments and 
approximation of acquis for each chapter. The ministry is also responsible for 
coordinating the work and monitoring all Albanian institutions for the proper 
implementation of the commitments taken under the SAA framework. Thus, it not only 
coordinates and assists institutions in drawing up strategic documents and national 
programmes, but it also monitors their implementation.  
Checking compatibility with EU acquis of all legislation drafted by Albanian 
institutions is another responsibility that the above mentioned Decision of the Council 
of Ministers has delegated to the Ministry of European Integration. The ministry ensures 
and checks the compliance of normative acts issued by the government with EU acquis. 
It is foreseen that most draft and proposed laws need to go through the ministry for its 
opinion before going to the Council of Ministers or the Parliament for approval. In 
addition, the ministry prepares and organises training on reporting and monitoring of the 
acquis transposition, based on the national plans which derive again from the SAA. In 
addition, the ministry is in charge of reviewing most of reports that line ministries need 
to send to the EU institutions and is also in charge of coordinating financial assistance 
that EU provides for the country.  
Overall, MEI is responsible for all horizontal functions and coordination of the process. 
Apart from the SA Council (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), the ministry co-chairs with 
EU Commission the bilateral institutional framework regarding the SAA 
implementation. To sum up, it sets the policy of European integration and it is 
responsible for monitoring and reporting the progress, the planning of legal 
approximation and compliance checking, translating the EU acquis into Albanian, 
coordinating the EU assistance and informing the public about the process. 
As regarding its structure and capacities, MEI has a total of 75 staff (only 65 in place 
in 2012), of which 12 are political-level appointments. An additional 17 are support 
staff (administration) and 26 are sector desk officers and coordinators. The structure of 
the Ministry has been built and formatted according to the main activities which it 
coordinates. The ministry has undergone twice a restructuring reform, trying to adapt to 
the different stages of the process. As in other ministries, apart from the leading 
positions, its main core is constituted by the directorates. Directorates are composed of 
operative units which are organised by areas (called ‘sectors’ or units). The ministry has 
six of directorates: 
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− Directorate for Justice and Home Affairs 
− Directorate for Internal Market 
− Directorate of the European Secretariat 
− Directorate for the Translation of the acquis 
− Directorate for Institutional Support (financial support) 
− Directorate for Internal Services. 
The present directorates are designed according to the needs deriving from the SAA. 
More specifically, the Directorate for Justice and Home Affairs has a total of 5 persons 
(including the director) and comprises two units: one covering the judiciary system and 
human rights, and the other covering justice, freedom and security. Most of the staff has 
received several training sessions, but only three of them have an adequate background 
according to the position they cover. Apart from ‘daily business’, its level of efficiency 
has also been tested in different occasions, such as the preparation of the roadmap for 
the visa liberalisation regime and the preparation for the 12 key priorities set by the EU 
Commission in order to recommend the candidate status for Albania. The new approach 
adopted by the EU for the accession of the Western Balkan countries implies that 
negotiations should open with chapters 23 and 24 of the acquis. This once again puts the 
units covering the rule of law issues in a difficult position, where capacities and 
resources need to be adequate. 
The second important Directorate is the one which covers Internal market (basically all 
other sectors and policy areas, including the ones that are part of this research). After 
the signing of the SAA, this directorate was composed by the following three units: 
− Economic, Financial, Customs and Markets 
− Competition, Industry and Social Policies 
− Agriculture, Environment, Fisheries, Transport and Energy 
With a total of 14 persons, this is the biggest directorate and it covers coordination for 
most of the issues related to the SAA and the other processes. The mission and objective 
of this directorate is to orient and coordinate policies and legal measures regarding 
internal market, towards approximation with EU law. It coordinates and offers technical 
support to all other institutional and working groups who are engaged with the EU 
integration process. The directorate identifies the obligations and commitments deriving 
from the SAA, from the Progress Report and other recommendations and monitors their 
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implementation by the line ministries and relevant institutions. Since most of the acquis 
and the areas covered by the SAA fall under the competence of this directorate, it is 
responsible for organising and coordinating the joint meetings with the EU under the 
SAA (SAA committee and subcommittees).  
Apart from the directorate for institutional support (which deals with financial support), 
and the directorate for Internal Services, the remaining two, as explained below, are also 
directly involved in the coordination process. The third one, the European Secretariat 
Unit, has a crucial role in horizontal coordination with line ministries and other 
institutions. This directorate covers main organisation needs within the ministry and acts 
as liaison with the EU Commission as well. It prepares also the important bilateral 
meetings and arrangements for all events related to EU integration process. In addition, 
the IT sector under the secretariat is in charge of databases regarding the integration 
process, including the important one on the allocation of the acquis in each line ministry 
and institution. The last relevant directorate concerning the integration process is the 
Directorate for the Translation of the acquis. This unit has faced several problems in 
terms of efficiency and performance due to its low capacities and unclear competences. 
During the last three years the whole directorate has translated a maximum of 440 
acquis pages per year and linguistically revised only a few more. As one of the 
interviewed desk officers of MEI claims, the ministry tried to seek external help with 
the translation (through outsourcing) but due to lack of financial resources the call failed 
two years in a row (2012). As a result, even one of the MEI main documents, the last 
versions of the National Plan for the Implementation of the SAA (NPISAA) exists only 
in Albanian language, making it very difficult to monitor and study by people who do 
not understand Albanian.  
There is a widespread perception and opinion that MEI does not have the political 
power and leverage necessary to guide the process. Sometimes the ministry is perceived 
as a public relation/translation/communication office, rather than a national coordinator 
of the process10. As one of MEI officers argues, this often causes delays in daily 
processes, especially when there is a need to respect deadlines for reporting. MEI staff 
manage to solve these obstacles by establishing personal relations with their 
counterparts in line ministries. The latter perceive MEI requests as ‘extra work’ and thus 
                                                 
10
 This sentence is a representative extract of opinions expressed by at least 8 civil servants interviewed in 
line ministries. The others would maintain an official position claiming the high importance of MEI and 
its role. 
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they are not keen on putting them at the top of daily work priorities. This has often 
required the direct intervention of the Minister of European Integration, especially for 
important parts of the process, such as the questionnaire for the membership application. 
as a MEI director recalls. 
However, the role of the MEI does not actually seem to be an issue in the agenda of 
politicians, of experts and high level officials in Albania (Bushati 2012). There have not 
been any debates in Albania so far on the possibility of radically changing the 
coordination system11. Although the choice is entirely up to the Albanian authorities, the 
EU representatives12 in Albania share as well the view that the present system is 
appropriate for the country (stressing the necessity for strengthening MEI and 
restructuring it from time to time) at this stage. After the analytical chapters that follow 
and the empirical findings, I will come back to this issue in the Conclusions’ chapter. 
For now, this discussion provides an overview of the role of the Ministry of European 
Integration in the process. 
 
4.2.2 The European Integration Units 
The European Integration Units (EIUs) or Directorates of EU integration within line 
ministries have the responsibility to coordinate and monitor implementation of the 
obligations arising from the SAA, including transposition and implementation of the EU 
acquis in Albania in their respective policy areas. They were established by Council of 
Ministers Decision No. 179 of 22.02.2006 (On the establishment of European 
Integration Units in line ministries). In terms of functions and competences, the 
European Integration Units are responsible for internal institutional coordination in the 
respective ministry and coordination with MEI and other ministries. More specifically, 
the units are in charge of ensuring a direct connection and coordination of the 
institution’s work with the Ministry of European Integration and other line ministries, in 
the framework of commitments undertaken under the Stabilisation and Association 
process. The same type of work is done by the units regarding the process of 
approximation of national legislation to acquis communautaire and for reporting 
                                                 
11
 No major studies or reports were found (apart from a not published draft paper by Agenda Institute in 
2006 where it was argued for a more centralised body under the Prime Minister’s office, which should be 
in charge of the process). 
12
 Three interviewees in the EU Delegation in Albania expressed their thoughts about the coordination set 
up. 
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regulations that are aligned to it. The units coordinate the preparation of reports for the 
European integration process, since they act as secretariats for the inter-institutional 
working group which covers areas under their responsibility. 
Performance of the units in the process of legislative harmonisation with EU acquis 
(planning, drafting and compliance checking) varies widely. Due to lack of capacities 
and resources, most of the units do not deliver in the above mentioned tasks. For this 
reason, overall, the harmonisation function remains at a rather early stage, 
understanding of it is still limited and performance of the law harmonisation function 
varies. EIUs are rarely involved in legal drafting though they might participate in 
working groups formed within a ministry for this purpose in the medium-term, 
providing advice on the acquis as well as helping in preparation of the concordance 
tables (through checking their quality). The units’ capacities in understanding the acquis 
and participation in law drafting groups is an important element that can contribute to 
the outcome of the product and the coordination of the process.  
As assessed by reviewing the legislation and from the interviews with officers from the 
units of four different ministries of the sample, the monitoring function is at an early 
stage as well. The units do not have a formal right to monitor work of other directorates 
or departments. In addition, there are no provisions for involving the units in translation 
processes in order to help sector directorates. There is poor capacity in drafting 
harmonised legislation and of coordinating revision of translated and linguistically 
revised pieces of the acquis. As a result, there is poor quality of materials and reports 
sent to MEI, which is also confirmed by MEI officers. 
As regards the structure of the units, the decision of the Council of Ministers does not 
determine the type of structure or the number of employees. It leaves it up to the 
ministries, according to the needs of each institution. However, it specifies that they 
should not comprise less than three employees
13
. Directorates usually are composed of 
two sectors, one supporting the EU integration director, and the other sector 
coordinating other European integration activities such as planning of legal 
approximation, monitoring, reporting and preparing for SAA subcommittee meetings. 
The low number of staff and capacities within the units was put to the test during the 
work for answering the questionnaire of the European Commission about Albania’s 
application for EU membership. Despite the fact that the Council of Ministers’ decision 
                                                 
13
 An updated full list of number of employees in each EIU by ministry can be found in Appendix 2. 
79 
 
of 2006 was revised in 2009 by improving the functionality of the units, and despite the 
fact that the number of people employed was increased (from around 50 people before 
2009 to almost 100), the low level of performance has been a constant issue which was 
reported especially by MEI officers during the interviews. 
As regards the capacities and background of people employed in the units, due also to 
the role that units have been assigned in practice, they rarely act like experts on 
European integration. They coordinate more the reporting and other activities, without 
having a role in the content of the work produced (Shytaj 2012). This is solely a 
responsibility of policy directorates. Another interesting fact is the academic 
background of people working in the units. From the data gathered from the Department 
of Public Administration, only 14% are lawyers and 31 % come from natural sciences. 
This is due to a problem with the annex of the Council of Ministers’ decision which 
does not declare a mandatory field of study for the candidates
14
. The same approach 
applies to the English language requirements of the people employed in the units. Lack 
of language skills affects the quality of law approximation. These obstacles makes 
monitoring functions more difficult and it weakens the ability to coordinate and enforce 
deadlines within ministries which appears to be a major problem in most ministries. 
 
4.3 Inter-institutional Coordination 
Coordination between the different institutions is key to the European integration 
process in general and to the adoption and implementation of the acquis. For this 
reason, it is important to explain and analyse inter-institutional structures that are in 
charge of the process, their role and performance. Institutional and inter-institutional EU 
integration coordinating structures in Albania are established and operational. Inter-
ministerial co-ordination in integration matters is based on a multi-level structure of 
committees and working groups. The existing structure was defined by the order of the 
Prime Minister No. 46, date 01.04.2009, “On the establishment, composition and 
functioning of the inter-ministerial coordination structures, for implementing the 
commitments undertaken under the Stabilisation and Association Agreement”. Inter-
institutional coordination of the process of European Integration in Albania is built upon 
three levels: 
                                                 
14
 It actually states “Law or Economics are preferable” and “a Master in European Studies would 
constitute an advantage”. Therefore it leaves room for hiring even people who do not fulfil the above.  
80 
 
 
     Figure 3 Inter-institutional coordination framework in Albania 
The Inter-ministerial Committee for European Integration 
(Chair: Prime Minister - Members: Ministers) 
 
 
The Inter-institutional Coordinating Committee for European Integration 
(Chair: Minister of European Integration - Members: Deputy Ministers) 
 
 
The Inter-institutional Groups for European Integration 
(Chair: Deputy Ministers - Members: policy makers) 
 
a) The Inter-ministerial Committee for European Integration (ICEI) is the political level 
format for coordinating the European integration process between Albanian institutions. 
Its establishment happened in the same year of the entry into force of the SAA (2009) 
which aimed not only at facing the new challenges ahead with a proper coordination 
framework, but also for giving a strong political signal about the importance that the 
process has for Albania. With the help of the other lower level platforms, its role is to 
lead, monitor and coordinate the implementation of commitments undertaken under the 
Stabilisation and Association Agreement, at political and administrative level. ICEI is 
responsible for leading and approving general policies and the EU integration policy. Its 
decision making nature helps also for policy coordination for the implementation of 
obligations arising from the Stabilisation and Association Agreement and from other 
strategic documents, for the European integration process. 
The ICEI is chaired by the Prime Minister, or in his absence, by the Minister of 
European Integration. Its members are all ministers. Apart from these permanent 
members, the committee can invite senior officials and representatives of line ministries 
and other central institutions to its meetings according to the agenda of the topics 
discussed.  
b) The Inter-institutional Coordinating Committee for European Integration (ICCEI) is 
chaired by the Minister of European Integration and consists of representatives of line 
ministries at the level of deputy minister and secretary general, and of representatives 
from institutions under the Prime Minister and ministers, at director general level. This 
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format is very important because it connects the political level to the more operational 
one and it is supposed to give solutions to problems emerging in terms of coordination. 
More broadly, ICCEI is responsible for the monitoring and coordination of obligations 
under the Stabilisation and Association Agreement and strategic documents, for the 
European integration process. ICCEI reports to ICEI on all main activities regarding the 
EU integration process; 
ICCEI is the leading institutional framework for annually updating the National Plan for 
the Implementation of the SAA and it is responsible for the validation and finalisation 
of documents and reports prepared for the meetings of the Stabilisation and Association 
Committee (where it represents Albania) and subcommittees. It is supposed also to 
assess financial and institutional implications of the SAA implementation and of law 
approximation with acquis communautaire. 
c) The Inter-institutional Working Groups for European Integration (IWGEI) constitute 
the technical and operational level of the coordination framework. They were set up 
with an order of the Prime Minister, on the occasion of the questionnaire that Albanian 
authorities needed to reply to after the application for membership. Each group is 
responsible for one chapter of the acquis and the allocation of institutional 
responsibilities per each chapter of EU acquis is determined by the Ministry of 
European Integration in co-operation with line ministries. The scope of activity of the 
Inter-institutional Working Groups for European Integration includes the specific 
content of the relevant acquis chapter under their responsibility.  
The IWGEIs are in charge of ensuring inter-institutional cooperation and 
communication at the technical level aimed at implementing the commitments under the 
policy documents related to EU Integration. They oversee and work for the 
implementation of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement. The groups prepare 
annual revisions of the National Plan for the Implementation of the SAA in the 
respective chapters.  
IWGEIs are presided by the deputy minister of the lead/coordinating ministry or the 
head of the lead/coordinating institution, for its relevant chapter. The lead/coordinating 
ministry and MEI can invite independent public institutions to participate in the IWGs. 
Stakeholder representatives can be invited to attend IWGs meetings with the purpose of 
providing information and insight on particular areas.  
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The order of the PM foresees that Inter-Institutional Working Groups for European 
Integration should hold regular monthly meetings to take stock of developments and 
decide on the course of action. In the last years, there have been rare meeting of just few 
groups (as reported by the Ministry of European Integration).  
 
4.4 Mapping legislation approximation and acquis adoption 
In order to better understand real compliance and implementation of the acquis, we 
should include in the loop different concepts and processes such as of the transposition 
of EU legal acts into the national legal acts of the country, the proper coordination and 
planning of this process and the required resources, monitoring of its ongoing progress 
and results, assessing of compliance with the undertaken acts, and, finally, full 
implementation of the legislation adopted as national legislation. 
The process of legal approximation and implementation of the acquis in Albania has 
been initiated and followed up in a more programmatic way only in the last decade, 
especially due to the SAA. Apart from few previous weak attempts, it was only with the 
Stabilisation and Association Process that this relation included clear commitments in 
terms of approximation of legislation. Article 70 of the SAA states that: 
“The Parties recognise the importance of the approximation of 
Albania's existing legislation to that of the Community and of its 
effective implementation. Albania shall endeavour to ensure that its 
existing laws and future legislation shall be gradually made 
compatible with the Community acquis. Albania shall ensure that 
existing and future legislation shall be properly implemented and 
enforced.” (Council of the EU 2006a, p. 65). 
One year before signing the agreement, the Albanian government had already prepared 
a plan that would guide the work on compliance with EU acquis. This was the National 
Plan for the Approximation of Legislation. This first attempt of organising the process 
was mostly a summary of main documents regarding EU integration. Despite its 
ambitions, the document was not well-structured and it was not realistic in its 
commitments (Vurmo 2008). As the EC progress reports have stated in 2006 and 2007, 
short term priorities and objectives contained in the plan were not respected. Beyond 
good intentions, the plan failed to provide some structure to the process of 
approximation. As a result, immediately after the SAA was signed in 2006, the 
government of Albania adopted a new plan: the National Plan for the Implementation of 
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the SAA. This document has been the main instrument used from Albanian institutions 
since then.  
 
4.4.1 The National Plan for the Implementation of the SAA 
After signing the SAA, the government of Albania adopted a new plan for 
approximating and aligning the legislation with the acquis. It was named the National 
Plan for the Implementation of the SAA 2007 – 2012 (NPISAA
15
). This new plan 
replaced and dismissed the one year old National Plan for the Approximation of 
Legislation. The SAA clearly defined the obligations for Albania in the area of 
compliance with EU standards and legislation
16
. The NPISAA follows the obligations 
and commitments of Albania and it tries to structure them in terms of measures and 
deadlines. The structure of the document is not much different from the previous one, the 
National Plan for the Approximation of Legislation. Apart from the failure of monitoring 
and implementing the NPAL, drafting a new plan was justified by the new government 
because of the SAA and the fact that a new stage of the process was about to begin. 
However, it is implied that another main reason was the fact that in 2005 Albania had 
general elections and the centre-right won, coming back to power after eight years of 
opposition. As usually happens in these circumstances in Albania, new forces try to build 
new instruments that they find appropriate, which would also leave their mark in the history 
of the process (although sometimes this might damage the so-called institutional memory).  
NPISAA contained measures based on short (2006-2007) and medium-term (2008-2009) 
priorities. The way it has been drafted is really important for understanding the process of 
compliance with the acquis and how it is planned. The Ministry of European Integration is 
the initiator and the coordinator of the process. It prepares the format and methodology for 
drafting the document. After this, MEI is in charge of training all working groups that will 
be involved in each of the parts of the Plan. In the end MEI reviews and prepares the final 
draft based on each institution’s contribution.  
The NPISAA is actually the main instrument used for planning and adopting EU acts and 
legislation in Albania. Despite the fact that authorities do not always respect deadlines 
foreseen and commitments undertaken in the document, it still remains a programmatic tool 
that the government uses in the process. It is updated almost every year and each revision is 
                                                 
15
 Council of Ministers Decision No. 557 (2007) 
16
Title VI of the SAA is Approximation of Laws, Law Enforcement and Competition Rules.  
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used also by EU partners in order to follow up the government’s planning. However, since 
the NPISAA is not a bilateral work but it is internal to Albania, and since the deadlines it 
sets are often not realistic and thus not implemented, the EU relies on other instruments for 
strictly monitoring the adoption and implementation of the acquis in Albania. Most of the 
work is channelised through the SAA bilateral structures. Though the Plan contains many 
provisions that come up from the SAA framework meetings, it is not a reliable instrument 
in terms of efficiency and deliverance. Commitments undertaken in the Plan exceed EU 
requirements in the process and serve mostly the purpose of showing political commitment 
and for giving the Ministry of European Integration an instrument to be used for monitoring 
and ‘pressuring’ the other institutions in terms of horizontal coordination. However, in 
order to understand the process of acquis adoption and implementation the Plan does not 
give a clear picture in terms of steps taken, therefore other government documents and 
fieldwork data collection were much more productive options. 
 
4.4.2 Tracing the process of formal adoption of EU legislation 
Albania’s principal obligations in terms of acquis adoption derive from the SAA and recent 
developments in EU legislation regarding related areas (which are monitored by the 
Ministry of European Integration). As already explained, the SAA is the main framework of 
EU and Albania relations. Therefore, it is the bilateral structures that lead and coordinate 
the process that give the impulse and pressure for acquis adoption in all areas. The SAA is 
very clear on the obligations that Albania has in this respect. However, there are no specific 
deadlines for all issues. This is arranged through the NPISAA and inter-institutional 
coordination (internally) and through the SAA institutional framework (bilaterally). The 
Ministry of European Integration does a systematic review of the obligations and deadlines 
and it demands from line ministries and agencies a response on actions to be taken. In 
practice, subcommittees of SAA serve well the function of keeping acquis adoption and 
implementation process in line through giving a top-down signal to relevant institutions and 
through monitoring and making them accountable in the periodic meeting.  
Figure 4 below traces the process of acquis adoption in Albania, by depicting the different 
stages17 and institutions involved. Although this describes only formal adoption of the 
acquis (and not implementation, which is the focus of the study), it is very useful for 
                                                 
17
 The different stages are labelled with numbers in incremental order for easing the reference and 
understanding in the narrative part. 
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understanding the steps of the process and then explaining in the next chapters how these 
affect implementation.  
In the conclusions of SA structures meetings, recommendations are issued as regarding 
commitments for the next steps that Albanian authorities need to undertake in terms of 
measures, reforms and acquis adoption. This corresponds to stage 1 and 2 in the graph. 
There are two parallel channels because although MEI is in charge of coordination (and it 
chairs the meetings), several inputs are also transmitted directly to the relevant institutions 
in the meetings, by EU representatives. However, at the end, MEI sends the official 
conclusions to all involved actors and monitors their work in the successive months before 
the next meeting.  
Apart from what comes up in the meetings, MEI does its own review of the obligations of 
the SAA (based also on the EC Progress Report and the NPISAA) and thus demands and 
pushes line institutions for specific issues with approaching deadlines (stage 3). Although 
this role is rarely exercised by the MEI, in some particular cases it has intervened and asked 
for fulfilling certain commitments18. Each year in October, when the Progress Report is 
published, the MEI does an analysis and a review of recommendations and tries to turn 
them into tasks for all relevant institutions. 
Once the input has reached the line ministry, there is usually a need for ‘external’ pressure. 
The EC progress report and the recommendations from the subcommittees serve to catalyse 
and speed up the pace of reforms and acquis adoption. Thus after this stage, officers from 
sector directorates and departments are involved in the process, according also to internal 
programming of the ministry or agency (stage 4). The ‘real’ work in terms of approximating 
legislation and policy-making happens here of course. And this specific part of the process 
will be largely explored in the following case study chapters. The desk officers in the 
ministries review the recommendations and, according also to sector strategies and working 
plans, prepare the draft of legislation which introduces legal acts that approximate Albanian 
legislation to EU acquis. Once the drafts are ready, before moving to the next stages, 
formally it is foreseen that new legislation should be discussed internally and also consulted 
with non-state actors and interest groups who might be affected. This should happen for 
most important interventions, but it is not always the case. As it will be assessed in the next 
chapters, the consultation practice varies between sectors and within the same sector, 
according to the importance or sensitivity of the draft proposal.  
 
                                                 
18
 This happens only when there are pressing issues, which however are rarely related to acquis adoption 
(such as measures needed for the visa liberalization process or the candidate status.) 
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Figure 4 Tracing the process of acquis adoption in Albania 
 
 
 
                               2 
 
                 1 
 
                               3                              6              7 
 
 8 
 
                                  4                          5                                                       9 
 
 
 
Once the draft is considered finished by the technical level and has been passed for revision 
to the direction and political level (stage 5), the draft should be sent to the Ministry of 
European Integration which has the responsibility for checking concordance with EU 
acquis. This part implies verifying whether and to what extent a draft law or piece of 
legislation corresponds to a relevant part of the acquis or not. For this purpose the 
ministry has issued tables of concordance which, by law, should accompany each draft 
proposal. However, this does not happen regularly and therefore it is obligatory that each 
draft goes through MEI for a legal opinion (stage 6), on whether the draft proposal 
approximates Albanian legislation with EU legal acts, if it is in concordance with them and 
the SAA, or if it is in breach of these commitments. Drafts of legal acts which do not aim 
approximation with acquis are not always sent to MEI. However, this has become at the 
discretion of line Ministries (determining which act is relevant to the process and which 
not).  
After the opinion from MEI, the draft is referred back to the originating ministry with 
possible comments (stage 7). Although the procedure foresees a revision of the draft in case 
of comments, usually this takes place even before, from informal contacts that desk officers 
in line ministries have with MEI desk officers. The final draft proposal is sent to the 
Government for approval (stage 8). If in case of a draft-law, the last stage involves the 
SAA framework 
(Committee, Subcommittees, Progress Report) 
Ministry of European Integration 
Government Line Ministry or Agency 
(Head of institution and EIU) 
Policy makers 
(Sectors in the line ministries) 
Parliament 
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Parliament, where drafts are discussed in relevant Commissions (MEI representatives are 
present in the discussions when requested) and then the final approval.  
Developments in terms of adoption of the acquis are regularly reported from MEI to EU 
counterparts in several periodical occasions, such as SAA meetings, contribution to 
Progress Report (twice a year, in May and in September), experts’ missions covering 
specific areas, etc. The approximated legislation is also reflected in the annual update of the 
NPISAA.  
88 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS 
Free Movement of Goods is one of the most important and extensive chapters regarding 
EU legal acts. To be integrated into the single market, accession countries must adopt 
the relevant acquis and standards. Trade with these countries has been a strategic sector 
for the EU in terms of conditionality and instruments for accession countries. In the 
Balkan region, it has been an important basis for EU’s relations with these countries. 
With the SAA and the interim agreement concerning trade, Albania entered a new stage 
in terms of relations with the EU. The preferential regime that the EU applied to 
Albania has contributed to an increase in Albania's exports to the EU (Albinvest 2008). 
This process was in line with the EU’s approach towards countries in the Western 
Balkans, which has been built upon a regional framework (Anastasakis & Bechev 
2007). When referring to these developments, Vurmo (2008) argued that “Albanian 
economic operators will now have to adopt a more sustainable approach in both taking 
advantage of the neighbouring markets and also in facing the pressure of the regional 
economies and that of the European Union” (p. 29).  
This is the most strategic agenda for Albania not only because most of its trade share is 
with EU members, more than 70% (DG Trade 2013), but also because of its national 
priority of achieving EU membership. The trade agreement had a great influence in the 
liberalisation of Albania’s foreign trade
19
 and in increasing trade flows between the two 
parties (ACIT 2012). More specifically, in relation to the market economy, free trade, 
and regional cooperation, the main SAA requirements in this field included “(i) 
establishing a Free Trade Area with countries in the region and EU; (ii) complying with 
WTO commitments and requirements; [and] (iii) adopting internal market acquis, 
related to free movement of goods, workers, services and capital” (Mancellari 2004, p. 
5). Regarding benefits, customs duties on Albanian industrial products exported to 
European markets were reduced to zero. The same rule applied to most Albanian 
agricultural products. For some remaining products, customs duties were progressively 
reduced until they dropped to zero.
20
 
                                                 
19
 For a detailed overview of Albanian economic indicators, please refer to Appendix 3. 
20
The agreement foresees a duty-free regime for a list of 323 processed agricultural products originating 
from Albania entering the EC markets. A detailed table on the custom duty exemptions is provided in 
Appendices 3 and 4. 
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Apart from improving trade figures and balances, with the entry into force of the SAA, 
there was a change in the nature of the contractual relation between Albania and the EU 
such that the membership perspective became more concrete (Vurmo 2008). The 
process finally had a better defined framework that would structure more efficiently the 
European integration path (Sanjay 2008), especially with regard to the approximation of 
legislation and transposition of the acquis. 
This chapter will explore the adoption and implementation of the acquis related to the 
free movement of goods in Albania. Its aim is to identify and explain patterns of 
implementation, to explore the theoretical propositions raised, and to reach conclusions 
on the process in this sector. It will start with an overview of the situation, focusing on 
the major institutional steps taken and the development of acquis transposition in this 
area in Albania. A detailed account of the adoption process for EU legal acts and the 
situation of free movement of goods in terms of complying with the acquis is given. 
This part also summarises the major steps undertaken by domestic authorities according 
to SAA commitments. 
The chapter continues with a brief explanation of the inquiry for this sector in terms of 
the documents and materials analysed, interview sample, the case study directives 
chosen to be analysed, and the process of data analysis. It explains the reasons for these 
choices and how they are implemented in the study. 
Section 5.3 concerns the results of the data analysis. It is organised following the three 
main explanatory themes and independent variables. In each related part, an analysis of 
the data and an explanation of the findings are described. In addition, the process of the 
adoption and implementation of the sample directives is used in the account as an 
example for a better understanding and to trace the process. The last section contains a 
summary of considerations on the findings and the final conclusions for this policy area. 
  
5.1 State of compliance with the acquis in Albania 
The general principle of the free movement of goods in the European project is that 
products must be traded freely within the Union. This general principle is then further 
detailed and put into practice by a harmonised regulatory framework in different policy 
areas, following either the “Old Approach” (precise product specifications) or the “New 
Approach” (general product requirements). Transposition of harmonised European 
product legislation is the main part of obligations of this chapter for all member states 
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and accession countries. For proper implementation of legislation in this area, good 
administrative capacities are needed for the application of horizontal and procedural 
measures in areas such as standardisation, conformity assessment, accreditation, 
metrology, and market surveillance.  
The Stabilisation and Association Agreement contains many obligations in the field of 
free movement of goods. Apart from trade liberalisation, the most important part 
concerns alignment with EU technical regulations and standards as well as metrology, 
accreditation and conformity assessment procedures. The obligation to approximate 
Albanian legislation with the acquis is detailed in Article 70 and 75 of the SAA.  
Some of the most important parts of this acquis chapter concern laws on market 
surveillance, product conformity (with additional laws on specific products)
21
, as well 
as on standardisation, metrology and accreditation. The basis for product conformity 
and market surveillance is Law N° 9779, date 16.07.2007, “On general product safety, 
essential requirements and conformity assessment of no-food products”. The most 
important legislation that Albania has adopted in this context is the basis of 
standardisation, such as the Law N° 9870 of 04.02.2008. The basis of metrology is 
contained in the Law N° 9875 of 14.02.2008, “On metrology”. The basis of 
accreditation is stipulated in the Law N° 9824 of 01.11.2007 “On Accreditation of 
conformity assessment bodies in Republic of Albania”. The legal framework on 
accreditation also includes Council of Ministers Decision N° 1716 of 03.10.2008 and 
Prime Minister Order N° 124 of 03.08.2007 “On approval of the structure and 
organisational chart of the Accreditation Directorate”.  
Deriving from the obligations and commitments under the SAA, this legislative 
framework has been designed and implemented through the line ministries and the 
specific directorates within these ministries. Transposition in this area is a joint 
responsibility of different institutions
22
. However, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and 
                                                 
21
 The legal basis these products in Albania has been approved earlier though not fully in line with the 
acquis: Law No 9290 of 07.10.2004, Law N° 9323 dated 25.11.2004 “On drugs and pharmaceutical 
service”, Law N° 8531, date 23.9.1999 “On the Fertilizers Control Services”, Law N° 8378, date 
22/7/1998, “Road Code of the Republic of Albania”.  
22
Institutions responsible for this area: Ministry of Economic Development, Trade and Energy; General 
Directorate of Accreditation; General Directorate of Standardisation: General Directorate of Metrology; 
Ministry of Energy and Industry; Ministry of Agriculture, Rural Development and Water Management; 
Ministry of Health; Ministry of Environment; Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure; Ministry of 
Innovation and Public Administration; Ministry of Defence; Ministry of Interior; Ministry of Culture; 
Authority of Electronic and Postal Communication; National Centre for Drugs Control; Technical Central 
Inspectorate; 
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Energy (METE)
23
 is the one in charge of this chapter of the acquis. METE is the main 
coordinating ministry in regard to trade and it has the largest share of product directives 
and market surveillance activities.  
As for related agencies and directorates, General Directorate of Standardisation (GDS) 
is the national standardisation body for the development, adoption, approval and 
publication of standards in all sectors, except for those in the area of 
telecommunications. The General Directory of Accreditation (GDA) is also an 
important actor, being the only accreditation body in the country. Additional 
accreditation committees and an Accreditation Advisory Board assist and support the 
work of GDA. The total number of accredited conformity assessment bodies so far is 29 
of which 15 are testing laboratories, 2 certification bodies and 12 inspection bodies. 
Another important agency is the General Directory of Metrology (GDM). This is 
Albania’s governing body of the national metrology system. The General Department of 
Metrology is a full member of EURAMET and an associate member of WELMEC. The 
GDM’s calibration and measurement capabilities were accepted for mass measurements 
in the Key Comparison Database of the International Bureau of Weights and Measures. 
In addition, a new National Metrology Centre has been built and is already functioning 
in Tirana (EC 2013).  
These newly established directorates are very important for implementing legislation in 
the free movement of goods area, since they are responsible for important parts 
concerning Chapter 1 of the acquis. These main administrative structures responsible 
for standardisation, accreditation and metrology are operational and, overall, Albania 
seems to have a proper institutional set up in place.  
In terms of approximation or harmonisation of Albanian legislation with the acquis 
communautaire, as a prerequisite for the country’s EU accession, Albania has 
transposed a significant amount of directives
24
 into the Albanian legislation, especially 
in the period 2006–2009. As Vurmo puts it, although there were some previous attempts 
to "create a structured approach regarding the challenges of approximation of legislation 
with the EU acquis, it was not until the adoption of the National Plan for the 
Implementation of the SAA (NPISAA), that the country took serious steps in this 
direction" (Vurmo 2008, p. 43). This strategy was followed by the National Strategy for 
                                                 
23
 Since a cabinet restructuring in September 2013, it is named Ministry of Economic Development, 
Entrepreneurship and Trade. 
24
 For a full list of approximated directives on Free Movement of Goods, please refer to Appendix 6. 
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Development and Integration 2007-2013 (NSDI), approved by the Council of Ministers 
on 12 March 2008 which incorporated integration in a broader development framework 
(Department of Strategy and Donor Coordination, 2009). These important documents 
contained concrete measures and legal acts planned for transposing EU directives for 
the free movement of goods sector as well. Some of the most important directives that 
METE has transposed so far are detergents regulation and some other products (toys, 
pressure equipment, low voltage, machineries, etc). However, as stated in the answers 
of the questionnaire that Albania prepared in 2010, and in EC progress reports, other 
ministries still have to make efforts for the transposition of other product directives such 
as: medical devices, construction products, CIVEX, Pyrotechnics, etc. This would be 
followed by the establishment of other respective Market Surveillance Bodies (Council 
of Ministers, 2009, p. 390). By 2010, Albanian legislation has been fully harmonised on 
legal metrology, pre-packaging and units of measurements; it has been partially 
harmonised on motor vehicles, chemicals, detergents and fertilisers; and it is in the 
planning process on drug precursors, explosives for civil use, pharmaceutical and 
cosmetics as well as on crystal glass, textile and footwear.  
Regarding the evaluation of the situation by the European Commission, it has 
acknowledged that horizontal and procedural measures, including the framework 
legislation on technical regulations for products and conformity assessment procedures, 
and Old and New Approach product legislation need to be harmonised with the acquis. 
Administrative and implementation capacities are also considered insufficient for 
implementation, although legislation is generally adequate. The 2011 Progress Report 
acknowledged positive developments in the legislative framework especially in the field 
of accreditation, standardisation, conformity assessment, customs legislation and in the 
field of the 'Old Approach' product legislation, while limited progress is noticed in 
regard to the ‘New and Global Approach’ product legislation (EC 2011, pp. 29-30). The 
report concludes by stating that “further efforts are needed in order to harmonise 
Albanian legislation with the New and Old Approach directives, as well as to align the 
horizontal legislation with the acquis and to build up an adequate market surveillance 
infrastructure” (EC 2011, p. 30). These were the same conclusions as the previous year 
regarding implementation deficit and the need for strengthening administrative 
capacities for effective implementation of adopted legislation.  
The 2012 Progress Report has reported good progress in the field of standardisation (the 
GDS has adopted about 95.5% of ENs as Albanian standards), conformity assessment, 
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metrology, accreditation and market surveillance, while, in contrast to the previous year, 
it reports limited progress in the field of the 'Old Approach' product legislation and good 
progress in the ‘New and Global Approach’ product legislation. No progress is reported 
in the area of procedural measures. The report concludes that “further efforts are needed 
on overall legislative approximation and on establishing an adequate market 
surveillance inspectorate” (EC 2012, pp. 31-32).   
In the different progress reports but also as stated in the minutes of the SAA 
subcommittee on Internal Market, there is a constant reference to the need for effective 
implementation of the adopted legislation. This has become more evident in the last 
years, when the amount of transposed legislation has increased and the implementation 
deficit has deepened as well. In terms of approximation of legislation, we can divide the 
integration process area of free movement and goods into two different stages according 
to EU evaluations: the first one is right after the signature of the SAA, 2006 – 2009, 
which has been an intensive period of adoption of acquis in this area, with no major 
focus on implementation. A high number of laws were approved in that period, many of 
which aimed at approximating Albanian legislation with the acquis, as foreseen in the 
NPISAA. The second period, 2009 – 2012, has been a more ‘careful’ one in terms of 
number of legal acts adopted, and the focus has shifted towards implementation of the 
already adopted legal acts. The rapid increase in the divergence between approved and 
effectively implemented legislation was of great concern to the European Commission 
and this is why implementation and enforcement in this area is still a main issue. 
 
5.2 Explaining the samples and the research work 
The set of directives falling under Chapter 1 of the acquis is very large. EU Old 
Approach product legislation covers the areas of motor vehicles, chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, legal metrology and pre-packaging, textiles 
(1007/2011/EU), footwear labelling (94/11/EC), crystal glass (69/493/EEC). It is 
foreseen that a series of procedural measures with the sufficient administrative capacity 
to be properly applied, needs to be introduced in order to fully comply with the 
directives. For the purpose of this research in the area of free movement of goods, two 
specific directives have been chosen: the first Directive is the 75/107/EEC on the bottles 
used as measuring containers. This directive has been fully transposed in the Albanian 
legislation through a CMD no. 1161 on 13 August 2008. It has entered into force on 2 
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September of the same year. The second directive is the 76/211/EEC on the pre-packed 
products. This has been fully transposed by Albanian authorities through Decision no. 
1352 on 3 October 2008 and it entered into force on 29 October of the same month. 
Both these directives have been chosen due to the potential for variance and 
understanding of the process that they offer. They are both specifically related to the 
same sub-area of the acquis chapter and they are both related to the Old Approach. In 
addition, they have been both fully transposed in the Albanian legislation
25
. However, 
the first one has been considered partially implemented
26
 while the second is regarded 
as not implemented (Council of Ministers 2010). Therefore, exploring in depth and 
tracking the process of legislative design and implementation set up of these two acts 
can offer valuable data regarding the understanding of implementation and the 
discussion on the raised theoretical propositions.  
Documents and secondary sources used for exploring this policy area were mainly 
related to the public materials that regard procedures and the specific directives 
considered. Some of the information could be found in official websites of the METE. 
However, reaching and accessing more internal documentation and drafts (such as the 
minutes of meetings) was more difficult so interviews proved to be a good instrument 
for complementing the missing part. Archives of the Ministry of Economy were poor 
and not helpful for tracking important parts of the process. More specifically, 
documents used for this chapter were the drafts of the relevant EU directives and the 
decisions of the Council of Ministers of Albania that have transposed those directives; 
the code of administrative procedures; internal regulation of rules and procedures; 
policy briefs from institutional experts and business communities. Documents were 
helpful not just for understanding the process from the formal point of view but also for 
the analysis and triangulation method used for exploring the patterns and factors that 
characterise the design of the policy and the interaction between the actors involved.  
Interviews in this policy area were quite useful in terms of information and accounts. 
All the participants agreed to be quoted but some of them did not want to be identified 
directly, in case they were quoted. According to the area to be explored and specifically 
for the directives selected for the sample, the full list of persons that have been 
interviewed can be found in the Appendix 1. They are representatives from the Ministry 
                                                 
25
 Most directives are partially transposed which might make it more difficult to explore their 
implementation. 
26
 Practical implementation 
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of European Integration, the Ministry of Economy, Albanian Parliament, EU 
Commission and its Delegation in Albania, Business Community, experts, etc.  
As regarding the method of participant observation, in the case of free movement of 
goods, I had the possibility of participating in three meetings of the National 
Consultative Council of Businesses (NCCB), where the Ministry of Economy presents 
drafts and discusses them with business associations’ representatives. I have used data 
gathered from this observation for enriching my exploration but not as a basis for my 
findings. Observations were very useful for understanding better interaction in 
consultations and for cross-checking information provided by participants in the 
interviews. 
 
5.3 Exploring theoretical propositions and findings 
5.3.1 Institutional coordination and division of competences 
Both selected directives, as part of the National Plan for the Implementation of the 
SAA, have followed similar paths in terms of timing and institutional framework. The 
first directive’s adoption was a result of requests coming also from SAA subcommittee 
on trade while the second was planned ahead by the authorities in the framework of 
planning approximation of legislation. In both cases, a working group was set up with 
members from different departments within the Ministry of Economy. Although this is 
the common procedure (Sykja 2012), it is not a written rule rather than an established 
routine. The group is usually chaired by the relevant director covering that area, 
therefore representing, in principle, a decentralised management of the process. The two 
chosen directives represent interesting cases because although both of them fall under 
the Directorate of Metrology (DM), the work on directive of measurement bottles was 
chaired by this Directorate, while the second on pre-packed products was chaired by the 
General Directorate of Trade Policies (GDTP 2012). The approach on the second 
directive resulted in a much more centralised operation, where information flow and 
expertise was concentrated in the GDTP. These differences in the organisation of the 
process determined changes in the way policy design was developed and handled, as it 
is explained later below, which then can determine implementation results. 
First of all, it affected the speed of the process. It seems that when the process is 
managed by a more central (and not sector based) authority, procedures are much faster, 
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consultations both internally and with other line ministries are easier, and disputes have 
more chances to be solved (Lleshi 2012; Sykja 2012). Although in both cases the first 
draft was consulted internally, the pace changed during legal department review, where 
delays produced uncertainties in the process and therefore extension of the deadline set. 
According to a desk officer in the Directorate of Metrology, the draft of the first 
directive was stuck in the legal department for several weeks and they were unable to 
receive a response for some time.  
Hierarchy appears to play an important role when it comes to a smooth development of 
the policy process, internal to the institution. This was confirmed in the second directive 
case where the leadership of the GDTP managed to produce a draft ready in less time 
when compared to the previous one. One of the key words used in most of the 
interviews, concerning this point, was ‘authority’. It is perceived that the momentum of 
the policy process depends more on the strength of authority of the leading body rather 
than on written procedures and rules.  
In addition to the duration of the policy process, central coordination seems to influence 
dispute solving as well. In the case of the first directive, the Directorate of Metrology 
faced problems in early stages with the Ministry of Agriculture, as a desk officer of DM 
explained during the interview. In the official correspondence between the two 
institutions there was an issue raised on the standards to be adopted in the case of 
agricultural products measurements. According to the account from the interviewed 
participant, although the raised issue was consulted ahead informally between the 
parties, they decided to follow the official procedure in order to ‘avoid any 
responsibility’ on the disputes that could follow. The process was slowed down and it 
was necessary to set up joint meetings at the desk officers’ level for reaching a common 
position, before sending the draft to Council of Ministers. This delayed further the 
drafting process until the final version was then passed through the Ministry of Justice 
and the Ministry of Finance (as per procedure) before going for approval. 
 However, when looking more in depth at the implementation phase, results appear to be 
more controversial. The first directive has been evaluated as partially implemented and 
the second one not implemented yet (although already transposed and adopted). In both 
cases consultations were carried with inspectors, but substantial differences could be 
grasped between them. As explained, the working group for the first directive was 
chaired by the specialised body dealing with metrology. Their technical expertise led 
the process and inspectors were involved in the drafting process. Surprisingly this did 
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not speed up things, but it delayed them further through several discussions
27
 internally, 
as one of the inspectors claims. However, the result in the end was a commonly agreed 
draft where most of the issues raised were solved. According to a representative of the 
Inspectorate (2012): 
“People in the offices know the area but they do not understand the 
ground. Laws are copied but then it’s up to us to implement and enforce 
them, which is not easy. I think that they should listen to us more before 
approving them and not see us as an enemy”. 
In the interview I had with an inspector that actually participated in those meetings back 
then (the others had been removed from office in the meantime), he manifested 
dissatisfaction with the way the design process takes place. However, he admitted that 
after many discussions most of his concerns were addressed and that the quality of the 
legislative act was satisfactory to him. This simultaneous connection to the later stage 
(implementation actors) has helped in improving performance. As the literature 
suggests, street level bureaucrats can fail to implement the policy when not involved 
properly. In this case, implementation is considered partial. It is partial because it is not 
implemented in all areas of Albania (especially rural). In some areas businesses have 
failed to invest in its implementation and inspectorates have not allocated adequate 
resources for monitoring. This is of course an additional factor for determining 
implementation failure. But when it comes to the content of the policy, the way it was 
designed was considered a success and therefore its implementation is taking place 
though partially. As a policy maker (2012) in the DM argues:  
"They should leave these type of works in the hand of the experts. It's not 
about getting credits or showing off with the bosses, it's about who can do 
the job and who can't. But we are always in a rush when it comes to EU. 
When they give us time and leave it up to us, we can do a decent job"  
Because of the less centralised approach and expertise oriented guidance, the quality of 
the product was more destined towards implementation success than failure, despite the 
very big delays. 
The opposite happened in the case of the second directive. As explained, the process 
was quick and all obstacles (even major ones with other ministries) were overcome 
using the authority of the GDTP or sometimes even intervention of the deputy minister 
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 There were no written minutes or material on these meetings and discussions, apart from the 
notifications and invitations for the meetings. However, by triangulating answers from the different 
persons interviewed it was possible to understand the content summary of the meetings. 
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(Lleshi 2012). Inspectors were invited to discuss the drafts but their involvement was 
more formal. Only two meetings took place with them and on both occasions they did 
not propose changes or suggestions. When asked why, they requested not to be quoted 
directly and this is why all the information they provided was then used anonymously. I 
interviewed four of them in two sessions, all from similar background. As one inspector 
(2012) would put it, the common perception was that: 
 “If you try to criticise the work of your superiors at the political level, it 
can be named as resistance or unwilling to comply with orders. And you 
want to have good relations with them, since they can promote or fire you”.  
It was very interesting to see how the more they had to deal with higher levels, the more 
they were 'complying' with no resistance. Even when they might have known that the 
draft represented problems and they would face obstacles in implementation and 
enforcement afterwards. Actually, as another inspector (2012) argues: 
"Sometimes I can tell if a measure will not work and will not be enforced. 
But I do not want to make enemies in this work. Why should I save the 
world and be the black sheep! You know what, sometimes I think even 
they (policy makers) know that it's not going to work. But you have to do 
your job in the end, you have to adopt these laws". 
This sort of pattern was quite common among civil servants at Inspectorate or desk 
officers’ level when approaching the higher political level. Senior officers in the 
ministry admit that this is a widespread characteristic even at their level, with few 
exceptions (Lleshi 2012). Of course this is a more structural problem of Albanian public 
administration and the system of political influence in appointments and dismissals, but 
from the angle of this research it shows that, in such cases, centralisation during the 
policy design can harm the process in terms of quality, due to the barriers built between 
the high political level in the institution and the desk officer/street level bureaucrats, 
between the urgent need of transposing the legislation and 'ticking the box', on the one 
hand, and the necessity of carefully planning and elaborating the legal draft with all 
actors, on the other.  
In terms of capacities in public administration, it is accepted that poor capacities are 
affecting directly their work. There is a performance evaluation system in place, which 
has been approved by the Department of Public Administration and it is common to all 
Albanian institutions (Sykja 2012). In the Ministry of Economy and in its dependent 
institutions this system works quite smoothly, however it does not seem to constitute the 
basis for promotion or downgrade. It was not possible to find official evidence of a 
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follow up to the evaluation results in terms of recommendations for superiors, apart 
from six disciplinary warnings during all the time taken into account (2006 – 2011). In 
terms of stability and length of stay of staff working in this area, the interviewed 
persons had been working there for periods ranging from 2 to 14 years. They also stated 
that most of their colleagues had been in the job for many years. This puts the 
institutional set-up in a good position in terms of capacity building and institutional 
memory, especially in countries such as Albania which suffers from massive changes in 
the public administration every time a new government goes in power. However, if the 
price to pay for keeping the job position is to comply with the process driven from the 
centre without contributing with critical expertise, then the quality of the draft might 
suffer and the implementation stage can present shortcomings. In this type of 'fear 
interaction culture' between the different hierarchical levels in the public administration, 
centralisation of the coordination process might give fast results in terms of delivery but 
not good ones regarding draft quality and implementation planning.  
 
5.3.2 Participation of non-state actors 
Policies regarding free movement of goods impact firstly, especially in the short term, 
the business actors and the business actors are usually the most organised and influential 
part of society even in countries experiencing democratic transition such as Albania, 
where the business community is newly established after the communist rule. In this 
area, a National Consultative Council for Businesses (NCCB) was set up by the 
Ministry of Economy. Its main objective is to offer the opportunity for discussion and 
interaction with interested parties, on policies concerning them. It started working in 
2007, but in 2008 meetings became more regular
28
. Meetings are chaired by the 
Minister of Economy and only business associations’ representatives can be permanent 
members of the Council. According to the representative of NCCB Secretariat, it is 
estimated that, approximately 18% to 25%
29
 of the legal acts concerning business 
community, are discussed in the Council meetings on yearly basis.  
As regards formal institutional involvement in the policy process, in the case of the 
sample of directives used for the study, the first one was part of the package discussed 
in 2008’s first meeting of the Council. One representative of the business community 
                                                 
28
 Referring to official records of the Ministry in 2008 the Council held 2 meetings. The number increased 
in 2009, 2010 and 2011. 
29
 This calculation refers to year 2011. 
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who attended that meeting claims that there was only one proposal for a change by a 
business owner who produced those items, but it was not taken into account and it was 
not discussed because there were more important laws in the agenda for that day. Desk 
officers of the secretariat of the NCCB do not recall this episode and they have no 
written record of it. However, they have correspondence with business representatives 
who contacted them via email expressing their concerns. They were also invited to the 
meeting but, according to the minutes of the meeting, they did not have the floor due to 
time limitations. From many years of experience, Mr. Sykja, a senior director in the 
ministry and also a member of the NCCB, claims that there has been very little 
contribution by the business community even when they had information ahead. As he 
argues: 
"We send regular reports to the members of the Council and they almost 
never send a reaction. They always wait for the meeting of the Council to 
discuss and react. And there is little time there to collect proper 
contribution, though they come more for complaining than contributing. I 
am sorry to say that we rarely receive proposals on the drafts".  
Sykja (2012) continues that even when few more active members send contribution, 
their quality has not improved of the drafting work. Either they lack capacities and 
expertise, or the proposal is too narrow to be taken into account (Sykja 2012). 
In the case of the first directive, there was information about the act and the draft was 
distributed ahead among members of the Council. Responses were mixed from business 
representatives when asked about any preparations they were making in order to 
undertake necessary measures for complying with the new changes (on measurement 
bottles), once it would enter into force. According to a Tirana based business 
association, out of nine different businesses inquired (all of them claiming to have had 
information before the law entering into force) only two of them took measures which 
had also financial implications. The rest of them answered that they planned to work on 
compliance later on when the law would come into force. It was a clear pattern of 
consequences related to policy uncertainty. They would not act until they felt that “the 
policy would become real” (Gjika 2012). When exploring this notion more in depth, it 
was easy to understand that 'becoming real' did not mean the approval and entry into 
force of the law. Instead, it means showing actual will to implement and enforce it, such 
as inspectors coming to inspect your business activity and the potential risk of fines and 
penalties. As one new member of the NCCB would argue: 
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"Business people are smart and follow developments. They know that 
most of these rules are done only for pleasing Europe. Only for showing 
that our government cares. But they know that no one will come to you 
and check bottles or stuff like that. Not for now at least. Afterwards when 
we have higher standards as a country, who knows". 
Another business representative that I interviewed (not a member of the Council), 
confirms that there might be a general perception among business actors that EU rules 
adopted are quite advanced for the country but they do not resist them because they 
know that the State will not be harsh in enforcing them. The directive discussed in this 
case has been considered as partially implemented, but businesses that are represented 
in the NCCB claim to have fully implemented it despite they did it much later after it 
entered into force, as the representative of the NCCB Secretariat confirms. Financial 
costs associated with compliance in this case were not very high and this might have 
also influenced their decision. 
In the case of the second directive, there was no formal involvement of interested 
parties in the process. Although civil servants dealing with it can’t recall details, they 
admit that it might be the case. A representative from a business operating in the area of 
recycling and packaging claimed:  
“I have a lawyer and an assistant who work for me and monitor new 
legislation. Maybe they didn’t do a good job, but I never knew that 
government was working on this draft until someone I know in the 
Ministry of Economy called me and told me. At least I knew what it was 
about. But no one ever asked me an opinion about it” (2002). 
Even in this case, a 'wait and see' approach prevailed from the business community side. 
The adoption of the directive into Albanian legislation failed to foresee the necessary 
instruments for enforcement, since inspectors were not entitled to inspections until a 
transitional period passed, when businesses would be able to adapt. The election 
campaign started early in 2009 and thus the government failed to produce the bylaws 
necessary for enforcement of the directive. This is why to date there has been no 
inspection or fine collected for infringement of this legal act. Therefore the ‘wait and 
see’ approach sometimes seems to pay off and businesses could perceive a lower risk 
through potential fines which they might receive, rather than certain costs for adaption 
and investments needed. However, another business representative (2012) raises a point 
about information and awareness: 
"I do not believe that businesses do not want to comply. Even in the case 
of this rule (the second directive). Sometimes it's about not having 
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information and being prepared for it. Not all of us have to time or have 
contacts for getting information. I personally get to know new rules 
mostly when an inspector comes and knocks at my door, which is too late. 
If he never comes, I might never know". 
It might be a justification, but it seems true that channels of information are not very 
well developed. The only ways to communicate are either as a member of NCCB or by 
having contacts with the ministry or business associations (Gjika 2012). Otherwise, it is 
necessary to check procedures of every government meeting in order to know what has 
been approved. 
Looking to the process of the two directives, it can seem that the business community is 
formally involved but not in all cases. Apart from the Council activities, individual 
businesses or other associations have the possibility of interacting with civil servants by 
sending official letters
30
. However, in both cases there was no substantial involvement. 
This lack of involvement is twofold: from one side, officers at the Ministry of Economy 
did not create any opportunity for them to speak up and their involvement (in the first 
directive) was only formal. The only comment/proposal they received was not 
considered and there was no explanation why (Business representative 2012). Despite 
directors in the Ministry claiming ‘continuous dialogue with business community’ 
(Sykja 2012), business representatives interviewed complained about lack of real 
involvement which, according to them, discourages them from participating in other 
cases. They also send official complaints on a regular basis to the international 
community in Albania, especially in the EU Commission (Ebejer 2012; Muco 2012).  
Representatives of EU Commission think that the consultation process has not been 
very effective in this area in general, despite the fact that the business community is 
quite strong. In fact, the EU delegation sometimes is functioning as their advocate by 
raising issues that they consider important in this policy field and which are related to 
the acquis. This might create problems in the future in terms of attempts for 
strengthening relations between government agencies and business communities, 
although in the short term it seems an effective way to raise issues (no record of 
addressing issues according to the participants). In the case of the two directives, there 
was no involvement or request to the EU authorities.  
On the other side, lack of involvement can be explained also by the lack of proper 
demand from business operators in the first place. From a formal point of view, there is 
                                                 
30
 According to the law, public administration offices need to reply to requests for information within 30 
days. 
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fair opportunity for business community to get involved. According to the regulation of 
the NCCB, membership is open to all associations which have been operating in 
Albania for the last 5 years and which have active membership. In total there were 21 
members in the Council. However, there are several factors concerning their 
organisation, representation and capacities.  
First, in the case of the first directive there was a lack of organisation and coordination 
capacities among members of the same association. As mentioned earlier, although 
there was a proposal by one member, the association representing him did not follow up 
on it. In terms of representation, there is no clear evidence on the number of the 
members, whether they pay membership fees for the association, how much they are 
involved in meetings, etc. In addition, when asked about their members outside the 
capital city, they admitted that contacts were rare and with no substantial interaction. 
This was common to most of the associations represented in the Council and might be 
one of the reasons why implementation is higher in Tirana and nearby, and not in other 
parts of the country. Apart from three associations (out of 21), none of them had 
structured channels for information flow with their own members and it is not common 
for them to organise meetings with members. As one of the members of NCCB admits: 
"To be honest with you, we have registered 68 members in our 
association, but is more or less 10 of us who meet regularly and discuss. 
And most of discussions are focused on how to cooperate and solve things 
informally, rather than come here (at the NCCB) and try to convince 
them on something. I think most of us (members of NCCB) here are in the 
same position of being the big companies and therefore can represent the 
voices of the sectors".  
Since no membership activism is present in these associations, therefore, it can be 
argued that the persons who are members in the Council are not properly representing 
the interests and causes of all their members, but were instead focused on their own 
business (in all cases, the person leading the business association owned the biggest 
company in that association). This is the impression of civil servants in the Ministry of 
Economy as well, who believe they are dealing with big individual business companies 
in the Council rather than with associations (Sykja 2012). It can’t be captured how 
much their positions in the Council reflect their membership views. Since effective 
involvement of non-state actors is well recognised in the literature as an important 
factor for implementation, this misrepresentation of the business community in talks 
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with government agencies has consequences in terms of lack of information for 
businesses which might then cause resistance to compliance.  
The NCCB Secretariat representatives claim also that the quality of the contribution 
from its members has been very low. I was provided with few drafts proposed by two 
associations which had been taken into consideration over the years, but according to 
ministry staff, they rarely receive materials they can work on (Sykja 2012). On the other 
side, business association recognise the fact that they invest very little in expertise and 
consultancy, claiming that the reason is that their work would rarely be taken in 
consideration by civil servants or politicians (Sejdarasi 2012). However, beyond this 
sort of vicious circle, there is also a cultural component among business community. 
Sometimes it is much more effective for a big business to have a good contact in the 
government or public administration rather than invest in consultancy or research 
(Sejdarasi 2012). Business community seems to assume a 'friendly' approach towards 
public administration and politics in the NCCB meetings or in the public arena in 
general, since they might solve their personal troubles through more informal channels. 
In spite of sporadic cases of actual involvement and contribution from business 
community, it seems that proper participation in the policy process is not the rule.  
This applies also to other non-state (non-business) actors. Experts from the field, 
academics and other interested actors do not have an official forum, such as NCCB for 
businesses, where they can articulate and express their concerns and proposals. 
Officially it can be done through letters, but there is no guarantee of a response. As one 
economy professor (2012) puts it: 
"We are rarely contacted and even when we are, it's for some big 
conferences which have no proper exchange of opinions. Sometimes we 
can be invited as experts for helping with a law, which is a good practise. 
But we would be paid for that and thus I do not believe that you can freely 
express all your thoughts in those occasions. You know, you want to be 
called again".  
This attitude was registered even in the case of the two selected directives. Although 
there was formal involvement in the first one, practical contribution was not relevant. 
However, some of the interested actors were informed and were present during the 
formulation stages of the draft, before getting approval. This helped at least in getting 
them informed and, when possible, even prepared for the new measure. In the case of 
the second directive, which has not been implemented at all, there has been no formal 
participation or informative sessions until the acts was passed. Up to date, it is still 
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considered not implemented and not enforced, therefore there have been no inspections  
for that category. 
 
5.3.3 Involvement of EU officials in the process 
“Policy makers need to understand and assimilate directives” (Lleshi 2012). This was 
the opening sentence of one of the senior desk officers at the Ministry of Economy 
when asked about the type of assistance they might need. There is a clear understanding 
on the importance of this topic among civil servants and of the consequences that it 
might have for their work. As mentioned earlier, the free movement of goods is one of 
the most important and complex chapters of the acquis, because it covers most of the 
issues concerning the market. Although the ministry has been working for quite some 
years on the acquis, it faces difficulties in terms of proper translation and understanding 
of directives (Sykja 2012).  
In general, for countries experiencing democratic transition many processes are carried 
top down, due to fragile civil society and low levels of activism. This becomes even 
more visible when adopting EU legislation (which comes from the top as a pre-designed 
agenda). Civil servants in the Ministry of Economy and its depending institutions seem 
to face the challenge of not only transposing properly the directives but also of 
understanding them at first and understanding what it entails in terms of bylaws and 
other measures necessary to ensure implementation. Failing to plan ahead might lead to 
incomplete adoption of legislation and risks for implementation failure might increase. 
For this reason, it becomes really important for EU representatives to be involved with 
their assistance in the process. The exchange of information would benefit both sides, 
not just the Albanian policy makers. As Ivan Ebejer, European Commission expert 
working on Albania covering economic issues, explains: 
“There are difficulties in evaluating and understanding the policy process 
in Albania due to the fact of not being on the ground. I must say that the 
information I get in two or three days of visit mission is more efficient 
than what I get from legal documents” (Ebejer 2012). 
That is the reason why officers at the EU delegation in Tirana are much more informed 
and involved in the process (than their colleagues in Brussels), though mainly through 
monitoring. They have better access to information on a daily basis and can provide 
monthly updates to their colleagues in Brussels (Muco 2012). However, direct 
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assistance through expertise in the policy process of free movement of goods is rare. 
The Albanian side sometimes requests opinions on a draft but that is the usual extent of 
cooperation in this area. Other times the EU’s opinion is requested by government 
agencies or interest groups on specific laws. The European Commission is directly 
involved only when they are financing a project for a law or a policy. In this cases, they 
do not do just the monitoring, which is ‘business as usual’ but they are also more 
“internal to procedures and can give direct specific feedback on the different steps” 
(Muco 2012).  
Such support is highly appreciated by Albanian civil servants and policy makers 
because it “helps to adapt the policy, to identify stakeholders and to create a suitable 
timetable” (Lleshi 2012). Muco (2012) recognises that the quality of drafts produced is 
not always good and that deadlines aren’t usually met, despite the good will showed. 
However, assistance in the area of free movement of goods is ad hoc and upon the 
request of the Albanian side. Sykja (2012) reports some cases where the policy design 
necessary for the transposition of a certain directive has required specialised capacities 
which Albanian authorities did not have. In these cases the GDTP has set up a working 
group to deliver a preliminary assessment of needs and the main issues raised have 
usually been about understanding the directive and planning appropriately the stages for 
transposition and effective implementation. After this phase, the Ministry of Economy 
has issued an official request to EU Commission for assistance in that particular process 
or policy.  
The most common practice in such cooperation is through TAIEX
31
 program, which 
supports accession countries through expertise from member states in a specific area 
where it is needed. In the area of free movement of goods this type of assistance has 
been used quite often, especially for complex legislation and policies. The expert 
provided by the program works close with officers in charge of the policy at the 
ministry and the work is planned jointly. This has turned to be a very useful exercise for 
Albanian authorities, in terms of learning and understanding better the acquis and the 
transposition process, but, moreover, it has had a more direct impact in the quality and 
the accountability of their work (Sykja 2012). As one of the desk officers in the GDTP 
has pointed out: 
                                                 
31
 Technical Assistance and Information Exchange instrument used by the European Commission. 
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“Having an EU partner working here with us, setting deadlines, 
explaining how to plan the process for adoption and the required 
instruments afterwards for implementation has helped me think a bit more 
strategically. Unfortunately political pressure can sometime bypass all 
these necessary steps and so the quality of work is not the best. But when 
foreign experts are involved, the process becomes more structured” 
(2012). 
 Actual participation of EU experts in the process seems to provide clear guidelines on 
what to expect in adopting a policy and how to prepare for guaranteeing its 
implementation. Of course this does not explain all successful implementations as there 
are cases when things have gone fairly well without this type of support. However, it is 
a common perception from civil servants and street level bureaucrats that when the EU 
is involved there is more pressure and accountability for succeeding, especially in the 
implementation and enforcement stages. As one inspector describes through his own 
experience: 
“I had to work for two weeks with a Dutch expert who came to help the 
ministry with the Law on market inspections. Honestly, first I was 
surprised how little information he had on Albania in general. However, 
when we went around in the ground, he could immediately list most of the 
problems we were facing and proposed some interventions in the new 
law. And most important he was listening to our thoughts, which is not 
always the case with our bosses” (2012)
32
. 
The EU presence in the process not only develops better planning and understanding of 
the directive to be transposed, but it seems also to help in somehow improving the 
bottom-up side of the process. The European Commission has a mandate to assist and 
propose interventions and, in order to do their job properly, they gather information 
from all parties involved and affected by the policy in the case of free movement of 
goods.  
The two directives used as sample for this area did not receive any targeted assistance. 
As explained earlier, the process was developed mainly internally. The staff who were 
involved in both cases claim to have good knowledge and understanding of that specific 
area and therefore transposition was not particularly difficult, according to their 
accounts. However, they were not involved in the translation, which might create 
potential risks for misinterpretation. They received the draft of the translated directive in 
Albanian and started working on the policy proposal to transpose it. They admit that 
                                                 
32
 During the time of the interview this inspector wasn’t on duty anymore, although he was trained by EU 
programs on inspections. There were different cases encountered when well-trained persons were 
dismissed by institutions for various reasons. 
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assistance could have helped for better quality, in principle, but, as one of the desk 
officers of DM put it, it is also “a question of ownership and our own capacities. The 
EU does not have the possibility to assist with all transposition and therefore we need to 
learn and do it by ourselves” (2012). Nevertheless, it seems that in the area of free 
movement of goods, involvement of experts from EU has paved the path for better 
implementation during the policy design process, in other cases reported. In the case of 
the two directives (the first partially implemented and the second not implemented), the 
adoption stage of the legislation has failed to properly prepare and plan the 
implementation stage. Considering the vast amount of acquis and its complexity in the 
area of free movement of goods, expertise seems to be often necessary. However, the 
official request for expertise can come only from the specific Directorate in the ministry 
(Sykja 2012) and therefore the initiative is left in civil servants’ hands. This might open 
a discussion on their willingness to engage with EU experts on daily basis considering 
the fact that this might exercise indirect pressure for changes on their daily routines and 
approach to policy work.  
 
5.4 Conclusions on free movement of goods  
From documentary analysis and the research data gathered in the field, it appears that 
the institutional setup in the area of free movement of goods is well established in 
Albania. The responsible ministry (the Ministry of Economy) is one of the largest in 
terms of structures and staff since its area of competence covers various policy sectors 
(in terms responsibility of acquis transposition, this ministry is in charge of seven 
chapters, being the Albanian institution with most chapters under its domain). In 
addition, trade has been the main pillar of the relation between the EU and countries 
aspiring to membership, such as Albania, so the amount of work required is quite 
intensive. 
This research on free movement of goods indicates that coordination and administrative 
capacities in planning the policy process are the main factors influencing the policy 
design and then consequently the implementation stage. First, the fact that there is not a 
formalised procedure for setting up working groups and dividing competences leaves 
room for different interpretations in the process and makes it dependent on 
administrative will or personal interaction inside the ministry. This gap and lack of 
clarity appears to favour the option of a highly centralised approach. Although 
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coordination centralisation is perceived as a good approach for meeting deadlines and 
pushing the process forward by overcoming obstacles, these obstacles, their reasons, 
and how they are overcome, can sometimes have an impact on the implementation 
stage.  
The quality of the draft depends not only on capacities within the department but also 
on contributions coming from different departments and street-level bureaucrats or 
inspectors and how these proposals are dealt with. In the case of the two directives 
studied, central coordination seems to have sped up the process but has not provided 
necessary instruments for the inclusion of other contributions. The type of attitude and 
approach assumed by inspectors and other desk officers in terms of interaction with 
higher hierarchical levels has affected the quality of the policy process. The inability to 
freely express their professional opinion and make contributions is one structural 
obstacle in the interaction between actors involved in the process from formulation to 
implementation and enforcement. This has resulted in a poor draft and a lack of 
agreement with other parties involved or affected by the directive. As a consequence, 
implementation has failed to date in spite of the fact that the law has been in force since 
2008. In the case of the second directive, decentralised coordination has slowed down 
the process for many months, and obstacles have been solved at the technical level by 
mostly including proposals from other agencies and especially from inspectors. The 
directive is still considered partially implemented because of uneven enforcement in 
different parts of the territory.  
Regarding the consultation process and involvement of interest groups and non-state 
actors in general, in the area of free movement of goods, formally, there is a well-
structured framework in place, especially thanks to the functioning of the NCCB. The 
institutionalisation of consultation processes is quite recent in the area, so it is still 
formal to a large extent. Policy implementation is affected because of a lack of 
substantial involvement in the design process and, most important, because of a lack of 
information for interested parties that will be later affected by the policy. Although 
business associations are formally involved in parts of acts before approval, there is not 
a structured information flow within their membership that would create the conditions 
for them to contribute or at least to prepare for when laws enter into force. There is a 
centralised management pattern in these associations, and their representatives are often 
acting in their own interest rather than the associations’. In addition, even when they are 
involved in a more substantive way, they lack capacities for contribution in terms of 
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technical expertise and quality of contributions. Because of the continuous growth in 
implementation deficit regarding acts that transpose the EU acquis, a culture of “wait 
and see” has developed among actors in the business community. In the case of the 
directives studied, most of them did not start preparing for compliance before the act 
went into force but rather waited for information or rumours to understand whether it 
would be enforced or not. 
When it comes to the importance of EU involvement in the process, it was difficult to 
find clear evidence for drawing conclusions on the selected directives. However, the 
experience of all participants was that EU direct assistance can improve the policy 
process because of their expertise and positive pressure in terms of structuring the 
stages from design to implementation. Neither of the two directives was assisted 
directly by the EU, but in other cases, their support on the ground generated positive 
cooperation, more accountability, and better planning for the process. Implementation 
records seem to have a positive coincidence with this cooperation, because monitoring 
from the EU side is more effective. In addition, because of the work approach adopted 
by EU experts, when they are involved, there is better inclusion of interested parties in 
the process. Experts tend to organise comprehensive cooperation by gathering 
information from different sources. Paradoxically, though the process is top-down in 
principle, the direct involvement of EU actors in the process for specific transpositions 
in free movement of goods has not only had a positive impact on implementation but 
also encouraged the bottom-up approach. One shortcoming regarding EU involvement 
is the fact that the initiative for assistance is left entirely up to the Albanian side. Since 
the participants all admitted the limited capacities in understanding the acquis in general 
and especially for properly planning its adoption, their choice for assistance may be 
influenced by this lack of capacity. EU experts would know better which are the most 
difficult parts of the acquis for the sector that have required major work for other 
accession countries in the past, what the order and steps in transposition should be, etc. 
Because of this “apathy” from the EU side, a request for assistance might not be 
effective and may not be used where it is really needed. 
Free movement of goods has been and will continue to be one of the most difficult 
chapters of the acquis for implementation in the case of Albania. Despite the efforts to 
ensure adequate administrative capacities (quantitatively), there is a clear need for better 
structuring of the process and balancing between speed and quality. If the design stage 
is not carried out properly through expertise and inclusiveness, the implementation will 
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show clear problems. The implementation deficit in this area has grown in recent years, 
and with an increase in administrative capacities in quantity and political pressure for 
transposition, it will continue to increase if implementation obstacles are not taken into 
account during the early stages of the policy process.  
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CHAPTER 6 COMPETITION 
In the 1990s, the Albanian economy entered a process of restructuring and 
transformation aiming at transition from a state planned economy to a market economy. 
At that stage, the rules of the market were less defined, especially in regard to 
competition. Market economy principles were being transplanted all at once into a 
society that lacked a competition culture (Gugu 2004; Gruda & Melani 2010). In 
addition, the Albanian economy lacked a legislative basis to regulate, protect, and 
encourage competition.  
The first real step for introducing measures to regulate and institutionalise competition 
in Albania was taken in December 1995 with Law No. 8044, “On Competition”. The 
law provided for the establishment of the first structure to deal with competition issues, 
the Department of Commercial Legislation (DCL) under the Ministry of Industry, 
Transport and Trade (Law No. 8044, 1995, Part V). The Competition Commission at 
the Ministry of Economy was later associated with the DCL (Gruda & Lati 2010). 
Although the law on competition was an important step forward, “the application of this 
law encountered with lots of problems in resolving cases of the privatisation and 
liberalisation of strategic sectors” (Gugu, 2004, p. 6). These concerns further emerged 
with the start of the negotiations for the SAA in 2003, the signing of the SAA, and the 
implementation of the Interim Agreement on Trade and Trade Related Issues in 2006 
(Lati 2012).  
One of the main developments in the area has been the creation of the Albanian 
Competition Authority (ACA), a structure responsible for competition-related issues. 
The creation of this structure is a direct response to SAA provisions on competition and 
competition-related issues. Points 3 and 4 (Title VI, Article 71) set the creation of this 
independent structure entrusted with the powers necessary for the full application of 
restrictions on: 
“(i) all agreements between undertakings, decisions by Associations of 
undertakings and concerted practices between undertakings which have 
as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of 
competition; (ii) abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant 
position in the territories of the Community or of Albania as a whole or in 
a substantial part thereof; (iii) any State aid which distorts or threatens to 
distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or certain 
products” (Council of the EU 2006a: Title VI, Article 71).   
113 
 
According to Gugu (2004, p. 3), the importance of the Competition Authority is visible 
compared to the previous Directorate on Competition established under the Ministry of 
Economy by the 1995 law “On Competition”. The Competition Authority is a unique 
institution composed of a Competition Commission, which is the decision-making 
body, and a Secretariat, which carries out the investigative work (Council of Ministers 
2010, p. 787). The Competition Commission formulated and approved on 28 December 
2006 the National Competition Policy (decision No. 43), the first document of this type 
on competition policy in Albania. This policy document “aims at fostering competition 
by ensuring the improvement of market efficiency and the minimisation of the negative 
impacts on resource distribution related to market power” (Gruda & Lati 2010, p. 14). 
Although assessed as considerably independent by the Project against Corruption in 
Albania (PACA 2010, pp. 19-20), recommendations aiming at preventing the risk to 
corruption related to the activities of the Competition Authority were given on three 
main areas: the legal framework, the operational independence, and the transparency of 
the work of this structure.  
This chapter explores the implementation of the acquis in the competition policy of 
Albania. The adoption and implementation of EU regulations related to competition 
implies structural and institutional changes in the economic system, and that is why it 
represents an important area that directly influences the economic criteria set in 
Copenhagen.  
Initially, this chapter introduces the background of compliance with EU legislation in 
the field through a summarised account of developments in EU acquis regarding 
competition and how compliance and approximation have developed. Then the research 
framework is explained by describing the sample, the process of data collection, 
materials and sources used, and the interviews that took place during the fieldwork.  
As in the other analytical chapters, the part where findings are analysed and discussed is 
divided according to the main pillars regarding the research framework of the study to 
understand and explain the process in terms of institutional interaction between different 
actors involved in the process. The case study regulation is integrated into this part 
through analysis and the tracing of its cycle from adoption to implementation status. 
The theoretical propositions raised are discussed and explored in the same part. The 
findings are then integrated into the conclusion section, where the outcome of the 
research and analysis of the area is summarised and some considerations on additional 
findings and future research are addressed. 
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6.1 Competition and approximation with EU legal acts 
The main mission of competition policy is the promotion and protection of free and 
effective competition by protecting the competitive environment and by promoting fair 
and effective competition in the market. The EU competition acquis covers antitrust, 
merger and State aid control policies. It includes rules and procedures to fight anti-
competitive behaviour by companies (restrictive agreements between undertakings and 
abuse of dominant positions), to scrutinise mergers and to prevent governments from 
granting State aid that distorts competition in the internal market. 
Chapter 8 of the acquis, "Competition Policy", includes rules on the protection of free 
and effective competition in the market, rules regarding the applicability of state aid, as 
well as liberalisation. With the start of the negotiations for the SAA and the need for the 
approximation of the Albanian legislation with the acquis a new law on competition 
was adopted, Law No. 9121 of 28 July 2003, “On Competition Protection”, referred to 
as the Competition Protection Law. The Competition Protection Law:   
“covers all sectors of the economy…applies to all public and private 
undertakings…applies to both goods and services…. covers binding or 
non-binding agreements of all forms concluded between undertakings, 
decisions or recommendations of associations of undertakings, and 
concerted practices of undertakings operating at the same level 
(horizontal agreements) or at different levels (vertical agreements)” 
(Council of Ministers 2010, pp. 779-781).  
Although this new law was considered “modern in the terminology used, and in 
evaluation of specific situation, regarding the performance of enterprises in the 
condition of market competition” (Gugu 2004, p. 3), at different stages the Competition 
Protection Law was amended in order to address specific acquis provisions, SAA 
articles and EU requirements. The last amendment to the Competition Protection Law 
was adopted on 16 September 2010, Law No. 10317, “On Competition Protection” 
(Albanian Competition Authority, 2013).  
To establish fair and effective competition in the Albanian market, the Albanian 
Competition Authority is responsible for implementing the obligations which derive 
from Articles 71 and 72 of the SAA, the National Competition Policy, and the entire 
legal framework that regulates the decision-making activity of an independent public 
institution. Articles 70, 71 and 72 SAA foresee obligations and responsibilities of the 
Albanian Competition Authority to protect free and effective competition from anti-
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competitive practices and actions, which may affect trade between the Community and 
Albania.  
Overall, the Albanian competition legal framework has been approximated with the EU 
legal framework
33
. The Competition Authority has intervened in many sectors of the 
economy where anti-competitive practices have been identified and detected, taking 
appropriate measures to restore competition in the market (EC 2011). The Authority has 
continued the process of the approximation of legislation with the EU acquis, aiming at 
a comprehensive legal framework for competition (Lati 2012). The focus of its activities 
is all anti-competitive practices which may distort or restrict competition in the market. 
The Competition Authority has been very careful in watching different sectors and 
markets of the economy, as stated in the European Commission progress report 2012. It 
has given priority to the drafting of secondary legislation in the competition field. It has 
drafted and adopted a number of Regulations and Guidelines, which are fully 
approximated with EU laws. In addition to its activity, the Competition Authority has 
given special importance to competition advocacy. The Competition Authority works to 
create a ‘competition culture’, which is focused on full transparency of procedures 
followed by the Authority (EC 2012). This transparency is achieved by the publication 
of the Commission's decisions in real time, as well as by listening to other actors (state 
institutions) before giving recommendations.  
The 2010 Progress Report considers Albanian legislative framework on competition as 
in line with “essential elements of the acquis” (EC 2010, p. 63), especially after the 
adoption of the amendments in 2010. The report again concludes by assessing that 
further steps are needed in order to safeguard the independence of the administrative 
structures. The 2012 Progress Report assesses that progress was made in the field of 
anti-trust and mergers following the adaptation of the Regulation on agreements of 
minor importance and especially considering the decisions against anti-competitive 
agreements and against the abuse of dominant positions implemented by the Albanian 
Competition Authority (ACA). The investigative and monitoring activity of the ACA 
during 2012 was further evaluated as important following some decisions on fines and 
its advocacy and public-awareness activities (EC 2012, p. 37). However, no progress 
was noticed regarding SAC administrative capacity. 
 
                                                 
33
 A full list of transposed EU legal acts in the legislation can be found in Appendix 7. 
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6.2 Explaining the research inquiry for Competition 
As explained earlier, the Albanian Competition Authority is the main responsible body 
for monitoring competition and for further complying with EU acquis in the field. 
Therefore most of research for this area has been focused on ACA’s activity and 
performance, in terms of management of the policy field and performance in 
implementation and enforcement. The ACA has been praised for many consecutive 
years in the EC Progress Reports on Albania, as one of the most advanced institutions in 
terms of compliance and quality of its activities. As an example, over the last years 
(2010-2012), the ACA has issued twice the number of decisions with penalties as the 
Croatian authority (Lati 2012). This good general performance of ACA has also been 
highlighted from representatives of EU Commission who were interviewed which 
consider ACA as a good example for other competition authorities in the region (EC 
2012, interview). Therefore, it is useful to explore in more depth the functioning of this 
institution and to understand its modus operandi as regarding compliance with the 
acquis and implementation. 
The ACA is very active in proposing the adoption of new approximated legislation 
since they are also chairing the Inter-institutional Working Group
34
 on Competition. 
They are in charge of coordinating all other institutions involved in this policy area with 
the purpose of transposing legislation on competition. However, implementation and 
enforcement is the main task for the Authority and its inspectorate
35
. Therefore, ACA 
covers the whole process of EU policy adoption from its proposal to monitoring 
implementation and enforcement. 
Due to the fact that EU does not regulate Competition policy through directives, but 
through regulations, in this chapter I have tried to go more in depth to the institutional 
functioning (policy cycle) by using more in-depth and detailed interviews and 
documentary analysis, rather than focusing on specific legal acts/regulations being 
adopted. Since the process is mostly internal to one institution, it becomes more useful 
to analyse it from an organisational rather than a regulation based approach. 
Documentary analysis has been used especially in the early stage before starting the 
interviews. There is extensive written documentation on this policy area since the 
system set up internally for the institution provides for very well-structured internal and 
                                                 
34
 The functioning of IWGEI was explained in Chapter 4. 
35
 Inspectorate is internal to the ACA and thus not a separate depending institutions as it is usually in line 
ministries. 
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external official communication. Several reports and publications issued by the ACA 
provided useful basis for understanding its activities through the years and its main 
statistics. Field reports from inspectors were also made available for my research 
(though not published to the wider public). The website of the ACA was also another 
useful source for gathering documents necessary for the analysis and for better 
understanding its activities from a formal point of view. In addition, studies done by 
external experts and internal staff were used for trying to capture evolution of the 
institution and changes in the policy area since 2006 to 2011.  
In such a highly regulated, formalised and well-structured institution, in-depth 
interviews were the most important and effective instrument for exploring the 
theoretical propositions raised and for understanding the impact of the variables in 
implementation. The participants were 16 in total for this area, including the Head of 
ACA, one General Director, one Direction Board member, two inspectors, two EU 
officials covering this area for Albania, two desk officers from the Ministry of 
Economy, three representatives of the business community, two professors from the 
University of Tirana, one local expert on competition and one desk officer in Brussels. 
The structure of the interview was similar to other areas but more focused on 
institutional coordination and interaction in terms of procedures and the impact on the 
design process and implementation. The extent of transcriptions was quite large and it 
was very useful for the data analysis stage because it provided useful information for 
my findings. Since competition is sometimes a sensitive area interfering with different 
interests, most of participants required not to be identified with their name. 
 
6.3. Analysis of the findings 
6.3.1 Institutional coordination and division of competences 
Being an entirely new policy area for Albania, competition required a central authority 
from the beginning in order to ensure proper functioning and to facilitate the 
establishment of necessary structures. The ACA fulfils that role since it was established. 
However, as the head of ACA, Lindita Lati (2012) points out, political support is 
essential when creating new institutions. Their credibility is often dependent on their 
competences and what type of political back-up they have in order to exercise fully their 
competences. First, this centralised role needs to be recognised by legal provisions. 
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With a few improvements in the legislation regarding the ACA, formally it now has the 
necessary independence
36
 and the mandate for checking all legal acts and policy 
interventions that might jeopardise competition and have implications in that area. 
Drafts need to be sent to the ACA and its opinion needs to be taken into account.  
However, beyond the formal aspect of the process, it is often a question of credibility in 
the practice and perception of authority. As Lati (2012) reminds, one of the key 
moments in strengthening their central role and perception in the public sphere was the 
case of the Insurance draft law. The legal act was drafted with businesses who were 
involved in the discussion but afterwards it was sent to the ACA for its opinion. ACA 
desk officers analysed the draft and identified several infringements to fair competition 
practices and SAA provisions. As Lati explained: 
“We were not sure how the ministry would react to our opinion although 
we were in contact with them at the desk officer level. We were ready to 
address it to the Parliament if it was passed by the government. It was an 
important moment for our work, because such a response could give an 
important signal for future practices. Fortunately the minister dismissed 
the act which gave us more credibility” (Lati 2012). 
This represented a turning point in its central coordination activities on the area, public 
awareness, especially among businesses, had an immediate boost. Complaints filed at 
ACA for competition issues by businesses increased by five times the year after (Melani 
2012; ACA bulletin 2012). As Lati further elaborates: 
“Before that event we used to call periodical roundtables with actors 
from business communities and institutions, but very few were attending. 
After that act was dismissed, they came” (Lati 2012). 
Clear competences and political back up seem to have been essential elements for this 
newly established institution. It provided a solid basis not only for credibility and 
publicity in the community, but it also facilitated interaction with other government 
agencies especially in solving disputes. In case of disputes, there is a resolution 
approved by the Parliament that allows the ACA to bring important disputes directly to 
the Parliament, specifically to the Parliamentary Commission for Economic Affairs. 
This ‘power’ has helped ACA in its relations with government institutions which would 
prefer to avoid having the legal act rejected in the final stage (at the Parliamentary 
Committee), after many months of work, just because they did not take into account the 
opinion of the ACA. All these instruments have improved the functioning of the 
                                                 
36
 It depends only from the Parliament. 
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Authority and have had a positive impact on the implementation record in the area of 
competition, where increased positive progress has been reported by the European 
Commission (EC 2012).  
However, having a strong and credible central authority to coordinate the process can be 
a necessary but not sufficient condition for ensuring compliance. As one ACA 
Commissioners, Koco Broka (2012), states, each state institution has its own agenda 
and they pressure one another to pursue their objectives. Lati (2012) recalls an example 
regarding the Financial Supervisory Authority (FSA). FSA's main institutional priority 
is to fight informality in the economy. For this purpose they encourage stronger 
cooperation between private companies. However, as Lati argues on this, ACA has 
opposed this in some cases because it harms competition. Therefore, in these cases it 
becomes quite a struggle between public institutions. This seems to be one of the 
elements that creates obstacles to ACA’s work especially in exercising their activity and 
involvement in the policy design stage (which later affects compliance and observance 
of transposed acquis). 
Close cooperation and continuous communication between agencies is very important. 
The exercise that Albania went through in 2010 with the application questionnaire 
helped in establishing more useful working contact between agencies, which for the 
ACA is crucial. The Authority signed several memorandums of understanding with 
main institutions in order to structure cooperation and exchange of information with 
strengthened procedures. However, coordination remains a sensitive problem. As 
Melani (2012) describes it: 
"sometimes it seems like public administration is a train with many 
attached cars but no common or clear orientation. Each of them looks 
only internally, at their own little space".  
While this is a common problem in most policy areas, it is interesting how even a very 
centralised coordinated authority with clear division of competences can perceive this 
when interacting with other parties. The difference in performance between ACA and 
other similar agencies has been recognised by Albanian and EU experts and one of the 
key elements that has helped the Authority in its activity has been strong central 
coordination within its policy area. However, as explained, this has been combined with 
political endorsement, credibility and strategic operations in terms of networking and 
structured interaction with other institutions.  
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In addition, the ACA has adopted a modern approach to investment in human resources 
and strengthening its capacities. As an EU official covering this area from Brussels 
would note, apart from strengthening internal and inspections procedures and setting 
very clear competences for each department, ACA has in place a very active policy for 
promoting and training staff. Inspectors and other members of ACA have higher salaries 
than their counterparts in other institutions. From the interviews with inspectors it was 
quite evident that their knowledge on EU acquis development and its interpretation and 
understanding was quite advanced. They claim to receive periodic training and, after the 
restructuring of ACA, there is now a department dealing specifically with EU 
integration and approximation of legislation. This new office monitors developments 
and updates its staff. Members of the board and direction of ACA participate in many 
regional and European events and are very active in suggesting policy interventions in 
the country. This pro-active approach has not only improved their performance but, as a 
consequence, has recorded a positive trend in compliance and enforcement of 
competition policy in Albania, as stated in the minutes of the SAA subcommittee of 
Internal Market on 2011. 
In terms of institutional capacities and centralisation of coordination, ACA is an almost 
unique case in Albania. Its successful performance in ensuring implementation and 
enforcement in the acquis related to competition policy has been stressed by EC in 
several occasions, praising its work even in comparison to other similar counterparts in 
the Balkan region. A local expert on competition argues that this is also due to the fact 
that this policy area does not face resistance from past practices, since there was no 
competition policy in the past. However, lack of resistance might be better explained 
from the strong political support given and the 'use' of Parliament from ACA as a 
instrument to fulfil its mandate. 
Another dimension of centralisation regards the fact that ACA is leading and 
coordinating the Inter-institutional Working Group (IWGEI) on competition. It has full 
responsibility and authority for planning the adoption of the acquis in this area and it 
uses this institutional framework regularly for coordinating the process. As a member of 
this group points out (2012): 
"Inspectors of ACA are part of the working group because they are 
involved in the drafting as well. They give their opinion. This facilitates 
things, I guess, cause then they know how to follow them afterwards on 
the ground. I can tell from their active role in the group that they are 
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quite capable. However, at least, they can get all the information needed 
before it's approved in the Parliament". 
This is quite a peculiar case which is quite different from the other policy areas. The 
same authority is in charge of both policy design and then implementation and 
enforcement. Inspectors at ACA are not the classic inspector on the ground, rather than 
desk officers, checking documents and exploring business practices. This joint side of 
the two stages of the process is like a 'short-cut' that eliminates potential failures and 
problems coming from interaction and coordination with other institutions when 
drafting legislation for this policy area. Therefore, it looks like institutional 
centralisation can produce good results in terms of implementation, when not only the 
policy design process is centralised, but also when this is exercised and managed in 
common with the enforcement stage.  
 
6.3.2 Participation of non-state actors 
As explained earlier, the ACA direction has been very open to the general public since 
the beginning of its work. Their periodical bulletin and website show a list of calls for 
open meetings and training programmes provided by the Authority, where 
representatives of public institutions, business community, experts, academia members, 
have been invited to participate. ACA's main engagement and interaction with the 
public sphere is about informing and raising awareness regarding bad practices or 
competition law infringements. These activities are quite important especially in this 
area which entails mainly new legislation that Albania has not faced before (thus there 
is a learning process and public education that requires constant attention).  
This is why, maybe more than in other policy areas, competition policy faces 
unprepared stakeholders. As one of the field experts (2012) argues, after the chaotic 
business environment in the 1990s, the early 2000s have represented the first attempt to 
put order into the Albanian economy. Business representatives interviewed claimed to 
have been quite active with their association in exchanging information with the ACA, 
though they are not sufficiently aware of adopted legislation and its implications. 
Going back to the already used example of the insurance law of 2007, what happened 
then can provide useful insights on this topic. The main insurance companies 
cooperated and agreed among each other on the draft proposed, which was initially 
accepted by the Minister of Economy. However, as explained, the ACA found out that 
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this was against competition legislation and imposed its decision. Even to date, when 
asking one of the main promoters of that draft, one of the big insurance company 
owners and a very active member of the business community. claims: 
“I am not saying that the draft was perfect, but it was adopted from the 
British model and adapted to our reality. The ACA fails to understand the 
stage of our economy. They set some criteria which are too advanced and 
do not allow us to grow and develop. Of course there is a need for 
competition, but we also need to improve our regulation and not let chaos 
go on in our economy” (2012). 
From the different views registered during the interviews, it emerges that the top-down 
approach is quite visible in this sector and there is weak involvement from below. An 
ACA member also admits that competition policy legislation is adopted mainly because 
of transposition requirements (SAA) rather than any perceived urgency or demand from 
business community or society in general. He argues that if legislation was properly 
implemented and enforced in other areas related to the market, there would not be a 
major need for advancing so fast in the EU policy adoption process. However, this does 
not match the views of other staff members and direction in the Authority, although it is 
a version which is supported by other participants interviewed. Most believe that ACA 
should play a minor role and adapt to the real situation on the ground, as regards 
rigorous implementation and enforcement. In relation to this, Lati (2012) argues that it 
might be useful to adopt a careful approach in the beginning and not ‘make enemies’ all 
around, who would then resist enforcement. She quotes the International Competition 
Network, that says that in first years of competition authorities activities, they should 
deliver mainly good advocacy, raising awareness and sharing information. Therefore, it 
should not use penalties but assume an educative approach and try to inculcate a culture 
of competition among the different stakeholders and actors.  
In general, from what I could capture from interviews and from meetings organised by 
the ACA, there seems to be a lack of interest from business community regarding this 
policy area. The big companies have the necessary information because they have legal 
offices that monitor developments, but the large part seems not to be aware of 
competition policy and how it can affect their activity. As a professor in the Faculty of 
Economy of the University of Tirana explains:  
“When the law on competition was drafted there was no knowledge and 
no information by anyone, not even by us who study the field. But this was 
understandable, because there was almost no market here yet. Therefore 
it was not perceived as something that would have major effects in our 
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lives. This is why no one resisted implementation, although they were not 
involved or informed.” (2012). 
However, inspectors of ACA believe that after the first few years of ignoring 
competition policy, stakeholders are now beginning to complain and become interested 
in understanding and taking into account its implications in their activities. From their 
contact with big companies, their perception seems to be that all the awareness work is 
giving its effects. As Melani (2012) puts it: 
"communication has been problematic for early years. However, now due 
to a more pro-active approach of the ACA, competition policy is 
becoming more important in the agenda of public institutions dealing 
with market issues and for stakeholders (business community)."  
ACA still organises regular meetings with business representatives but, from the 
meeting minutes, participation seems to be very low. When asked about this, Melani 
argues that this is due to the culture changing very slowly. According to him, there is 
participation when there is direct interest on a certain subject by the company or when 
they need information they can’t access otherwise, for example when there are rapid 
changes in the law (Melani 2012).   
In spite of being a new policy area and of its many shortcomings in involving 
stakeholders, competition policy has a positive record in implementation. While it has 
been elusive in the previous years (due to lack of legislation in the field), it is now 
becoming more and more present, especially due to the speed of adoption of regulations 
from the acquis, helped by the good level of capacities and coordination of the ACA. 
However, this sector seems to be still at an early stage in terms of substantial 
involvement on non-state actors in the policy design and implementation, in spite of the 
awareness work and communication with stakeholders.  
 
6.3.3 Involvement of EU officials in the process 
As mentioned in the previous sections, the ACA has a very well developed network of 
international experts and is a member of organisations concerning competition. Its 
activism and registered progress has further strengthened its role. However, since it was 
a new policy area when established, assistance and support from the EU has been 
crucial. There are few other cases in Albania when some institutions have been built 
from scratch with foreign, especially EU, assistance. EU expertise has assisted the ACA 
and competition policy since its beginning. Their staff have received adequate support 
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and training which allowed them to immediately interact with European experts’ 
networks (Melani 2012). In addition, twinning projects have been a success story in the 
case of ACA, contributing to an elevated quality of its internal procedure, staff 
preparation and enforcement records.  
Competition policy in Albania represents a relatively successful story for the EU and its 
conditionality. There was a very high attention and assistance during its establishment 
and especially after the SAA was signed. This is also confirmed by two of the 
interviewed participants, representing the EC. Thus, by doing this “initial investment” in 
terms of support and assistance, the EU created the conditions for a well-functioning 
institution and the premises for a good work in implementation and enforcement of 
competition policy (Lati 2012). That said, competition policy acts are however not fully 
implemented in Albania. There are several open cases and inter-institutional discussions 
going on, where Albanian authorities have not been able to implement relevant 
legislation, especially in the oil industry, telecommunications, energy, etc. In most cases 
the ACA acts on request, in others it assumes a pro-active approach (when the issue is 
brought to public attention by media or when it is sensitive). Despite the high level 
training of its inspectors and staff as explained earlier, the ACA does not have yet the 
required capacities to cover all the market in all sectors and EU expertise is still strongly 
needed (Broka 2012). 
In addition, ACA has not developed and consolidated yet a proper interaction with 
stakeholders (as explained above) which would help its activities and would facilitate 
implementation of competition policy. This is proven by the fact that some issues or 
complaints to ACA have come from EU member states representatives in Albania or 
from EU Delegation. Muco (2012) recalls a case she faced in her capacity as EU officer 
based in Tirana, covering economic and competition issues, where a legal act that would 
be passed by Albanian government clashed with non-discrimination article of the acquis 
and SAA provisions, which could potentially harm competition. The issue was raised 
directly from the EU Delegation and the clause was revoked. Therefore implementation 
is monitored by other important actors which help ACA in its activity. Although EU 
delegation is involved more when they directly assist for designing and implementing 
specific policies (Muco 2012), they pay attention to implementation in all areas. 
The fact that competition policy has been performing well in terms of implementation 
does not exclude the necessity for more direct assistance from EU experts. Adoption of 
EU competition regulations has been incremental and so far ACA has managed quite 
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well in planning its resources and capacities in accordance to the workload to come (EC 
2012). However, in order to maintain this pace it is necessary that it strengthens further 
its expertise and capacities. As Melani (2012) points out, as an example: 
“EU is a moving target in all areas and competition policy is quite 
complex. For example, in the area of cartel practices there have been 
many changes in just few years. It is quite difficult to follow up and that’s 
why either we have additional specialised staff or we have support from 
EU expertise”.  
Involvement of EU actors helps in increasing attention and speeding up the process. 
However, in the case of competition, especially when big interests are at stake, sensitive 
cases are difficult to pursue without political support. Therefore, in the case of 
competition policy, rather than EU pressure, 'positive' political pressure and support 
seem to have more impact and effectiveness. The EU played a crucial role when 
assisting the institution in the beginning and supporting the framework for establishing 
a structured competition policy. Afterwards, implementation has been followed and 
monitored quite effectively by the ACA and its capacities.  
However, especially in terms of inclusiveness, the EU is still playing a major role as 
'mediator' for companies (especially foreign ones), member states, different 
stakeholders, which sometimes address their complaints to the EU delegation. Since 
competition policy has been transposed from EU acquis and since the EC is monitoring 
Albania’s progress towards membership, the logical short-cut is used by all these 
entities who involve the EU in the picture anytime there is a clash or a dispute. While 
this helps competition policy implementation in general, it might undermine ACA’s 
credibility in the long term, if stakeholders do not address issues directly to them. As an 
expert of ACA argues: 
"we have an excellent cooperation with EU representatives in Albania. 
However there are cases where they bring us complains from business 
community, especially foreigners. We do not mind that, but we have been 
open to interest groups for any request or issue they might have. We know 
that trust in public institutions here is quite low and international 
community is seen in a more positive way, but I think we need to 
cooperate for this to change".  
EU officials' role seems to undermine the authority and credibility of ACA despite the 
good intentions. This has further intensified contacts of non-state actors with the EU 
delegation, rather than with Albanian authorities. However, in the short term, this close 
relation between ACA and EU representatives has helped in ensuring its right direction 
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and in monitoring its activities more effectively and in including opinions and concerns 
from non-state actors (although mostly via EU officials). This has turned to have a 
positive impact on monitoring implementation and enforcement in this area. 
It is still quite early to reach sound conclusions on the solidity of competition policy and 
its implementation because, as explained, it is still a new policy area. Since its 
establishment, ACA has been chaired by the same person, political support has been 
steady and staff has almost not changed, which has guaranteed the strengthening of 
capacities and institutional memory. However, we cannot predict what can happen in 
the future with this institution, what will the political will be, the vision of its future 
chair, etc. This is why, in spite of a good performance in implementation, EU assistance 
can be helpful even in the future for making sure that competition policy is monitored 
and ruled properly. 
 
6.4 Conclusions on the Implementation of competition legislation 
Competition policy governance and implementation of the EU acquis in Albania 
represents an almost sui generis case for the country, for various reasons. First, it is 
coordinated in a very centralised system with an institution built from scratch. The 
mandate of the Albanian Competition Authority has been set clearly since its 
establishment, with an accurate description of competences and strong political support. 
Its public recognition and credibility grew quite quickly, and its proactive approach 
helped in ensuring compliance with and the implementation of adopted legislation. 
Inter-institutional disputes have been important but relatively easier to manage, as the 
ACA is independent from the executive and responds directly to the Parliament. In 
addition, the ACA has been given the power to bring disputes and issues directly to the 
relevant Parliamentary committees. Documentary analysis and information gathered 
suggest that strong central coordination has been an important asset in ensuring the 
good performance of the ACA in monitoring the implementation and enforcement of 
competition policy acts in the country. 
The substantial assistance received from the EU since the beginning, the human 
resources strategy adopted, and the directions’ proactive vision have also further 
improved the performance of this institution, achieving good results in ensuring 
implementation (which has also been recognised by the European Commission). High-
level training and an efficient inspection system have also been praised for their 
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effectiveness. The involvement of inspectors in other important governance activities 
have had an impact in maintaining a common understanding among the various 
departments. As the literature suggests, street-level bureaucrats are not always involved 
in other processes and therefore do not have the opportunity to express their concerns, 
which might avoid obstacles in the implementation and enforcement stage. The smooth 
cooperation ensured in the institution through clear procedures and internal rules has 
helped in making the institution “work as one”. 
However, the inclusiveness of stakeholders has not been developed properly. Because 
this was a new policy area for the country, public awareness was quite low, and despite 
the efforts of the ACA, there seems to have been a lack of information among 
stakeholders. Most of them do not show interest even many years later, although 
competition policy might affect their business activity. From interviews with business 
representatives, I grasped a perception of the ACA as an “enemy”, especially from big 
companies. The business culture still hinges on a desire for a less monitored system, and 
the introduction of new rules in a very incremental way might create tensions in the near 
future, especially in terms of implementation and enforcement. Therefore, there is a 
need for better communication and interaction with stakeholders from the ACA and 
other public institutions dealing with competition policy.  
When it comes to the EU’s role, this is a very good example of what the theoretical 
proposition stands for: if EU actors are more involved in the process through assistance, 
then implementation has a better chance of succeeding. The EU was present in setting 
up the whole legislative and institutional framework from scratch through financial 
assistance and expertise. Its involvement, combined with domestic political will and 
good capacities from staff engaged in the process, helped in establishing a well-
functioning structure that would then be able to achieve good results in ensuring the 
implementation and enforcement of related acts that would be adopted. Its role 
continued to be important in the years after, although the ACA has been covering the 
area in a satisfactory way by engaging with experts from different countries. However, 
the EU’s role remains very important in monitoring developments in competition policy 
from an institutional and legislative point of view. In addition, it is helping to fill the 
gap in inclusiveness since different stakeholders contact the EU delegation as a 
mediator on issues concerning competition. This function should be developed by the 
ACA directly, but in the short term, the EU is providing its assistance under this 
perspective.  
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Finally, the coordination and governance of this policy area has raised some additional 
discussions concerning implementation. This case seems to suggest that institutions 
built from scratch but with a clear vision and strong support might have better 
performance with implementation. The legal basis was immediately consolidated, so it 
started with a strong legal framework in place, ensuring clear competences and 
independence (Melani 2012). Their practices and internal procedures were transposed 
from good examples from the EU and did not reflect the institutional culture of 
Albanian institutions (so less resistance to new practices emerged). The staff hired had 
different domestic and international backgrounds in terms of professional experience, 
but the access criteria were higher than usual in Albanian public administration. Since 
the EU has been “sponsoring” and monitoring this institutional framework, its 
independence and staff stability has been monitored even closer, which has further 
increased the quality of its work. Therefore, this case can be considered an 
“experiment” that needs to be analysed even more deeply to understand the dynamics 
and combination of factors that can guarantee the replication of these results in other 
policy areas. Although just a few years have passed since its establishment, the ACA 
provides a good example of how implementation can improve when the right 
institutional framework and capacities are set in place.  
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CHAPTER 7 FOOD SAFETY 
The EU acquis on food safety is based on general principles derived from the Treaty on 
European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, as well from 
the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union. These principles 
include the “precautionary principle", that has been invoked to ensure health protection 
in the Union and transparency principle to ensure that consumers have confidence in the 
decision-making processes related to food law and the structures and independence of 
the institutions protecting their health. A considerable level of protection of human life 
and health needs to be ensured in the pursuit of Union policies that apply to all stages of 
the production, processing, and distribution of food according to the farm to fork or the 
“stable to table” principle. Food safety requirements are thoroughly regulated in EU 
secondary legislation. Regulation 178/2002 is the basic legal framework for food safety 
in the EU and the basis for establishing a high level of protection of human health and 
consumers' interest in relation to food, taking into account in particular the diversity of 
the supply of food, including traditional products. With the adoption of Regulation 
178/2002, food safety became a horizontal issue, and such a horizontal approach has 
continued to be followed and completed by the adoption of the Food Hygiene Package 
and other relevant regulations listed in Chapter 12 of the acquis on Food Safety, 
Veterinary and Phytosanitary Policy. 
In the case of Albania, food safety, unlike the previous policy areas, has some 
institutional history from the communist regime. Under communism, the Ministry of 
Agriculture was in charge of and responsible for this area, and it had its own institutions 
and laboratories that were involved in ensuring safety to a certain extent. Of course, the 
EU represents a much higher level and quality of standards in this field, which require 
major efforts in terms of financial and administrative resources.  
This chapter starts by explaining the most important steps and reforms undertaken by 
Albania regarding alignment with the EU. It describes the state of legislation 
approximation and then explains the institutional framework that has been established 
over the years to fulfil the commitments and requirements under the SAA. The elements 
of the research inquiry are then described, focusing mostly on the directives chosen for 
the sample and the sources used. Section 7.3 elaborates the findings according to the 
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different variables studied. Last, conclusions are discussed and the main findings 
relevant for this policy area are explained. 
 
 
7.1 Alignment with the acquis and institutional development 
The obligation to approximate Albanian legislation in Chapter 12 with that of the 
European Union stems from Articles 70 and 95 of the SAA. It is required from Albania 
to strengthen the food safety system and related control systems. This would imply the 
reinforcement of laboratory capacity in food safety and in the veterinary and 
phytosanitary domain. Most important, it requires alignment of legislation with EU 
legal acts and its proper implementation for improving food safety, phytosanitary and 
veterinary situation.  
Current Albanian law on food safety is partly in compliance with the EU acquis. 
Although several provisions are either fully or partly approximated, further legislative 
work is necessary in order to comply with the approximation obligation laid down in the 
Stabilisation and Association Agreement (EC 2012). More specifically further 
legislative work is needed in order to comply with the two certification requirement 
regulations (Regulation 605/2010/EC and Regulation 206/2010/EC). Moreover, major 
transposition effort is necessary to approximate the Albanian hygiene package with 
Regulation 853/2004/EC and Regulation 854/2004/EC on food of animal origin.  
Overall, in the field of food safety, more than one hundred EU acts have been 
transposed into national legislation and a number of major steps have been undertaken. 
The Law on Food No. 9863 was adopted in 2008 and this is partially approximated with 
EU Regulation (EC) No. 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 
January 2002 laying down the general principles and requirements of food law, 
establishing the European Food Safety Authority and laying down procedures in matters 
of food safety and with Regulation (EC) No. 882/2004 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 29 April 2004 on official controls performed to ensure the verification 
of compliance with feed and food law, animal health and animal welfare rules. In 
general, current legislation dealing with food safety in Albania is partially aligned with 
EU provisions. However, implementation remains the main problem (EC 2012). 
In terms of institutional organisation, the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Consumer 
Protection (MAFCP) is the main responsible institution for  food safety policy in 
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Albania. The central competent authority within the ministry is the General Directorate 
of Food Safety and Consumer Protection (GDFSCP). This unit is also responsible for 
the transposition and implementation of legislation on the technical aspects, while the 
Legal Directorate is responsible for checking legal aspects.  
As mentioned previously, the legal basis regulating food control includes Law No 9863 
of 28 January 2008 ‘On food’ (No 17, 2008), based on Regulation No 178/2002 of the 
EU. This law is designed to help lay the foundations for the protection of human health 
and consumer interests. As regarding the process of alignment with EU legal acts, the 
ministry drafts legislation in the field of food safety and it is responsible for 
approximation of Albanian legislation to EU legislation. The ministry cooperates with 
the Ministry of European Integration on complying with the National Plan for the 
Implementation of the SAA and obligations formulated in the respective SAA 
subcommittee. 
In Albania, official inspections in food safety, animal health and plant protection are 
carried out by inspectors, employees of the regional directorates of agricultural, food 
and consumer protection, regional directorate of public health and the veterinary offices 
of the local government. Samples taken during official inspections are analysed in the 
regional laboratories under the Ministry of Health and MoAFCP, and in the relevant 
agencies, namely the Public Health Institute (PHI) and the Food Safety and Veterinary 
Institute (FSVI). The official control is carried out across all the stages of the 
production, processing and distribution. There are 12 regional inspectorates country-
wide. At present, there are a total of 135 food safety inspectors. These inspectors draft 
their monthly and yearly control plans and, in general, they apply these plans through 
special inspections based on the Albanian legislation in force (Ministry of Agriculture 
2007). These controls are performed in serious risk periods based on the joint control 
programs. The State Sanitary Inspectorate is responsible for the food safety control of 
the products of non-animal origin. The Inspectorate of the Food Safety is responsible for 
the quality control of all types of food products (Cuko 2012).  
By changing the Law no. 9863 date 28.01.2008 “On Food”, the organisation of the 
control system changed
37
, foreseeing the creation of a National Food Authority (NFA) 
who became responsible for all inspections regarding food safety, animal health and 
plant protection, including risk evaluation. It was foreseen that NFA would be 
                                                 
37
 The system explained above has experiences changes and the National Food Authority has been in 
charge of inspections since 2009. 
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functional gradually, in three phases, until 2011 when it would be fully functional. At 
the time of fieldwork of this study (2012), the NFA was fully functional and staffed (EC 
2012). 
The full establishment of the National Food Authority (NFA) has been the most 
important institutional development in food safety area. NFA was established with a 
Ministers Council Decision No. 1081 date 21 October 2009, but, as explained, it 
became fully operational in 2012. The main reason for establishing this new body was 
because of the unclear chain of command between the four agencies involved in food 
safety and to clarify competences related to it, concentrating them under a single 
authority (Cuko 2012; Misha 2012).  
In terms of actual responsibilities, NFA is the competent authority for inspecting at 
national level in the field of safety and protection of consumers’, plants and animal’s 
health protection. Therefore now organisation of adoption and implementation process 
is simplified as follows: the only responsible organism for transposing and drafting 
legislation and policies that cover EU legal acts on food safety is the Ministry of 
Agriculture and the NFA is the only authorised body for implementing and enforcing 
this legislation and policies. Since its establishment, the NFA has significantly increased 
its operational capacity and has expanded its activity across the 12 regions of the 
country (Cuko 2012). However, the responsibilities, powers and interaction procedures 
between the Ministry of Agriculture and NFA need to be defined clearly (EC 2012). 
 
7.2 Explaining the sample and the sources used 
This chapter of the acquis is composed from four different parts: food safety and 
control, veterinary policy, phytosanitary policy, and seed and planting material. The 
focus of this inquiry is on food safety only. The main strategies and planning documents 
of this area used as reference in the study relate only to this first of the four sectors. The 
food safety chapter is considered as one of the most difficult for accession countries. 
The quantity of directives and legal acts makes it quite difficult to comply with. Quality 
is also a big challenge, since most of it is related to standards and therefore has financial 
implications for the country. As explained in the previous sections, Albania has done a 
considerable amount of work in trying to comply with the acquis in this chapter. 
Legislation in this chapter is complex and more often quite technical. In order to better 
identify representative legal acts which might help in exploring the policy process, I 
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undertook a preliminary fieldtrip where I consulted different actors and experts of the 
area. I chose two different directives which have been transposed into Albanian 
legislation, both presenting partial compliance
38
. In addition, in one case 
implementation has been considered partial and in the second case there is no 
implementation as of the end of 2010 (Council of Ministers 2010). An interesting fact is 
that transposition has been implemented through two different legal acts, one via the 
Council of Ministers’ Decision and the second via Ministerial Order. As will be 
analysed later, the two procedures present differences in terms of policy process and 
adoption, which might affect implementation. The choice reflects also the need for 
exploring different scenarios which might offer more variance for the analysis. 
The first Directive is the 92/46/EEC which regulates the norms for collection of 
unprocessed milk. It has been transposed and partially complied with in Albanian 
legislation through Decision no. 1132 of Council of Ministers of Albania named “On 
adopting the norms governing collection of unprocessed milk”, on date 05.08.2008. The 
decision has entered into force on the same day. 
The second is the Directive 86/363/EEC on levels of pesticides in food, which has been 
transposed through Ministerial Order no. 5 on date 07.09.2009, entitled “On maximum 
levels for pesticide residues in food of animal origin”. It has entered into force in the 
same day. 
Research work on this policy areas included a preliminary stage, as explained above. 
During that first phase, I gathered documentation related to internal regulations and 
procedures concerning organisational work and interaction between different 
departments in the Ministry of Agriculture and with other depending institutions such as 
the NFA, and non-state actors in this area. These institutions cover a vast policy area 
and therefore there was a considerable amount of internal documentation. However, my 
focus was on materials that could help with the three main propositions that I needed to 
explore. Some minutes of meetings with interest groups were available though not 
published. Documentary analysis was used to understand the formal regulation of the 
policy process internal to the ministry which would provide the basis for then 
triangulating with personal accounts taken in the interviews. Written reports from 
inspections, their format and periodicity provided additional information which was 
then used to adapt the interviews for this policy area. In addition, learning about the 
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 For most of legislation transposed in this area, compliance with EU acquis is considered partial. 
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organisational structure was quite useful, since the ministry is quite different from other 
line ministries, especially in terms of high number of staff and expertise required. 
As with the other policy areas, interviews have been the most useful source for analysis 
and for exploring more in depth the policy design and implementation. Two rounds of 
interviews were carried out. The first one was during the pilot stage and it was focused 
mainly in the directorate for European integration in the Ministry of Agriculture. The 
second round started once all elements of inquiry were clarified and the interview 
questions were adapted according to the feedback received during the pilot stage and 
after documentary analysis. Thirteen persons
39
 were interviewed for this policy areas. 
Around half of the participants required not to be quoted directly by name. They were 
three desk officers at the Ministry of Agriculture, two inspectors, two members of 
Farmers’ Association, one expert on food safety. In addition to the two rounds of 
interviews, a last follow-up session was done at the NFA with two desk officers 
covering Food safety. 
 
7.3 Analysis of the findings 
7.3.1 Institutional coordination and division of competences 
The Ministry of Agriculture together with its dependent institutions represents one of 
the biggest public institutions in terms of competences and number of employees. In 
addition to all other policy areas related to its work, it provides central coordination for 
food safety sector. As explained in previous sections, the level of approximation in this 
area is quite low and it is one of the acquis chapters where the country will have to 
invest considerably in the future. One of the challenges that the ministry faces as central 
coordinator is the fact that this sector is very much interrelated with other sectors and 
institutions (Misha 2012). This requires constant communication and structured 
cooperation, especially during the work on designing policies.  
From the analysis of this sector, there are three main components concerning 
coordination which explain and affect performance in planning of implementation 
instruments for policies. 
First, despite formal centralisation of the process in the ministry as leader of the Inter-
institutional Working Group on food safety, coordination is still mostly horizontal with 
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 For a full list of persons interviewed please refer to Appendix 1. 
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other institutions. Most of the officers interviewed in the ministry admit that relations 
with other line ministries at the technical level are quite problematic. Main clashes are 
related to different views on understanding of methodology and its implementation 
(Misha 2012; Zeqo 2012). In most of the cases they are solved through informal 
negotiations and they depend also on the type of interpersonal relations built between 
and with directors of the different ministries. Therefore there is a lack of establishing 
formal channels for solving disputes. This is confirmed by the fact that there is little 
official communication available regarding problems and disputes in the ministry. In 
both cases of the chosen directives, informal discussions with the Ministry of Economy 
were considered sufficient to solve the few problems raised. 
It is interesting to notice differences in perceptions between the different levels in the 
same ministry when it comes to relations with other institutions. At the technical level 
there is common position on the need for improving relations and coordination with 
other line ministries. At the political level, it seems that "there are no disputes involved 
and if there are, they are solved quite easily with direct contact with the political 
counterpart" (Varfi 2012). Therefore this seems to be a common feature as in the 
Ministry of Economy. 
Communication with the Ministry of European Integration is quite intensive at the 
technical level, according to the filing system used in the ministry. However, at the 
political level there is little communication. From the political staff, contacts with the 
Ministry of European integration are considered not ‘decisive’ and not important since 
“the Ministry of Agriculture is very clear on the approximation process and does not 
have remarks by MEI on that” (Varfi 2012). This is an important point on which I will 
come back in the next session. Overall the political level in the ministry communicates 
only with its internal Directorate for European integration which, although it has regular 
contact with MEI at the technical level, is not much aware of developments and 
indications at the political level. According to official job description and competences, 
but also from what could be grasped from interviews, this Directorate carries many 
duties which overload it in terms of coordination tasks. The interviewed policy makers 
in the Ministry believe that daily communication and interaction should be organised by 
sectors (line departments) by assigning competences horizontally and not centralised in 
one Directorate (Misha 2012). When it comes to approximation and designing policies, 
the Ministry of Agriculture has close contacts with the Ministry of Justice in the 
consultations stage of the draft (same procedure as each ministry, foreseen by law). 
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Overall coordination system in the policy design process is not well established and 
somehow confused and different approaches between political and technical level. This 
has generated a high number of disputes during the process, including in the case of the 
directives of the sample, which affects later the implementation process. 
The second important element concerns internal procedures of the coordinative body 
regarding transposition of EU acquis. According to internal regulation, for each 
transposition a working group is set up, with at least one lawyer as member. Once the 
technical work on the draft is finished it goes through the Legal Directorate which check 
legal compliance and then the draft is ready for consultations with line ministries, other 
government agencies, interest groups, etc. This is the description of the formal policy 
design process and how it should be taking place. However, in reality it is not how it 
goes and this is probably one of the weakest points in terms of explaining 
implementation failures in this area. According to the Director of the Legal Department 
in the ministry, most of transposition acts are issued through Ministerial Order (Profkola 
2012). One of the two directives of the sample was transposed via such ordinance. This 
type of decree, though it’s faster and effective in terms of getting through with the 
process, represents many important problems when it comes to the acquis and its 
implementation. First of all, Ministerial Order do not require or need the set-up of 
working groups. In theory the legislation or the policy can be drafted by a single desk 
officer in the ministry, be checked at the Legal Department for general references, and 
then be signed by the minister which makes the act enter into force immediately. Not 
setting up working groups means that other departments and other line ministries and 
institutions do not have a say in the policy design process and therefore get information 
only when it enters into force. This is what happened in the case of the second directive 
which was drafted by the desk officer in the ministry and not by a working group (as in 
the first directive). This creates potential risks for implementation because there is no 
time and consultation before so that other actors can discuss, prepare and plan 
implementation requirements. None of the implementation disposition contained in the 
ordinance is discussed with other implementing and enforcement parties. They just get 
the notification when it enters into force. 
The second problem that comes from using ordinances for transposition concerns 
relation with Ministry of European Integration. According to the law on competences of 
the Ministry of European integration, any legislative act related to transposition of the 
acquis, needs to be submitted to MEI for opinion on compliance with the acquis, before 
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going through approval procedure. This happens in most of the cases according to MEI 
officials, because otherwise when the draft goes in the agenda of the Council of 
Ministers for approval, it may get blocked if there is not a positive opinion from MEI or 
if its comments are not reflected. The problem is related to the fact that Ministerial 
Order do not need to be submitted (and are not submitted) to MEI for opinion (Profkola 
2012). Therefore there is no check for compliance with the acquis apart from the desk 
officers who worked on the draft in the Ministry of Agriculture. The ordinance on 
pesticides in food did not go through MEI for opinion on compliance (Begaj 2012) 
while the first on collecting unprocessed milk is registered in MEI database before 
being submitted to Council of Ministers for approval in 2008.  
This difference in procedure creates potential for two types of deficits. On one hand, the 
difference between what the ministry declares as transposed acquis with what is actually 
been transposed grows further and no one is checking it. As a MEI officer (2012) states:  
"This will be a big problem in what is called the screening process before 
opening accession negotiations, where all chapters are scanned in 
detail".  
On the other hand, implementation deficit grows since the transposed acts through 
ordinances lack many elements which are necessary for successful implementation such 
as consultation and common positions on implementation mechanisms which are shared 
by all actors involved in the process after approval of the policy. In the concrete cases, 
implementing agencies have had the opportunity of being informed previously on the 
draft of the directive for collection of unprocessed milk, but have received the bylaw 
and the ordinance on pesticides in food products only when it was approved. To date, 
the first directive is partially implemented (mostly in farms close to big cities) while the 
second one has not been implemented and no inspections have taken place, according to 
the National Food Authority. One of the direction members claims that they are still 
waiting for training to take place on this issue, since there is lack of information (the 
legal act has entered into force in 2009 and training has not taken place yet!). 
It is also interesting to notice that the EU representatives have not issued any criticism 
or complaint about this type of procedure but instead focus on the outcome 
(transposition and/or implementation). This is confirmed by ministry staff and also by 
EU officials interviewed in Brussels and Tirana. It appears that the general view is that 
it is up to the country to choose the instruments it uses for transposition and 
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implementation. However, it is clear that this type of coordination and regulatory 
framework used puts at risk the implementation stage in the case of food safety. 
A third important element concerning coordination is related to frequent restructuring 
and lack of clear division of competences. The ministry, its structure and its 
competences have changed quite often during the last 10 years. Especially when 
referring to food safety, responsibilities and competences have been spread out in 
different institutions such as Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Health, Health 
inspectorate, etc. This has caused many shortcomings in terms of coordination and 
accountability when it comes to implementation and enforcement. Overlapping in 
exercising activities in food safety standards enforcement has been highlighted by EU 
experts as well in different occasions and reports. This has been confirmed by 
interviews carried in Brussels at Albania unit, in DG Enlargement, as well. At the time 
of this field research (2011-2012) another restructuring process was going on, with 
particular focus on food safety. Implementation of food safety acts were somehow 
slowed down due to a transition period of no clear division of duties among different 
structures within the ministry and its dependent institutions (Varfi 2012). The outcome 
of this new restructuring process has been a concentration and centralisation of 
competences in one body when it comes to implementation and enforcement of food 
safety regulations, which is the National Food Authority. Previously inspectors would 
report to the ministry and did not have a proper planning on inspections.  
From accounts of interviewed inspectors, there is a standard procedure for their work. 
During official inspections in the food establishments the inspectors take samples. 
These samples are taken in routine controls as well as in cases when there is foreseen 
risk in sight. The samples are tested in the regional laboratories of food, veterinaries and 
public health regarding physical-chemical or microbiological tests. These inspections 
are carried out regularly twice a year, during the hot season of summer and at the end of 
the year. An important element is the availability of instruments for inspectors to 
enforce the law and its implementation. Based on the Law no. 9863 date 28.01.2008 
“On Food”, Chapter XVI, all inspectors have the right to impose sanctions. In the cases 
when a food has been launched in the market, and verified that has caused damage to 
the human’s health, or may create serious threat for his life, according to the provisions 
of this Law, the inspector can also remove the license to exercise the activity to the 
operator of food business.  
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However, according to the EU official (2012) covering this sector for Albania, they 
were not organised and equipped properly to handle the tasks and, most important, their 
inspectorate was unstable due to continuous changes. As he states: 
"there is a need for public authorities covering this sector, to understand 
the vast amount of work required for implementation. It needs to start 
from the desk of the ministry, when bylaws are drafted, to the instruments 
planned for the inspectors and the enforcement work." 
When referring in particular to the two selected directives, for the first one on 
unprocessed milk collections the registered inspections according to data of the ministry 
have been only 7 in 2009
40
, in 2010 18 inspections and in 2011 23 of them. Some fines 
were issued but no confiscation of products or any business closed down. As already 
explained in the case of the second transposed directive there have not been any 
inspections yet and it results as not implemented. Inspectors claim that there is a lack of 
clarity regarding their tasks and until it is sorted out they are not starting inspections. 
Enforcement and the ‘threat’ of potential fines is of course key to raising awareness 
about implementation and therefore sorting out this stalemate in terms of division of 
capacities will contribute to improvement of implementation records. 
It will also be interesting to observe the functioning and performance of the new 
institution, the National Food Authority, since it has been largely assisted and supported 
by the EU in its early stages. So far it has significantly increased the number of 
inspections and according to Cuko (2012), who was a former desk officer in the 
Ministry of Agriculture, working now in the NFA, ‘concentrating all implementation in 
one hand is giving very good results. It was necessary to divide policy design from 
implementation’. However, success in this perspective will also depend on the level and 
quality of coordination and interaction between the ministry and the NFA, especially in 
the policy design stage which now is entirely separated from implementation and 
enforcement. The type of interaction and involvement of inspectors in the formulation 
of approximated legal acts can determine the outcome of implementation. 
 
7.3.2 Participation  of non-state actors 
Food safety regulations have a direct impact on a large part of Albanian population 
which is employed in the agriculture, agro-processing, services, and other sectors. This 
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 This was the first year of implementation of the transposed directive but it was also an electoral year, 
when in general all public authority enforcement gets weakened due to political pressure. 
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is why it becomes really important to inform and involve most affected groups by legal 
acts in this policy area, in order to avoid resistance in implementation. Farmers’ 
associations and consumer protection organisations are present in Albania but their 
activity and public visibility is quite weak. This is also confirmed from their interaction 
frequency with public institutions such as the ministry or the NFA. Communication 
officers in both institutions claim that they are rarely contacted by interest groups or 
parties whose activities are affected by policies in this area. There is no direct contact 
with sector departments and they rarely participate in meetings of working groups in the 
policy design process. However, when asked about official opportunities that the 
ministry offers for participation, there seems to be no other procedure than receiving an 
invitation from the ministry (for participating in a hearing or in a working group) or 
writing a complaint letter directly to the minister. Therefore meetings and contacts 
happen case by case, depending on the will and availability of ministry staff and 
direction, and not in a structured, periodical and formalised manner. What can be 
extracted from the interview accounts of both sides
41
, seems to be a circle of non 
cooperation with each other. Profkola (2012), director in the ministry, claims that: 
"business associations in this area are not well organised and their 
representatives represent their personal interest in the discussion. There 
have been many cases when policy drafts are sent to associations via 
email by ministry's officers, before approval, but we have not received 
any response most of the time".  
Therefore business associations do not seem very active and do not possess capacities in 
terms of organisation and technical expertise for contributing to the policy design 
process. On the other hand, during the interviews, members of the biggest association of 
farmers,  complain that they are not involved regularly and, since their comments have 
not been taken into account in the past, their members do not have trust in the 
consultation process and therefore are not active. Despite the different views on the 
reasons for non-involvement, it seems a shared position  that they are not involved. This 
not only prevents them from defending  their interests, but it also increases the risk of 
resistance in the implementation stage since they have not been part of the process, have 
not been informed on the new policy regulations and have not been able to contribute.  
Instead, the way they interact with the process is through informal information channels 
within the ministry and through requesting the direct involvement of the minister. This 
is the case of the transposition of the selected directive on pesticides in food. As 
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 Ministry officials and farmers association representatives 
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explained earlier, this legal act was approved via Ministerial Order which means that 
formally no interest groups were involved in the drafting process. However, according 
to two persons interviewed (one from the farmers’ association and one from a large food 
processing company), they knew about the draft and its content before approval. They 
claim to have their contacts within the ministry, because of their previous jobs and 
therefore when some initiatives affect their work they can ask for information 
(informally). In that particular case they sent a letter and a request for appointment to 
the minister. The minister received them
42
 and there was a lively discussion of the 
missed opportunities and damages caused to their business activity if this transposition 
happened at that time (Varfi 2012). The minister, after consultations with the technical 
staff, agreed on few minor changes and a longer transitional period for some parts. 
These changes shifted the draft to lower level of compliance with the EU directive
43
. 
Despite this might seem as a very effective way of dealing with problems during the 
policy design process, it weakens incentives for a structured interaction and cooperation 
with technical structures in the long term. Interested parties who have influence and 
access to politics can sometimes manage to influence decision making, but they do not 
cooperate with the technical level before the meeting with the minister.  
However, there are also positive cases of an open process. As Zeqo (2012) reminds also 
another similar case concerning olive oil when a different type of interaction with 
interest groups brought some changes to the draft.  
“The Department chairing the working group that was set up used the 
database of registered NGOs that is in the Albanian Parliament and 
invited all organisations and associations which in their mission include 
food safety and agriculture. Around 60 persons were consulted during the 
whole process. The draft was also sent to MEI for compliance check and 
it is considered to be one the most constructive experiences with interest 
groups in the ministry.”(Zeqo 2012) 
The transposed act is now considered partially implemented by with much higher rates 
than other legal acts (EC 2010). However, apart from this episode, the general trend in 
and view from the ministry and NFA on the interaction with interest groups is 
summarised as follows by Cuko (2012): 
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 Once again interaction seems to be depending on political will and openness for cooperation. 
Especially when it is around elections time (such as this case) this type of contact can work well, but, 
however, it is unstructured and unstable. 
43
 In both cases the compliance level remained ‘partial’, but after the changes fewer parts were 
transposed. 
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“There is an established practice that when we have working groups 
meetings, we send invitations to interest groups. Few participate, even 
few send comments and most of the comments are not constructive. 
Mostly it is about resistance and complaining. The main problem is that 
most of the companies are not involved in associations”.  
This last part of Cuko’s comments is actually key to understanding the weak interaction 
and involvement of the business community. In the area concerning food processing and 
food wholesales, the sector is fragmented with few very big companies and many little 
ones. This is why the big ones manage to obtain access (mostly at the political level) 
and the little ones are discouraged and do not participate. In the case of the other 
directive, on milk collection, big companies participated in the consultation process and 
none of the smaller ones (which are many more) attended. This explains why the 
transposed directive is considered implemented in areas near cities (where big 
companies are located) and not implemented in more rural communities, according also 
to inspectors involved in this area. 
Overall, involvement of non-state actors is weak and unstructured. This seems to have 
direct repercussions in terms of resistance to implementation, especially due to lack of 
information and ahead planning. Informal practices with direct access to the political 
level have perpetuated this lack of formal interaction and have not helped in 
implementation of the two directives in a large scale. 
 
7.3.3 Involvement of EU officials in the process  
Technical expertise and good knowledge of the evolution of the EU acquis are 
important in the food safety policy area as well. Changes in the legislation are evolving 
fast and their complexity has grown especially in the last decades. Accession countries 
such as Albania have adopted food safety acquis ‘in a rush’, trying to fulfil 
commitments taken in important joint meetings such as SA subcommittees (Varfi 
2012). Considering the vast amount of legislation in the field, strategic capacities in 
terms of planning and setting priorities are really important and other countries’ 
experiences can teach in this perspective. 
EU has provided substantial assistance in this policy area, especially in terms of 
institutional capacity building, such as in the case of the establishment of the National 
Food Authority. Several training programmes have taken place since the Authority was 
established and, with particular attention to inspectors, tailor prepared assistance under 
TAIEX has been used. However, there seems to be some confusion when it comes to 
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communication with EU representatives, regarding food safety policy. Desk officers at 
the Ministry of Agriculture and at the NFA claim to communicate on case by case 
issues directly with the respective DGs in the EC (Misha 2012; Vuksani 2012). When 
asked about exchange of information and coordination with MEI, they say that they are 
in contact but mostly for issues concerning coordination of meetings with EU or 
specific directives.  
Direct communication is best for solving some issues regarding technical aspects, but 
may cause problems when it comes to a common ground of understanding of the 
transposition and implementation process. As Misha (2012) claims, relations with 
counterparts in other line ministries or dependent institutions become often difficult due 
to different understanding of the process. Although there are joint trainings of the 
European Integration Units of each ministry, the technical staffs by sector are not 
involved in these trainings and therefore the people who do the drafting work have 
different understanding. According to Profkola (2012), this creates many problems that 
are then inherited by the implementation stage. He adds: 
“I think there are no clear dispositions on transposition at our disposal. 
We interpret directives and transposition according to our knowledge in 
each sector or each line institution. Administration is sometimes 
unprepared to take decisions on what to transpose and what standards to 
adopt” (Profkola 2012). 
Very often directives are transposed by using directly the translation from the original 
directive, with no adaptation work. And there are cases when sentences do not make 
sense in Albanian because of the way they are translated or when there are even bigger 
mistakes. He continues: 
“As director of Legal Department I check every act for legal standards 
and compliance. In some cases I have found the word ‘member state’ in 
the Albanian legal act that was proposed. Clearly it was just translated 
and put ahead for adoption, without even caring to read it properly. I 
think sectors should work on English original version of directives, and 
not use translated drafts. But we need a lot of help for understanding and 
interpreting them” (Profkola 2012). 
The more this aspect is explored and the more there seems to be a need for direct 
assistance and involvement from EU experts in explaining directives before they are 
adopted. In the case of the first selected directive that has been transposed, the one on 
collecting unprocessed milk, the desk officers drafting the act were advised by a 
member state expert who was at the Ministry of Agriculture for a short visit under Taiex 
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program. Although he was assisting the sector in a more general framework of 
institutional capacity building, according to desk officers in the European Integration 
Unit, people working on the draft had the opportunity of interacting with him and 
exchanging some useful information and contacts. It is difficult to assess how much this 
has influenced and improved the understanding of that particular directive; however, it 
is a common perception among staff of the ministry that when external experts are 
involved there is a better understanding of the act and a better quality of policy draft. It 
is like an ongoing training which helps in improving skills during transposition work. 
In the case of the second directive, as explained earlier, the whole transposition and 
drafting process was somehow behind ‘closed doors’ and therefore not only there were 
no consultations but also there was not any assistance provided. As a representative of 
the respective DG in Brussels comments: 
“Directives on food safety have a whole historical background to them. It 
is sometimes difficult for accession countries to understand them and 
elaborate and adequate policy for transposition. The case mentioned, on 
food from animal origin, it is difficult even for some member states. That 
is why we expect vigorous attention to implementation after adoption of 
the directive”. 
EU representatives in Tirana consider the expertise assistance given to this area 
insufficient, but they argue that the request for assistance should always come from 
domestic actors. They claim to have offered assistance on most required cases, while the 
initiative is in the hands of Albanian authorities. A professor in the Agriculture 
University of Tirana and expert on food safety who follows developments of the process 
thinks that: 
"there is quite a strong pressure on Albanian institutions dealing with this 
topic to rush with adoption of transposed legislation, despite the clear 
fact that there is a lack of capacity".  
In addition he argues that: 
"there is a mismatch between what most ‘hot topics’ are in terms of 
priorities coming out from bilateral meetings
44
 and where assistance has 
been provided".  
Another expert on food safety, who now owns a big wholesale company, is quite critical 
of the EU’s approach of waiting for the Albanian side to propose. He perceives the 
process as guided by the EU and therefore it can’t be left only in the hands of the will 
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 He calls them bilateral meetings but when he elaborated further it was clear that the reference was to 
SA subcommittee on Agriculture. 
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and capacity of Albanian representatives. Notwithstanding the different views and 
perceptions gathered, the food safety policy area seems to have suffered from a lack of 
proper understanding of the work related to transposition and implementation of EU 
acquis. Anytime EU or member states’ experts have been involved they have brought 
not only an improvement to the quality of work but also some know-how and capacity 
for future work (Misha 2012). This chapter of the acquis is so complex and with high 
standards needed, that it will require not only many financial resources in the future, but 
also a strong need for capacities in understanding, transposing and implementing the 
developing acquis of the EU. Since implementation in this area is assessed very low in 
general, it is difficult to evaluate precisely whether EU assistance provided has made 
big changes, but in the specific directive cases, based on the accounts gathered,  EU 
support is definitely a positive and qualitative added value for Albanian institutions’ 
work. 
 
7.4 Conclusions on the Implementation of Food Safety legal acts 
Food safety is another difficult and complex policy area. It represents one of the 
chapters of the acquis where the Albanian record of implementation is quite low. As 
explained in this chapter, there are different explanations for this, and some go beyond 
the variables taken into account, such as financial resources. However, there are several 
aspects concerning our theoretical propositions that directly affect the policy design 
process and implementation outcome.  
The issues of policy coordination and the division of competences are crucial in 
explaining poor implementation in this area. There have been continuous clashes and 
disputes with other institutions that are not solved horizontally (which would strengthen 
capacities and help in developing a common understanding within public 
administration) but rather through political intervention. This has also brought a 
different approach and understanding between the political and technical levels within 
the ministry on the same issues. Communication and interaction with MEI and other 
institutions is also fragmented, and not everyone is “on the same page”. However, the 
biggest problem in this respect concerns the centralisation of internal procedures for 
transposing directives. As explained, most of the acquis is transposed through 
Ministerial Order, which are not required to be discussed or consulted either internally 
(with other desk officers and inspectors from the ground) or externally (with other 
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mainline ministries or stakeholders). Because of the vast amount of acquis and the 
highly ambitious commitments that Albanian authorities have made in this policy area, 
transposition requires a very intense pace of work that is beyond the public 
administration’s capacities. The ordinances are a “shortcut” for speeding up 
transposition work by avoiding long procedures and delays because of disputes from 
consultations to attain formally transposed legislation with a satisfactory speed. This has 
produced poor-quality legal acts with either missing or problematic implementation 
disposition. The result is a very big gap in implementation that has made it one of the 
worst-performing sectors. The two selected directives and the process followed confirm 
the above conclusions, especially in terms of implementation.  
Regarding the involvement of stakeholders in the process, a pattern of direct interaction 
with the political leaders in the institutions has been developed (as in the case of the 
second directive). Because most acts are implemented through ordinances and few 
public hearings are organised, direct contact with the minister has become quite a 
common solution, especially for large companies, which have more opportunities for 
access. In the other cases when a directive is transposed through a Council of Ministers’ 
decision or via law, working groups are established and records of meetings with 
stakeholders are kept. However, in general, there is low turnout and few constructive 
proposals or comments. The meetings turn more into sessions for complaining and 
criticising the policy or public administration work in general. Mutual mistrust has 
developed on both sides (desk officers and stakeholders) based on previous interactions 
where comments were not taken into consideration (stakeholders’ view) or they were 
not of good quality and not helpful (desk officers’ view). As the findings show, 
stakeholders have the power to resist implementation, so their involvement (or at least 
their information) in processes regarding food safety needs to be improved. The uneven 
implementation in terms of geographic distribution suggests also that the network and 
associations of stakeholders in this area are quite poor and need to be strengthened with 
concrete support. 
Last, the EU targeted assistance for this area is another important factor. It seems that 
the field is so broad and complex that, regardless of what assistance is provided, 
immediate and tangible results cannot be achieved. However, in the learning process 
and in building institutional memory, the EU can provide more ad hoc assistance for a 
specific group of directives. According to the data analysis, there is a general lack of 
understanding of directives, and very often, desk officers get lost in translation. This 
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brings a need for constant support for capacities from experts of the EU Commission or 
from new member states that have recently faced those challenges. In addition, the EU 
might need to assume a more proactive role in monitoring the need for assistance and 
proposing it rather than leave the entire initiative to Albanian authorities. Although the 
process is mainly a commitment and workload undertaken by Albanian institutions, in 
the bilateral framework meetings, there is room for jointly planning technical assistance 
in a more coherent and strategic way. 
Overall, there is a lot to learn and to explore about implementation failure and problems 
in this sector. The positive side is that, with shortcomings looking so clear from these 
findings, it might be easier to tackle them if the appropriate political will and capacities 
are in place. However, this policy area might represent one of the weakest points when 
Albania starts negotiating acquis chapters with the EU and might delay the process even 
further because of the large implementation deficit it already presents.  
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CHAPTER 8 ENVIRONMENT 
EU environment policies aim to promote sustainable development and environmental 
protection. These policies are based on the integration of environmental protection with 
other EU policies, preventive measures, the fight against environmental hazards at the 
source, and the division of responsibilities. The environmental legislation includes over 
250 main legal acts, which cover horizontal legislation, water and air quality, waste 
management, nature protection, climatic changes, industrial pollution control and risk 
management, genetically modified organisms, chemicals, noise, and forestry. Achieving 
compliance with the EU legislation requires significant efforts, especially financial 
investment (Andonova 2005). For the application and implementation of the acquis, it is 
necessary to have strong administrative capacities at the central and local levels.     
The obligation for the approximation of Albanian legislation in the field of environment 
with that of the EU derives in particular from Article 108 of the SAA, in which it is 
cited that “the Parties will develop and enforce the collaboration in the very important 
task of the fight against the environment degradation, with the view of promoting the 
sustainability of the environment. The collaboration is mainly focused on the priority 
areas related with Community acquis in the environment field” (Council of the EU 
2006a). The main policy document for the achievement of legislative compliance is the 
National Plan for the Implementation of the SAA. These documents attempt to manage 
environmental issues through a very large number of legislative changes, which are 
required to achieve transposition. The current body of law is considered broad in scope, 
although it does not cover all areas of the acquis.  
The EU Commission considers that there is a “major gap” between the current level of 
implementation of Albanian legislation on the environment and that of the European 
Union. There are structural problems associated with the current environmental 
legislation (EC 2011). As reported by Albanian authorities, the main difficulties 
encountered during the approximation process include the initial identification of 
required organisational, economic, structural, and administrative measures. Many of the 
directives require the establishment of new organisations and systems and the necessity 
to strengthen existing capability and capacity. Thus, in practice, EU directives are 
implemented with major difficulties and generally involve delays.  
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This chapter starts with an overview of the transposition of EU legal acts into Albanian 
legislation. In this part, the most important steps in terms of institutional settings and 
compliance with directives are described, with a particular focus on the implementation 
records based on EU reports. Since this policy area is very broad and includes several 
sub-areas, for the purpose of this study, I have selected waste management as the case to 
examine. The sample selected is explained in section 8.2. A case study directive is taken 
as reference to concrete examples of policy design process and lack of implementation 
are explained. The policy process of the sector will be analysed in depth in section 8.3, 
where detailed components and variables will be explained according to the study 
methodology. Final considerations on the findings of this area will constitute an 
important part of the conclusions of the thesis, which is also reflected in the conclusions 
of the chapter. 
 
8.1 The state of alignment with EU acquis: Waste Management. 
Environment is one of the most difficult chapters of the acquis in terms of alignment 
requirements and that is why Albania is falling behind in this process. In the horizontal 
legislation field there has been progress regarding the transposition of the Environment 
Impact Assessment (EIA) Directives, but there has been no progress regarding the other 
directives. The transposition of the EIA Directive (2011/92/EU) has advanced and there 
is an ongoing work for its full approximation (Abeshi 2012). Notably progress has also 
been achieved in regard to the transposition of the Strategic Environment Assessment 
(SEA) Directive. The majority of the provisions of this Directive were transposed with 
the adoption of Law No 91/2013 ”On Strategic Environmental Assessment” in February 
2013.  
Considering the vast area that this acquis chapter covers, I have selected Waste 
Management as the focus of the research. This is a very sensitive area in general, but 
even more important in the case of Albania, since there has been much and continuous 
public debate on this topic. In addition, this area can be considered important also from 
the point of view  of analysing interaction between institutional actors and non-state 
groups. 
Transposition in the acquis in the waste management field has experienced good 
progress. The level of approximation with directive in the framework for waste has been 
high. The legal framework on the administration of wastes is based on the Law No 
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9010, of 13.2.2003 “On the Environmental Administration of Solid Wastes” and on the 
Law No 9537, of 18.5.2006 “On the Administration of Hazardous Wastes”. In general 
terms, what legislation aims in this area is protection of the environment and public 
health from pollution and solid wastes through environmental administration at each 
phase, including creation, collection, separation, transportation, recycling, processing 
and disposal. The transposition of the Directive on packaging waste was completed in 
2012 with the adoption of the Law “On Integrated Waste Management” in September 
2001, as well as with the adoption of DCM No. 177/2012 “On packaging and its waste”, 
in March 2012. The adoption of DCM No. 705/2012 “On the management of end-of-life 
vehicles”, in October 2012, has notably improved the transposition of the respective 
Directive (EC 2013).  
Legislation dealing with the administration of waste has only partially transposed 
European directives. According to the Progress Report of the European Commission of 
2009, “On monitoring the Transposition and Implementation of EU environmental 
acquis”, the level of transposition of the Waste Directive
45
 stands very low. In 
alignment with the recommendations of EC Progress Report 2009 and 2010, and in 
compliance with the National Plan for the Implementation of the Stabilisation 
Association Agreement (NPISAA) 2009-2014, a new integral law regarding waste was 
drafted in 2011 which aimed at to completely transposing the new Framework Directive 
on Waste
46
 of 2008.  
The Ministry of Environment (MoEFWA) is the principal institution dealing with the 
development of policies and legislation on waste administration, licensing of waste 
administration, waste generation, inspections and supervision of environmental 
legislation enforcement. Currently MoEFWA does not have a separate directorate 
dealing with waste management issues. The MoEFWA is responsible for drafting 
polices and legislation concerning waste management, and for ensuring compliance and 
implementation. The MoEFWA also coordinates the work of 12 Regional Environment 
Agencies (REA) with 38 employees. 
In other areas, waste management responsibilities are split between Ministry of Health 
for hospital wastes, the Ministry of Public Works, Transportation and 
Telecommunications for solid and urban wastes, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and 
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Waste Directive of the European Parliament and Council 2006/12/EC, of 27.04.2006, 32006L0012, 
Official Journal 114, L, of 16.05.2006, p. 9-21. 
46
Framework Directive on Waste 2008/98/EC, 32008L0098, Official Journal 312/3, L, of 22.11.2008. 
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Energy for industrial and mining wastes, the Ministry of Agriculture for relevant sectors 
generating wastes, and local authorities.  
As pointed out earlier, cooperation between these institutions remains poor. There is 
overlapping in several activities, such as inspecting (Agenda Institute 2009). All three, 
the MoEFWA Environmental Inspectorate, the State Sanitary Inspectorate, and the 
Municipal Inspectorate have the right to exercise waste activity control. Based on the 
Article 76 of the Law “On environmental protection “, the Local Government Units 
represent the most important element for environmental protection by executing duties 
and obligations enumerated in Law No.8652, dated 31.7.2000 “On organisation and 
function of local government”. With regard to waste management, they are required to 
designate sites for collection and the processing of production wastes in accordance to 
environmental criteria and developmental plans. They should also organise the dumping 
of wastes and dangerous substances, and for protection of green areas in urban zones 
and their surroundings. Finally, they are in charge for the management of urban waste, 
including water treatment plants and solid waste. 
Despite some positive developments, the EC points out in almost all progress reports of 
the last years that lack of implementation and enforcement of the legislation remains a 
concern. As regarding administrative capacities the EC has identified several problems. 
Apart from the visible lack of financial and human capacities in most of the involved 
institutions (the Ministry of Environment, the Ministry of Public Works, the 
Environment Agency, the National Environment Inspectorate, etc.), cooperation and 
coordination experiences many difficulties. Interaction between the responsible 
ministries, the agencies and coordination between central and local authorities is weak 
(EC 2012, p. 61).  
 
8.2 Description of the sample and data used 
In the case of environment, the selected sample is Directive 2008/98/EC which 
regulates integrated waste management in general and then by specific products. The 
directive has been fully transposed in Albanian legislation in two different steps: first, 
through the law no. 10463 date 22.09.2011 “On integrated waste management” which 
entered into force on 23.11.2011. The second step was the Council of Ministers’ 
Decision no. 765, dated 07.11.2012, which entered into force on 22.11.2012. These acts 
and what followed in this  area have been highly debated in the public sphere in Albania 
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and therefore represent a very good case for not only assessing coordination among 
institutions in the way the process was developed, but also for exploring interaction with 
other non-state actors. In the same period another important legal act was approved to 
regulate imports of waste for recycling purposes. This case was highly controversial and 
it will be discussed further during the analysis of the data and findings. In terms of 
formal compliance, the selected directives represent a good example of the transposition 
process, even though implementation is considered poor. Implementation failures in this 
area need to be explored more also in the work of inspectors and enforcement agencies, 
rather than only in ministry desks. 
As regarding documentary sources, environment policy in Albania has produced a large 
quantity of written documents through the years. There are several strategies, action 
plans and memorandums signed and approved. This has been possible, first because of 
high attention from EU and international community through assistance and support, 
and, second, due to the fact that there is a quite consolidated expertise present in 
Albania inherited also from the previous regime. However, not all the documentation is 
useful for understanding implementation. I used mostly documents regarding waste 
management policy development through the years and structural changes in the 
institutions covering this area at the ministry desks but also on the ground. In addition, 
media debates were quite useful, since most of the discussions were ongoing when I 
started fieldwork. Minutes from meetings with stakeholders and their policy 
amendments in written form were sometimes available and provided useful information 
for exploring the theoretical propositions.  
Interviews for this area included
47
 two senior desk officers at the Ministry of 
Environment who are in charge of sector policies including waste management, another 
two desk officers from the ministry, three inspectors, two EU representatives, three 
representatives of local organisations dealing with environment protection, one activist 
who co-organised protests in 2012 and one independent environment expert. For 
different reasons only the first two and one EU official accepted to be quoted by name. 
All the others agreed to be quoted but not to be identified. Interviews in this policy area 
were quite interesting not only because of the topics discussed, but also due to the fact 
that many events were occurring in real time and it was very useful to capture and 
analyse information during action. Interviews were quite long, especially in the case of 
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 The full list of participants can be found in Appendix 1. 
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the meetings with representatives of local NGOs since they cover these topics for many 
years and their historical perspective on developments was quite helpful as well as their 
thoughts on the specific directive and the ongoing situation.  
 
8.3. Analysis of the findings for waste management sector  
8.3.1 Institutional coordination and division of competences 
Coordination of waste management policies in Albania is quite complex. Competences 
are spread out between Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Agriculture, different 
inspectorates, local governments (municipalities), etc. However, when it comes 
specifically to transposition of the EU acquis and monitoring of implementation in this 
area, the Ministry of Environment is the leading institution. It chairs the Inter-
institutional Working Group on the Environment chapter of the acquis (Chapter 27), 
coordinating one of the biggest among these groups, in terms of number of members. 
Within the ministry, the Directorate of European Integration plays quite an important 
role in coordinating working groups of policymakers to respond to the Ministry of 
European Integration requests and directives. What could be grasped since the first 
interviews is a general confusion in terms of division of competences which seem to 
shift depending on the issue and policy in discussion. As Hoxha (2012) observes: 
“Without a clear map of competences in terms of relations between us 
and other departments or agencies, from time to time there are 
misunderstandings, tensions, delays and stalemates. These have increased 
even more with the increase of environmental acquis adoption”.  
In the case of transposing the directive on waste management, two different departments 
cooperated on the drafting process (the General Directorate of Policies and the 
Environment Directorate). It was a decision of the minister to set up that type of 
arrangement. However, as Abeshi (2012) explains, there is not a unique and 
consolidated procedure in terms of coordination of the transposition process, even 
concerning the procedure followed for setting up working group. There seems to be no 
clear  institutionalised model when dealing with transposition work, in terms of units 
involved. As one desk officer in the legal department claims, sometimes their 
department has been used for legal compliance checks and other times it has been called 
for drafting the legal act. This does not allow for proper preparation and planning in 
terms of human resources. Because of the vast amount of sub-policy areas that the 
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ministry covers, it seems that there has been strong and centralised coordination at the 
department level, but not at higher level. By higher level I refer to minister or deputy 
ministers, when dealing with inter-institutional coordination. Therefore it can be 
described as a big institution with weak central coordination at the top and different 
'islands' within it, which have strong power in terms of coordination of their sub-area. 
This type of structure can become quite efficient when policies are more segregated 
within that specific area of expertise. However, it reflects a quite problematic 
coordination when it comes to possible disputes with other institutions and depending 
agencies such as the selected case.     
Related to the dispute settlement point, this chapter appears to have been by far the most 
problematic as compared to the previous policy areas. The transposed directive on waste 
management experienced different stages of stalemate,  according to desk officers in the 
Ministry of Environment,  mainly because of clashes with other institutions. The staff of 
the ministry, in charge for leading the coordination process of the working group, 
expressed dissatisfaction about cooperation with other members. As a member of the 
working group (2012) would describe: 
"We would meet on weekly basis and say the same things, the same 
positions. It got so ridiculous because no steps ahead were taken. 
However we would formally attend the meetings because it's an 
obligation. But we already knew that nothing was going to happen". 
The whole process was characterised by several ‘inter-agency conflicts and institutional 
clashes’. As explained earlier, rather than following legal procedures to higher 
institutions or to a well-defined structure for such cases, these disputes are usually 
settled and solved on an individual case basis by the main officers in respective 
institutions. However, in this case, due to sensitivity involved and overlapping of 
competences for the upcoming implementation and enforcement stage, they assumed a 
more official approach. After many weeks of stalemate, the respective department in the 
Ministry of Environment sent an official letter with their arguments
48
 to all members of 
the working group. This opened up the process and, according to the  accounts of two 
desk officers involved in the drafting process, it gave the perception to other members 
that there was no central coordination in the group. One of them recalls: 
"Asking to more than 30 persons for their opinions on that problem was a 
mistake. We ended up making fun of the process and it was a clear sign 
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 The dispute in this case was about who should carry out inspections on waste management 
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that the ministry didn't want to follow that version of the draft and thus it 
was 'killing' it in that way, by throwing it in the 'market'". 
In spite of this view, when collecting other accounts, it looks like the intention was not 
to delay the draft but it was rather a way to remove responsibility for that situation out 
of the department in charge. A long correspondence
49
 followed, involving all members, 
with no agreement or structured discussion been carried on, but rather deepening the 
conflict with mutual discharges of responsibilities. Clearly, as stated earlier, having 
strong coordinating units is helpful for the institution internally, but for horizontal 
coordination with other line institutions, a central coordination mechanism at higher 
level is required. According to Hoxha (2012) there is no formal mechanism for solving 
disputes officially, without the involvement of the respective political level. He argues 
that: 
"in these cases the political level is involved, otherwise we can't solve the 
issue. We were asked to set up an additional working group for solving 
the dispute and we still didn't manage. Some decisions are to the political 
managers" (Hoxha 2012). 
The biggest obstacles encountered during the policy design stage of the directive were 
related to the role of municipalities (local governments), which according to the draft of 
the transposed directive were to be in charge of monitoring implementation and 
enforcement. Although their representatives were part of the working group, they 
opposed this proposal from the beginning. In the final draft, this responsibility is 
divided between central and local government which has created a confusing situation 
as regards implementation. Although some inspections have already been carried out, 
according to a known expert on this topic in Albania, there have been embarrassing 
situations when central government would need to issue fines to the local municipality 
for not implementing and enforcing the law in its territory. This is confirmed by the 
Ministry of Environment as well. Nearly one year after its entry into force, this 
transposed directive was still not been implemented (according to EU Commission 
representatives in Tirana and the EC progress report). 
A final point concerning coordination and competences regards a crucial side of 
implementation: inspections and enforcement. The new law assigns this power to the 
central Inspectorate which is accountable to the ministry, but also to municipalities and 
their officers in charge. There is regular interaction between the desk officers in the unit 
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 Copies of part of the correspondence were made available. 
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responsible for drafting the law and the inspectors to explain or interpret the law. I 
interviewed inspectors from the central unit and from one of the local offices. Despite 
evident and well-documented lack of financial and human resources in the Inspectorate 
activities, which have been pointed out by EC in several occasions, their interaction 
with policymakers and interest groups is not always affected. They have regular 
meetings between units where they raise problems and issues, especially regarding 
specific cases. Contrary to preliminary impressions, street-level bureaucrats and their 
counterparts in the Ministry of Environment unit appear to be in harmony when 
discussing policies and implementation. Communication and information flows between 
the two groups  are regular with no major problems experienced.  
However when explored in more detail in relation to the specific directive, their 
opinions on procedures for specific cases differed in terms of their understanding and 
interpretation. Although they were part of the working group when the waste 
management law was drafted, they claim to have had a different position, especially on 
the ‘discretion responsibility’ given to inspectors and how it is interpreted in different 
areas. Since officers in the inspectorate are from varied backgrounds, experiences, ages, 
training, etc., the outcome of their interpretations often depended on the quality of 
instructions and information received. This gap determines often the differences in 
practical implementation of the directive, especially in geographic terms. In the case of 
the selected directive, because of the poor clarity on the interpretation and due to delays 
in allocating resources to inspectors, very few inspections have been carried out in the 
first year after the directive entered into force.   
Therefore, there is a typical top-down pattern that characterises environmental 
legislation implementation, which is somehow accepted and recognised. As one 
inspector recalls: 
"whenever there are disputes and discussions among us and people in the 
ministry, or whenever we raise some issues or changes we propose to the 
draft, they would tell us that this draft is mandatory and non-negotiable 
because it's about transposing EU laws". 
 This type of attitude is often assumed and used by desk officers in the ministry (Abeshi 
2012) whenever there are discussions with inspectors about interpretation of 
implementation dispositions. Once again, the need for keeping up with the 
approximation planning and agenda can lead to overcoming consultation with involved 
institutional actors. 
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8.3.2 Participation of non-state actors 
In Albania, there is a good network of environmental organisations that have operated 
since the early 1990s. Some of them are well-structured and have a broad range of 
activities in environment protection. In terms of their presence and efforts in influencing 
environment policies, the difference between expertise-oriented organisations and 
advocacy/protest types can be distinguished. The former have established regular 
relations with policy makers and participate often in roundtable consultations and 
common projects. Their members are usually professors, experts and former policy 
makers (removed after political changes in the government). They have managed to 
cooperate with policy makers occasionally, offering expertise on specific sub-areas. 
This has proved to be a good practise considering the fact that public institutions 
handling environmental issues suffer from a lack of administrative and expert 
capacities. An interesting phase of successful experiences of consultations happened 
during the period of preparation of the questionnaire answers in 2010 that the European 
Commission sent to Albania. 
However, in the environment policy in general, relations between government agencies 
and non-state actors have experienced highs and lows. Overall the Ministry of 
Environment seems to have a clear strategy (formally) in place for performing regular 
consultations with the public on environmental plans, programmes and legislation, 
organising regular meetings with environmental NGOs, and also for the delivery of 
weekly and monthly Environmental Bulletins. It is broadly accepted from most of the 
participants that this has had a significant impact in improving the situation regarding 
public awareness and its participation in environmental decision making, as well as 
public access to environmental information. Presenting a more political stance under 
this perspective, Abeshi (2012) claims that: 
“The cooperation with interest groups is a main priority in our policy 
approach. For every initiative, and especially the preparation of new 
legislation, we have a long process of consultations in place with 
businesses, NGOs, experts, etc.” (Abeshi 2012). 
Desk officers in the ministry report about good cooperation with interest groups in the 
last years. There is a large number of environmental NGOs operating in Albania, many 
independent experts from academia and activists from civil society. What happens 
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formally in the consultation process is described by rules of procedure internal to the 
ministry, summarised as follows by Hoxha: 
“All drafts of acts are published in the ministry’s website and are left 
there for one month. In addition, we have a long mailing list with most 
important stakeholders in the field and we periodically send them all new 
proposed drafts. We receive their comments and we integrate them when 
we can” (Hoxha 2012). 
However, from interviews with independent experts and NGOs’ representatives, it 
comes out that, although the ministry publishes everything in a transparent way, there is 
no regular feedback from policy makers on the comments of non-state actors. A 
representative of ECO-Movement, a well established network of NGOs, provides 
correspondences over the years and although in one case their comments were reflected 
in the draft, they never received responses. This is also confirmed by ministry officers 
who claim that there is not available time for replying to all comments and explaining 
why there are not taken into consideration. This discourages interaction from the non-
state actors’ side since they never understand whether their comments are read and on 
what basis they are rejected. On the other hand, a desk officer in the Ministry of 
Environment argues that from his experience non institutional actors are not active in 
the policy design stage: 
“They are often invited at our roundtables, but they are not useful in 
general. They either do not come, or if they come they do not intervene. In 
intervention cases, they broaden up their comments and are not very 
constructive but mainly complaining about everything. And after the 
meeting they claim in the media that they were not consulted”. 
Beyond frustration from both sides, there are some gaps in the mechanisms used for 
collecting comments in the consultation process which do not help to strengthen mutual 
trust. In the case of the selected directive on waste management, the ministry had a 
transcript of all comments that arrived via email or in official written letter. This type of 
archive is not common in other line ministries. There were a total of 18 comments and 
letters coming from different areas: academia, NGOs, and business. In addition, the 
ministry organised two roundtables during the drafting phase where stakeholders were 
invited. The meetings were characterised by intense discussions but here again versions 
differ from both sides and meetings’ minutes are essential for reconstructing an account 
as accurately as possible. Ministry desk officers say that consultations went well and 
that participants at the end agreed, but afterwards they changed their minds as soon as 
they went in media debates. While the interviewed participants claim to have opposed 
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some parts of the draft and they agreed because they were promised those changes. 
These types of reactions fuelled  the mistrust and maintained a tense situation until the 
draft was approved. The final draft reflected partially their suggestions (ECO-
Movement 2012).  
As explained earlier, substantial involvement of these important networks can pave 
down the way for smoother implementation. They are important actors in the 
community and have a considerable role especially in terms of raising awareness and 
educating citizens towards compliance. In spite of dissatisfaction registered, the case of 
the waste management directive represents a quasi success or a step ahead for 
cooperation between public administration and non-state actors. There was a large 
participation of non-state actors in the process through consultations, but not all their 
concerns were reflected.  The ‘case within the case’ presented below offers a very 
different perspective of the same story, which helps in understanding more this complex 
interaction and its impact in implementation. 
 
A case within the case: import of waste for recycling industry.  
As explained above, the previous law on waste management was reformed in order to 
increase harmonisation with EU directives. However, some later changes in the same 
year, more specifically two articles of the same law (art. 22/3 and art. 49) provoked 
early public reactions and debates. These changes included paragraphs regarding rules 
and conditions for permitting waste imports by recycling industries in Albania. Business 
representatives from the recycling industry expressed their support for this intervention 
and argued for a positive impact it would bring in terms of further investment and 
employment. On the other hand, what started as a modest struggle against these 
measures, by three NGOs, spread and became a public campaign embraced by many 
intellectuals, opinion makers and civil society in general. Because of the lack of 
dialogue with public authorities, this group appealed to the general public and grew 
strong by creating the so-called Aleanca Kunder Importit te Plehrave (Alliance Against 
Waste Import). Initially, this movement started to organise itself through minor protests 
and roundtables, where they repeatedly invited institutions’ desk officers, who did not 
attend. The support and endorsement of public personalities was crucial for the 
Alliance, especially in terms of visibility. As explained by a desk officer (2012) at the 
Ministry of Environment, the Government’s main argument on the specific articles 
related to the fact that:  
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"recycling industries in Albania do not invest in technology, due to the 
lack of necessary amount of waste suitable for such technological 
investments and financial efforts. Therefore, Albanian waste would not be 
processed and recycled. If Albania would allow waste imports, this would 
bring more investments in technology and, as a result, Albanian waste 
would be recycled as well".  
The law was also justified by authorities in some public declarations, as often happens, 
as a requirement of the EU in the transposition and integration process (top-down 
pressure). However, the latter point was not confirmed from Peter Stano, DG 
Enlargement spokesperson in the European Commission, who was asked by an 
Albanian journalist regarding the possible obligation of Albania to adopt this articles, 
and he commented that:  
“the approval of this law was within the framework of the harmonisation 
of Albanian legislation with the acquis. What we need to keep in mind is 
that the EU does not encourage and does not force anyone to import 
waste. We do not establish rules on what you have to import and in which 
ways you import” (Stano 2011). 
The Alliance contested the lack of transparency of the amendment process and the 
public protest spread, undermining trust and cooperation with authorities. One of the 
main supporters of the Alliance (famous Albanian columnist), Fatos Lubonja, argued 
that: 
 “it is unforgivable that this has been done without explaining everything 
to the public and without getting their opinion. Politicians need to 
understand that this is not the way to do things anymore, we want 
participation!” (Lubonja 2011).  
After a period of debates, discussions and protests, the amendments were approved by 
the government. The Alliance decided to take a further step in order to block the 
implementation of the law, by starting procedures for a referendum. It organised a 
petition for gathering necessary citizen signatures (50,000) for holding a referendum. 
After many months of this marathon and institutional legal battles for the referendum 
procedure, the president declared the referendum in early 2013 and decided to hold it in 
late 2014. The referendum never happened because in September 2013 the new centre 
left government that had just come in office dismissed the decision of the previous 
government regarding the articles on waste import. 
This illustrative case gives a more practical example of the relation between decision 
makers and environmental NGOs in Albania. Thanks to their public visibility and civic 
engagement, environmental organisations have been able to exercise political pressure 
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upon decision makers and 'threaten' implementation of the legal act. Many of the 
environmentalists often participate in public debates and have good access to the 
Albanian media sphere. Therefore, they have strengthened their impact in the policy 
design process through indirect instruments of influence, such as engagement with 
media or civic organisations. Although this might seem an effective method of 
influencing the policy process, it also enlarges the gap between policy makers and civil 
society actors who are involved in environmental protection. By fighting each other on 
the output of the policies, they seem to avoid attempts of sitting down and discussing 
the input process. This distance is reflected in various institutional practices and has 
determined a conflictive and non-inclusive type of interaction.  
                            
8.3.3 Involvement of EU officials in the process  
Implementing EU environment acquis requires considerable financial resources and 
human capacities. Not only are its standards quite high, but they need to be applied in 
developing contexts where public awareness is more focused on growth rather than 
environment protection and sustainability. This is why a more direct communication 
from EU actors present in the country can affect implementation of legislation for this 
policy area as well. 
Although Albania has some expertise on environment in general, waste management 
and its very fast development require necessary knowledge and management skills. This 
is why EU has put considerable focus in assisting Albanian authorities in this area. Its 
main assistance, apart from investment in preserving the territory, has been in giving 
technical support to desk officers and inspectors in the ministry. Training and study 
visits in different member states have helped in improving the understanding of policy 
and implementation on waste management (Kontonis 2012). 
However, some of the most fruitful cooperation recalled by ministry desk officers in the 
interviews concerned  cases when policy based pilot projects were developed. Due to 
complexity of some directives, their transposition was assisted by experts invited from 
the EU delegation in Tirana. They worked together with Albanian desk officers in 
setting up the preparatory framework and for planning ahead activities necessary for the 
policy design and its implementation. All participants from the ministry expressed high 
evaluations of these exercises. They claim to ‘have learnt more in those few weeks than 
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in entire months of trainings and seminars’. Exchange experiences were more effective 
as a result of  “learning by doing”, together.  
In  the case of waste management directive no direct involvement of EU assistance was 
provided, because it was not requested. As Avignon (2012) points out, the country 
needs to strengthen capacities for planning assistance required and for prioritising the 
policy agenda through a strategic approach. The outcome of that process was lacking in 
quality and encountered considerable resistance, which make it even to date a not 
implemented directive. Based on other successful cooperation, involvement of EU 
experts might influence the quality of policy design and then implementation. 
According to accounts of desk officers and inspectors, this impact has been visible in 
different modalities: 
First, the opportunity of having the day by day contribution of experienced experts 
improved the quality of the drafts sent for consultation. This is not only a general 
perception in the ministry but it is also confirmed from their counterpart in the Ministry 
of European Integration. In general they say to be able to ‘recognise when drafts have 
been aligned with acquis by external expertise’ (Shytaj 2012). Legislative technique, 
references, format and reasoning in the draft are more complete and exhaustive. 
Whenever the quality of policy design improves it affects also the implementation stage 
because a well prepared draft implies also well planned implementation dispositions.  
According to a desk officer in the Legal Department of the ministry, all directives that 
have been transposed with external expertise from EU, have achieved full compliance
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into Albanian legislation. This facilitates the work of Albanian institutions once the 
negotiation stage of accession chapters begins.  
Secondly, EU experts’ involvement, as in other areas, has increased accountability. 
Their participation puts pressure in terms of deadlines and solving disputes contributing 
in cultural interaction benefits for the Albanian side. In addition, due to high perceived 
leverage of EU in Albania, the commitment of local officials improves in front of this 
pressure. As one of the desk officers in the Ministry of Environment puts it: 
“It’s not a shame to admit that Albanian public administration is 
motivated and pressured positively by EU projects and assistance. It is 
one thing when my Albanian counterpart calls me and asks me to meet 
with guys coming from Brussels and work with them, and it’s a different 
story with cases when a certain law project is initiated by local 
actors…different type of commitment and engagement. Of course in the 
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 Full compliance means that they have been able to transpose the entire directive into Albanian 
legislation. However this does not necessarily reflect practical implementation. 
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first case you are more strict and aware about deadlines, monitoring, etc. 
Everything runs smoothly and there are rare conflicts. Because it is a 
different culture of work and we do not want to perform low in their eyes, 
and because of other repercussions”. 
This very open and sincere account from the desk officer reflects the general attitude 
towards cooperation with EU experts in the ministry. It seems that when EU institutions 
are directly involved with the policy process, better practices are applied by ministry 
desk officers. Prompt interventions from EU officials and/or directive/project based 
assistance in the compliance process improves the attention of policy makers, in spite of 
daily routines, and maintains a healthy tension in terms of effective communication and 
schedules. This brings a better preparation for implementation dispositions and because 
of the follow up monitoring it increases the chances for better results.  
Last, one of the requests that EU experts raise in their participation is inclusiveness. EU 
projects seek to encourage participation of organisations and other stakeholders, which 
is not a given in the environment policy process (Ikovic 2012), as it was explained in 
the previous section. EU experts exercise their influence that the process or project is 
established with clear instruments that give the opportunity for involvement of interest 
groups (Avignon 2012; Begeuot 2012). As it is argued by a desk officer at the ministry:  
"When we were drafting the first version, the German expert that worked 
with us asked us to identify all stakeholders. He would then participate in 
the meetings we organised with them and he requested the minutes of the 
meeting. I guess it's a different method of work, but we tried to adapt to 
the requests, although there was not any big contribution from the NGOs 
in my opinion". 
This institutional pattern ‘affects’ the process they are assisting and the attitude of civil 
servants when interacting with stakeholders. This was mentioned from NGOs 
representatives as well who claim that when ‘EU is sitting at the roundtable then 
behaviour and communication changes’. This influence brings better cooperation 
between parties and reduces chances for resistance in the implementation stage. One of 
the experts in the EU delegation in Tirana who was involved in one project considers 
this a very useful practice since participation of stakeholders was high and their 
contribution was satisfactory.  
The fact that there was no EU expertise involvement in the case of the waste 
management directive didn't allow this type of cooperation and atmosphere to be 
established. Not only did this affect the quality of interaction and involvement of non-
state actors and their contribution, but it also did not produce a good quality of the draft, 
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in terms of implementation provisions and in terms of level of compliance with the 
acquis, as confirmed from the Ministry of European Integration (Begaj 2012).  
Overall, the direct involvement of EU experts in the process helps its quality and 
improves institutional capacities and culture. Of course EU representatives cannot do all 
the work that civil servants need to do, but these types of joint projects go beyond the 
specific policies. They bring added value to the process and help the learning curve in 
terms of quality, accountability and better interaction with stakeholders. 
 
8.4 Conclusions on the Implementation of environmental legislation 
Although there have been big efforts at approximating with the EU environmental 
acquis by Albanian authorities, implementation remains weak. Poor capacities and little 
information and public awareness of actors and citizens, combined with inadequate 
financial resources, have produced low implementation rates of transposed legislation.  
Coordination and how the process is organised institutionally affect the design of 
policies that transpose the acquis and their implementation. Albanian authorities have 
established a weak central coordination at the Ministry of Environment with strong sub-
area units of coordination. While this has proved effective in the policy process within 
the ministry, it has created difficulty in solving disputes in horizontal coordination with 
other ministries or agencies. In the case of waste management legislation, a lack of 
substantial interaction with other institutional actors, especially municipalities, has 
undermined the policy design process and led to a poor outcome in terms of draft and 
implementation dispositions. Resistance to implementation by environmental 
organisations and groups was a predictable consequence. Different interpretations and 
understanding among enforcement agencies and inspectors have complicated 
implementation further. Their substantial inclusion during the early stages of policy 
design and a clear coordination in terms of the division of competences between 
inspectorates are necessary conditions for increasing the implementation rate. 
The effective involvement of stakeholders in the policy process is important in this area, 
where they are strong and well organised in networks. Policymakers at the ministry 
have established all formal arrangements for guarantying official participation to 
everyone, with some good transparency practices. However, trust between the two sides 
is quite unstable and communication needs to be improved. As the law on waste 
management case shows, substantial involvement is necessary to ensure a better quality 
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of the draft and less resistance during the implementation stage. In addition, NGOs can 
contribute with their technical expertise and especially help with raising public 
awareness because of their activism and good access in the media. This can be used as 
an instrument for improving conditions for implementation of the transposed acts. 
Last, the direct involvement of EU experts in the policy process has a direct positive 
impact in the quality of the draft and the implementation of the legislation produced. 
Apart from improvement in the technical side of the work, their involvement through 
specific policy-based projects improves the accountability and commitment of civil 
servants and ministry structures. Their leverage and positive pressure have managed to 
produce good results in a few joint projects. In addition, because of their approach to the 
policy process, their participation has improved interaction with stakeholders and thus 
helped in building more constructive bridges between civil servants and non-state 
actors. This has improved the quality and the outcome of the process, but it has also 
ensured better cooperation between the parties regarding the implementation stage. As a 
third important party, the involvement of EU experts has helped in managing disputes 
and conflicts while increasing inclusiveness.  
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CHAPTER 9 CONCLUSIONS 
Explaining policy implementation patterns is not an easy task. In this study, I have 
explored in depth the policy process in Albania to understand and explain what 
determines implementation failure or success. After studying the four policy areas and 
analysing the relevant data, findings were explained and discussed for each chapter 
based on the research framework explained in Chapter 3.  
In this chapter, I will formulate the main conclusions based on the findings. It starts 
with an overview of the most important elements for each policy area in the study 
sample. This part constitutes a summary of the main findings in each field and serves as 
a helpful basis for introducing the next section. Section 9.2 discusses the theoretical 
propositions raised in Chapter 3 that served as the main theoretical framework guiding 
the study. It will discuss the three main independent variables taken into account and, 
based on the respective theories, it will address their replication in the Albanian case. 
The discussion is based on the actual findings from the selected cases explored, but they 
will be confronted with the theoretical claims they were extracted from. In addition, 
some more general considerations will be developed regarding findings registered 
beyond the three variables. 
The chapter continues with the implications of the findings and conclusions of my study 
for the main implementation theories and compliance with EU studies. The views of 
most important scholars of the field, which were described in Chapter 2, will be 
revisited from the new potential perspectives emerging from the findings. The 
contributions of the study and suggestions for further research in this direction follow. 
The chapter concludes with some final considerations on the study, as well as the EU 
integration process of Albania, particularly the transposition and implementation of the 
acquis. I formulate a few recommendations based on this study that might help to 
improve the performance of the policy process in the future. 
 
9.1 Overview of findings for policy areas 
The selected policy areas represented very useful cases for exploring in depth the policy 
process. Despite differences among them, some patterns were similar in all areas, 
following expectations formulated on the basis of previous theoretical works.  
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In the area of free movement of goods, one of the largest chapters of the acquis for 
Albania, there is a clear need for better structuring of the process in terms of 
coordination and for balancing between necessities for the speed and quality of the 
policy process. If the policy design stage is not carried out properly through expertise 
and inclusiveness, implementation will experience shortcomings or even fail. The 
implementation deficit in this area has grown in recent years also because of the higher 
speed and will to meet transposition targets. Involving interested non-state actors in a 
substantial way and having an increase in EU expertise influence preparation and 
planning for the process and the tackling of some of the implementation challenges that 
this policy area is facing.  
The case of competition policy represents some sui generis characteristics. The 
coordination and management of this policy area has further enriched the analysis on 
implementation. Findings from this case seem to suggest that institutions built from 
scratch but with a clear vision and strong support might have better effect upon 
implementation. However, this depends on the conditions and instruments provided. 
The legal basis has been properly consolidated with EU expertise, so it started with a 
strong legal framework with clear competences and independence. Their practices and 
internal procedures were adopted from good practices from the EU and were not based 
on previous experiences in the country or the institutional culture of Albanian 
institutions. The hiring criteria for its personnel and experts were more rigorous than for 
similar positions in other public institutions. Centralisation of the policy design and 
implementation activities in the same institution has helped performance. Since the EU 
has been sponsoring and monitoring this institutional framework, its independence and 
staff stability have been monitored even closer, which has further increased the quality 
of its work. EU direct monitoring and conditionality have been important instruments 
for keeping this policy area’s developments in the right direction. Therefore, this case 
can be considered a successful experiment that could be analysed in even greater depth 
to understand better the reasons and explanations for its good results. Although just a 
few years have passed since its establishment, the ACA provides a good example of 
how implementation can improve when the right institutional setup and capacities are 
set in the beginning. The same is happening with the NFA and a few other minor 
institutions, which might be interesting to explore in other research studies to determine 
whether the same patterns are repeated. 
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Food safety is probably the most problematic of the four policy areas in terms of 
implementation performance. Bad practices in coordination and internal procedures for 
transposition, which damage draft quality and implementation provisions, are some of 
the main obstacles to reducing the deficit. This difficult area suffers from instability in 
terms of institutional structures such that frequent changes and a clear division of 
competences is difficult to achieve. Non-state actors are mostly excluded from the 
policy process, bringing important consequences in terms of resistance to change and 
implementation. Assistance from the EU has helped, but it remains weak and it is based 
on general support and involves little policy project-based aid. 
Regarding environment policy, despite a more transparent policy process than the 
previous one, coordination is again the missing link. Failure in horizontal coordination 
has produced shortcomings in implementation, and overlapping in the competences of 
enforcement authorities has deepened the implementation deficit. Although a very large 
and structured network of organisations and other non-state actors are operating in the 
field, public institutions fail to properly include them in the process beyond formal 
participation. This has caused tensions and conflicts that have translated into poor 
implementation. EU expertise in this area has had a very positive influence on 
implementation, but it has been unstructured and lacked good bilateral planning. 
 
9.2. Theoretical propositions and the findings of the study 
9.2.1. Coordination and administrative capacities 
The first theoretical proposition guiding the process of exploring policy implementation 
in the four policy areas concerned administrative capacities and, more specifically, the 
coordination and division of competences. It emerged from the literature that central 
coordination influences the implementation process, and this proposition was analysed 
in the Albanian case. Van Meter and Van Horn’s (1975) findings on the centralisation 
of coordination apply generally in the Albanian case as well, but mainly in inter-
institutional processes. Top-down practices seem to explain to some extent the type of 
inter-institutional process that takes place in the policy design stage. For all four areas 
and the legal acts of the samples, the level of centralisation of coordination was a crucial 
factor that can explain failures and successes in the implementation process when a 
draft is processed by different institutions. However, institutions present different 
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approaches and, apart from the case of competition policy, there seem to be no 
standardised procedures between ministries or within a single ministry, and this has 
clearly had an impact on the policy process. In some cases, there is weak central 
coordination but strong centralisation in the departments (Ministry of Environment), 
and in other cases, higher levels intervene and centralise the process (Ministry of 
Economy). The adoption of different methods and approaches does not allow the 
consolidation of coordination practices, putting implementation at risk. Therefore, rather 
than centralised versus decentralised coordination, it is more challenging to establish 
one repeating pattern. However, following the top-down perspective (Mazmanian and 
Sabatier 1981), clear central coordination has produced better results during the policy 
process. 
In all ministries, there is an institutionalised practice of setting up working groups for 
transposition, but it changes according to the case. This flexibility does not help 
interaction between the different units because it demonstrates weak central 
coordination and therefore low-quality transposition and implementation, such as in the 
case of the environment acquis. The sort of subsidiarity in the internal organisation of 
the policy process has made interaction more difficult (apart from the area of 
competition, where the approach is different). It is useful to have centralised 
coordination within the departments, but when it comes to policies that involve different 
institutions, coordination should be central at a higher level and avoid horizontal 
coordination, which proved problematic in all the cases analysed. However, for this to 
work, there should be good coordination between the political and technical levels 
inside the institution, which is not always the case (such as in the area of food safety), 
and this causes different perceptions and different types of process management. The 
point made by Goggin et al. (1990) regarding the importance of communication and 
sharing information in the policy process finds ground in the findings of the study and 
has been confirmed to be an important factor. Exchanging information between the 
different levels has a considerable impact on the quality of the policy product and, later, 
on implementation and enforcement. 
Many scholars, from Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) to Falkner et al. (2005, 2007, 
2008), have claimed that one of the important instruments for facilitating 
implementation is a limitation on the number of actors participating in the process. 
Although this might be true in the enforcement stage, in the policy design process, the 
inclusion of affected actors can help implementation. Rather than limiting the number of 
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actors and excluding potential contributions, in the Albanian case, there is a need for 
what Bardach (1998) wrote about: making agencies work together. As explained in 
Chapter 2, there are different views on choices regarding single or multiple 
implementing agencies. Hogwood and Gunn (1984) and Steunenberg (2006) strongly 
argued for a single agency model for successful implementation. Though this is the case 
for the Albanian Competition Authority, in the current study, I did not find other 
evidence that supports this claim. Rather than the number of implementing agencies, 
minor resistance to change (as compared to other institutions that were not built from 
scratch) seems to be an explanation additional to the joint design-implementation 
functions. Many scholars have argued on institutional resistance (Knill and Tosun, 
2009; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004; 2005) and its importance in the 
compliance process. Börzel and Risse (2003) also elaborated on the importance on 
having appropriate institutions in place, and in the case of the ACA, all the right 
instruments were assigned with no major “misfits”. In addition, the clear division of 
competences and a formal method of dispute resolution seem to help implementation. 
As explained earlier, including more participants with appropriate procedures can bring 
benefits to implementation. 
However, to allow greater participation in the process, clear mechanisms for solving 
disputes should be arranged. This is a point made especially by Börzel (2009), and the 
findings from the current research confirm the necessity of including solutions when 
planning for a legislative measure. In the Albanian case, very often, inter-institutional 
conflicts and disputes could be solved only by ad hoc political interventions. This type 
of solution did not necessarily yield the best solution but depended on the will and 
political influence of the politicians involved. The quality of the draft and its 
implementation were not debated and agreed upon at the technical level in the 
appropriate way. Thus, the lack of a clear and institutionalised mechanism for solving 
disputes has harmed the policy design process and made implementation more difficult. 
In the case of competition policy, where disputes are taken directly to the Parliamentary 
committee through a very clear procedure, enforcement is much easier and 
implementation has been showing progress.  
In all cases, the division of competences played a direct role in determining the outcome 
of the process. As mentioned, in the case of competition policy, a well-established 
system could guaranty accountability because of a clear division of responsibilities. 
There were rare cases of overlapping and therefore no major obstacles to monitoring the 
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implementation and enforcing the policies. In the case of line ministries, especially for 
environment and food safety, the stance of Lipsky (1978) regarding street-level 
bureaucrats has been confirmed, especially in the aforementioned sectors. Uncertainty 
in competences between different inspectorates has influenced the number of 
inspections (low) and produced negative results in monitoring implementation, which 
has been considered absent in most of the legislation transposed. This lack of coherence 
and certainty in the competences has also weakened the credibility of these enforcement 
agencies because of instability and frequent restructuring. As Falkner et al. (2005, 2008) 
concluded, the pressure capacity and sanctions are vital for ensuring implementation 
and enforcement. This is the case for the Albanian inspectorates in the policy areas 
studied. If inspectors do not have the right legal instruments to monitor and enforce a 
policy, implementation will experience problems. 
Another pattern that is common to most of the cases studied is the fact that inefficiency 
in coordination at the department level has led to the “speed versus quality” conflict. 
Because of the over-ambitious commitment on acquis transposition, departments are 
pressured to transpose at a high pace, but this is often done at the stake of quality of 
transposition and implementation dispositions. The quality of the draft depends on 
capacities within the department and on the contributions of different departments and 
street-level bureaucrats or inspectors and how these proposals are dealt with. In the case 
of the two directives studied, central coordination seems to have sped up the process but 
has not provided the necessary instruments for the inclusion of other contributions. 
Consequences for implementation could be observed in the cases explored. In 
particular, in the case of food safety legislation, adopting ordinances, a very internal 
procedure, like a shortcut for transposing directives, has had direct consequences for 
implementation because the drafts were not consulted and not checked for compliance 
by the Ministry of European Integration.  
Therefore, an open and standard procedure for transposition should be adopted by all 
institutions to guaranty better quality for the legal drafts. However, this is also related to 
the role of the Ministry of European Integration. It emerged from the findings of the 
current research that central coordination at the inter-ministerial level is very weak. MEI 
clearly faces difficulties with horizontal coordination because of internal limited 
capacities and a lack of political strength to impose its role in line ministries and 
agencies. Its staff lacks the capacities for fulfilling the obligations properly. In addition, 
it does not include in its competences the monitoring of implementation of the acquis. 
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Sometimes, this has reduced the ministry to being like a secretariat whose main 
responsibilities concern forwarding materials to and from line ministries to the EC and 
vice versa, without having the capacity to properly review these documents before 
sending.  
The weak role of this central coordination body has also had a direct impact on inter-
institutional coordination structures. From the findings, it is clear that the weakest point 
is the link between the political level and the technical level, which is the ICCEI (as 
explained in Chapter 4). MEI leads the ICCEI, and the Minister of European Integration 
is the chair. This committee should serve many purposes and, considering how 
institutional coordination is designed in Albania, it is the most crucial body. It organises 
a few ad hoc meetings rather than monthly as anticipated. The failure to make this 
committee work affects the work of the other two structures, ICEI above and IWGEI 
below. ICCEI has failed to fill ICEI with information needed to make important 
political decisions and has failed to pressure IWGEI regarding the transposition work. 
IWGEI rarely meet and coordination of transposition does not take place through these 
groups, as foreseen, but each line ministry has adopted its own regulatory style. The 
malfunctioning of ICCEI has created additional chaos in the types of procedures for 
transposition that each ministry adopts, as it is a duty of MEI and ICCEI to harmonise 
work and rules regarding the European integration process across the public 
administration. 
Regarding institutional coordination of the policy process in the country, central 
coordination is key in explaining implementation failure. The lack of a standard 
procedure for coordinating transposition has produced institutional disputes and poor-
quality implementation dispositions. Combined with a clear division of competences, 
such as in the case of competition, centralised coordination improves implementation. 
In addition, very weak inter-ministerial coordination has increased disputes at the lower 
levels. The Ministry of European Integration seems to experience difficulties in playing 
that role because horizontal coordination would require a more centralised authority in 
terms of competences and political power. It is also failing to deliver one of its main 
duties at the inter-institutional level – which could avoid some of the disputes between 
institutions – which is to provide a common methodology for the transposition process 
and to monitor its implementation by the line ministries. 
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9.2.2. The role of non-state actors 
The second explored factor affecting policy implementation is the involvement of 
stakeholders in the policy design stage. There were some common patterns across the 
policy areas but also some important differences. It is common that, overall, Albanian 
institutions have in place a formal consultation process. It goes from the best practice in 
the Ministry of Environment, which publishes all the policy drafts on its website before 
approval, or a structured and institutionalised consultation, such as in the area of free 
movement of goods with the National Consultative Council of Businesses, to a less 
developed interaction as in food safety or competition policy. Bottom-up scholars, such 
as Berman (1981) and Hjern and Porter (1981), have asserted that the substantial 
involvement of non-state actors is essential to ensuring implementation.  
In the Albanian case, when we focus on real substantial participation, the situation is 
quite different from the formal involvement situation. In most cases, either there is a 
lack of contribution from stakeholders in the process or their contribution is not taken 
into consideration. Just as Smith (1993) predicted for such cases, this has produced and 
reinforced a “circle” of mutual mistrust in the interaction and consultation process, 
where both sides (public administration and non-state actors) blame each other for the 
lack of cooperation, with desk officers claiming that stakeholders do not contribute or 
do not have the capacities to contribute and stakeholders accusing desk officers of 
neglecting the involvement and participation of non-institutional actors. It emerged 
from my findings that, to some extent, both points of view are accurate and both keep 
feeding it. Stakeholders do not invest time and resources and do not trust the results of 
the consultation process because of previous experiences. This is why their interaction 
very often turns into a series of debates and complaints rather than constructive dialogue 
on the specific policies. A finding that could be key to understanding the establishment 
of this circle of mutual mistrust is that there is no feedback mechanism in place in any 
of the explored institutions. After desk officers receive comments and proposals, they 
decide what to include but never provide feedback to stakeholders explaining the 
outcome of their proposal and, if it is rejected, the reasons for not accepting them. This 
does not help in improving interaction and in avoiding the conflictive state that prevails 
that has not permitted trust to be built in the process. The actual participation of non-
state actors would improve implementation since, in some areas (especially food safety 
and environment), resistance from stakeholders can be an important obstacle to practical 
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implementation. Degnbol-Martinussen (1999) made a point on the importance that this 
resistance can have with respect to compliance. We could see from the current study 
that, as in the case of food safety, not involving stakeholders can activate their 
resistance to implementation and the legislation will not be enforced. 
In addition, because of the increasing number of transposed directives that have not yet 
been implemented and enforced, stakeholders affected by this legislation (especially 
businesses and farmers) have developed a “wait and see” attitude. They do not comply 
immediately with the new legislation when it enters into force but wait for inspections 
to start because they may never start and potential compliance spending would have 
been useless. This appears to be quite a problem, especially in food safety, where the 
implementation deficit is larger than in any other area. To tackle this phenomenon, there 
is a need for constant information exchange and increasing awareness among 
stakeholders and, of course, better enforcement activities once competences are clear 
and defined. Falkner et al. (2007, 2008) theorised on the possible impact of a lack of 
information for non-state actors on their activism and therefore the whole policy 
process, from design to implementation. As found in the current study, in the presence 
of a weak network among interested parties and their membership, no active pressure in 
the policy process would follow, and there would be no awareness of the necessity of 
adapting to the new legislation for implementation. 
The substantial involvement of stakeholders is also necessary to ensure better quality for 
the transposed drafts and less resistance during the implementation stage. In the 
Albanian case, they play a very small role in effectively monitoring the policy process, 
which, according to Börzel (2009), can have a direct impact on its outcome. In addition, 
they contribute very little of their technical expertise, especially in raising public 
awareness among members of their sector. This represents another obstacle for 
implementation of the transposed acts. However, as in the case of the free movement of 
goods, although substantial involvement would be the best practice, even formal 
involvement produces a positive effect in terms of information and the education of 
stakeholders. From the explored policy cases, it could be concluded that, despite 
complaints and lack of cooperation, where formal participation was guaranteed, 
stakeholders were at least informed, and implementation had a better chance to succeed, 
even partially. In view of Albania’s approaching the opening of accession negotiations, 
the substantive contribution and involvement of stakeholders becomes very important in 
facing the challenges entailed by stage of the process.  
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9.2.3. EU involvement in the policy process  
The third theoretical proposition claimed that, if EU actors are more directly involved in 
the transposition process, then implementation would be more effective. In different 
ways from one policy area to another, this proposition also applies in the Albanian case, 
according to the findings. The more direct participation of EU experts in the process of 
policy design through twinning projects, technical assistance, or ad hoc expertise brings 
a positive contribution that improves implementation in three main ways. 
First, EU expertise affects the quality of transposition outcome. Sometimes, because of 
a lack of capacities in Albanian line ministries, the drafts produced are translations from 
the original directives without coherence within the general framework of the sector and 
without a clear and efficient implementation disposition (Bushati 2012). The general 
lack of understanding of directives and the rush for transposition because of political 
pressure have produced a large number of transpositions with low-quality policies 
(especially in food safety and environment). The current study has confirmed Cini’s 
(2003) conclusion on the importance of properly understanding the complexity of the 
acquis as the key to understanding the implementation. Observed and documented lack 
of capacities in this regard have affected policy design and implementation across 
policy areas. Therefore, the implementation deficit has deepened and domestic 
capacities have not improved. In cases where EU experts assisted a transposition policy 
as a project during the design and drafting, the quality of the policy product has been 
improved because of their experience, expertise, and different approach to the 
transposition process. Not only have these experiences produced better policies and 
more chances for implementation but they have also served as training and learning 
experiences for Albanian desk officers working on these projects together with the 
experts. In addition, because of the increasing volume of acquis to be transposed, 
Albanian authorities face many challenges in setting priorities and planning the 
transposition process over the years. Therefore, experts, especially from new member 
states that have recently gone through the same process, can give a substantial 
contribution in improving domestic capacities for better planning.  
A second important element that EU involvement has improved is accountability. In all 
cases, policy projects developed in cooperation with or with the assistance of EU 
experts were monitored closer and taken more seriously by all members of working 
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groups. Because of the positive leverage that EU actors exercise in the country as a 
result of conditionality mechanisms (Grabbe 2002), their involvement increases the 
sense of responsibility and helps in changing some routines in desk officers’ work, 
especially in terms of approaches and deadlines. This has been the experience of most 
of the participants, and because of the increased pressure for better performance, the 
policy process has improved. There have also been cases where the EU has been 
involved from scratch in establishing an institution, not just policies. This is the case for 
the Albanian Competition Authority, one of the best-performing institutions in the 
country, according to the EC. The involvement of EU experts in setting up the 
institutional and legislative framework of the ACA, helping with selection criteria, 
competences, its organisational aspects, etc., has been one of the key elements in 
explaining implementation performance in this policy area. This joint effort between 
Albanian and EU experts produced a well-structured institution with clear competences, 
a dispute resolution mechanism, and an effective human resource strategy. In each step, 
accountability was high, so the results of the policy process have been satisfactory. The 
same experience is now being repeated with the National Food Authority, newly 
established, where the EU has participated directly in its setup and organisation. 
Although it is quite early for assessment and many problems still exist, in terms of 
accountability, this institution represents a better environment than other established 
institutions.  
Börzel (2009) reminds us that the EU interacts with three different group of actors in 
accession countries: public administration, non-governmental organisations, and 
business community. A third contribution made by the involvement of EU actors 
involves their role as a mediator with the different stakeholders in the country. As the 
analysis showed, interaction between stakeholders and policymakers is not well 
structured and there is mutual mistrust when it comes to involvement in the policy 
process. The EC and EU delegation in Tirana has considerable credibility in the public 
sphere and therefore is used for complaints and proposals by different stakeholders. If 
the matter is relevant to the EU integration process, then EU representatives might 
present it to Albanian authorities and even follow up if the issue is important. In all four 
policy areas, there have been cases when stakeholders have used EU authorities as a 
mediator for presenting their concerns, which have then been transmitted to Albanian 
institutions. This type of indirect interaction between stakeholders and Albanian 
policymakers can improve the policy process and the implementation stage because 
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their comments are sometimes taken into consideration because EU actors are backing 
them. However, in the long term, they do not allow the establishment of direct 
cooperation between the stakeholders and policymakers, as EU representatives are often 
perceived as more credible. This is what has happened, for example, in the case of 
competition policy, where, despite good implementation performance, interaction with 
stakeholders is still poor and often goes through EU desks and channels. 
Overall involvement of EU expertise in the policy design process has positive 
repercussions for implementation in the short and medium terms. Although most of the 
work must be done by Albanian desk officers, their presence improves the structure of 
the process, with a particular focus on the implementation stage. However, these types 
of assistance are not frequent and are activated only at Albanian institutions’ request. 
This might represent an obstacle when, for example, there is no sufficient will to be 
monitored and “pressured” in the daily activities. Considering the high leverage that the 
EU has in Albania, in terms of conditionality (Grabbe 2006) and credibility, it is not 
contributing as much as its potential promises. The EU is perceived as very important, 
so it needs to be more present in assisting Albanian authorities because of the positive 
results that this interaction can produce, as shown in the findings. Increased interest will 
benefit both sides. Policymakers will improve their understanding and capacities in the 
transposition and implementation process, and EU officials will be more directly in 
touch with the Albanian policy process to better evaluate and program future assistance. 
Planning and programming assistance for the country does not seem to have matched 
the necessities of policymakers, as it has been designed mainly in Brussels, with little 
contact with the ground and through general assumptions for the whole region, without 
distinguishing the specific characteristics of each country in the policy process. 
 
9.3 Theoretical implications of the study 
This research work started with a main question about implementation, asking “why”. 
Why is Albania experiencing difficulties in implementing EU legislation? Following the 
main theoretical frameworks of implementation studies, to explore and respond to the 
question, the second helpful questions were “how” and "what". How is the policy 
process developed and what are the factors influencing its shortcomings? After 
reviewing the main literature on implementation and developing the research study and 
the analysis, I was able to explore the theoretical proposition formulated and reach some 
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conclusions on their pertinence in the Albanian case. As shown in the previous section, 
most of the findings were confirmed as applicable in the policy process of the selected 
sectors. However, there are some findings and observations that challenge the 
mainstream theoretical model. In this section, I will discuss these elements and then 
summarise how the study has contributed in this sense.  
One of the most interesting approaches described in the theoretical framework for the 
study was Matland’s model. As explained in Chapter 2, Matland (1995), by combining 
top-down and bottom-up perspectives, formulated a model based on two main pillars: 
policy ambiguity and policy conflict. His framework with four different types of 
scenarios concludes by predicting what the implementation results would be according 
to high or low ambiguity and conflict in a policy process. Based on the analysis and the 
findings, the concepts of conflict and ambiguity as developed by Matland, in terms of 
impact in implementation, are not confirmed in the Albanian case. This is mostly 
explained by the development stage of Albanian public administration in terms of 
capacities, political influence, and type of organisation. 
More specifically, regarding policy conflict, this model fails to capture the fact that 
conflict can assume many forms. Matland claimed that, if there is no conflict, policy 
implementation has a greater chance of succeeding because of lack of resistance. 
However, the lack of conflict does not mean that there is no opposition to the policy. A 
“silent opposition” can be present and undermine the process in the later stages of 
implementation and enforcement. For example, as shown in the case of the second 
directive regarding the free movement of goods, there was no resistance or conflict 
during the policy design process. However, as the in-depth interviews showed, 
inspectors and other desk officers admitted that they were afraid to speak up and give 
their professional opinion.
51
 Because of the construct of public administration and staff 
instability, opposing initiatives coming from above are perceived as non-collaborative. 
To preserve their jobs and not create a hostile environment, actors involved in the policy 
process do not get into conflict. However, as they admitted, this happens even when 
they know that the policy as designed has little chance of being implemented. 
Therefore, the concept of policy conflict and its consequences in terms of 
implementation, cannot be generalised and cannot be applied to contexts with an 
unstable public administration where civil servants are not fully assured of their job 
                                                 
51
 All inspectors interviewed, in the four policy areas, requested not to be quoted directly in the study.  
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positions in spite of relations they have with the other hierarchies. In addition, low 
“courage for conflict”, combined with strong political support for the integration 
process, such as in Albania, can create an unpleasant situation in terms of 
implementation deficit. Because of the political pressure to speed up transposition, 
implementation records might become even weaker. Since negotiations and the 
screening process have not started, lack of implementation does not seem to concern the 
political elite much at this stage rather than having formally adopted the EU acquis. 
However, this lack of conflict has created an interesting scenario from an academic 
point of view, where legislation is rapidly passed even without adequate resources and 
time for implementing it (courts also are not enforcing some transposed legislation). 
Regarding policy ambiguity, Matland’s conclusions are also a matter of discussion 
when considering the findings of the current study. Matland (2005) claimed that, when 
policy ambiguity is high, implementation depends on contextual factors. This implied 
that ambiguity can sometimes be positive because it can create flexibility that can be 
used to reduce resistance among the different actors. The argument is that, in this 
scenario, both goals and means are ambiguous and there is fluid participation of actors 
(which changes over time). For this reason, implementation varies from one area to 
another and from one policy to another. However, as shown in this study, policy 
ambiguity itself is caused by the context as well, since administrative capacities in terms 
of understanding the acquis and poor institutional coordination cause poor-quality 
transposition and very often ambiguity, which represent obstacles to implementation 
(especially for street-level bureaucrats). The lack of clarity in procedures, competences, 
legal provisions, etc., instead of creating room for accommodating different actors' 
interests, has caused a lack of accountability and responsibility in the Albanian case, 
harming the implementation stage. Matland’s concept of policy ambiguity seems more 
suitable for developed public administrations, with clear institutional responsibilities. 
Thus, when policy is not clear, they can become more proactive and use it to their 
advantage. In administrations with low capacities and weak stability, policy ambiguity 
adds to the general chaotic attitude, damaging the policy process and implementation. 
This was evident in this study, especially in the case of food safety and environment.  
This research work has also been largely based on studies of Falkner et al. (2005, 2007, 
2008). As detailed in the findings section of this chapter, many of the positions and 
conclusions that Falkner et al. formulated have emerged in the Albanian case as well. 
However, there are a few points that the findings of the chosen policy areas seem to 
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challenge. The first is related to the issue of inter-institutional disputes. As in Matland's 
case, the concept of conflict is seen in negative terms by Falkner et al. (2005). They 
claimed that one of the main obstacles to implementation is related to conflicts merging 
between the different institutions and within them. However, as already explained, the 
study showed that lack of conflict does not necessarily translate into better 
implementation, as it may harm the quality of the policy design stage. At the same time, 
the presence of conflict does not necessarily translate into poor implementation. It is, 
rather, the presence of a clear mechanism for settling inter-institutional disputes that can 
determine the outcome in terms of implementation, as the Albanian case shows. Falkner 
et al. (2005) did not elaborate further  in depth on these distinctions, so there is room for 
reconsidering the concept of inter-institutional disputes and their impact on 
implementation, in different contexts.  
Another important finding of Falkner et al. (2005) on implementation involves the 
relevance of the type of regulatory framework adopted. They claimed that there is no 
evidence that regulatory frameworks can influence or determine implementation 
performance. In addition, more specifically related to street-level bureaucrats, they 
pointed out that the regulatory framework needs to be very flexible and mostly 
interpreted by inspectors on the ground to allow them to adopt the necessary 
instruments that they consider appropriate for enforcement (Falkner et al. 2007). This 
study concluded that these propositions do not seem to be confirmed in the Albanian 
case. The regulatory framework has had a direct impact on procedures regarding policy 
design and implementation. The case of food safety showed the clear impact that its 
regulatory framework had on the policy process from design to implementation. The use 
of a certain procedure (Ministerial Orders), the lack of hierarchical organisation in the 
process, ambiguity in the definition of duties for inspectors in the enforcement 
disposition, etc., proved crucial factors for determining policy results on the ground. 
The relevance of the regulatory framework was also strengthened in the other cases, 
such as in competition policy. Unlike in food safety, implementation in the competition 
field has registered good results because of the type of institutional and regulatory 
framework adopted. Therefore, there is a need to revisit the conclusions of Falkner et al. 
(2005), especially in relation to the context of accession countries where transposition 
and successful implementation can depend on regulatory framework patterns. 
Another important contribution to the literature, as explained in Chapter 2, was provided 
by Steunenberg (2006). He claimed that, in terms of the organisation of the process, a 
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single agency can be more successful in implementation. Although this was confirmed 
in the Albanian case (ACA), there are some specific conditions that make this possible, 
without which this statement fails to capture the whole picture. Implementation seems 
to be managed and organised in a more efficient way when there is no need for 
coordination with other agencies and institutions. In the case of this study, we had two 
agencies dealing with implementation as a sole actor, the ACA and the NFA. 
Implementation performance differed, with the ACA being ahead with satisfactory 
records and the NFA still struggling to find its own path. In the Albanian context, what 
explains the success of the single agency is not that all implementation and enforcement 
instruments are gathered in one body but the fact that policy design is also included in 
the same agency. ACA is leading the process of transposition, the policy drafting 
process, consultations, implementation, and enforcement. Its unique structure, combined 
with other quality elements as explained in the relevant chapter, has provided good 
performance in implementation. In contrast, the NFA is only an implementing agency 
for food safety. The policy design process regarding the sector happens entirely at the 
Ministry of Agriculture. As shown in the findings, there are many shortcomings in that 
process, so implementation is affected by the consequences. To sum up, having a single 
agency for implementation does not guarantee success in challenging environments, 
such as Albania. Other conditions, which Steunenberg did not develop further, are 
required for those agencies to succeed.  
A last discussion emerging from the findings of the study concerns the bottom-up 
approach (Berman, 1978; Hjern and Porter, 1981; Lipsky, 1978) with respect to related 
author's view of the process and explanations for implementation. Based on conclusions 
reached in the current work, my criticism is not related to what they claim to be 
important for implementation and how low-level actors influence it by resisting, 
interpreting, and enforcing it. It is related to their view of the policy process as strictly 
divided between the top and the bottom. A common statement from the aforementioned 
bottom-up scholars says that, once the draft is designed and approved, there is nothing 
more that the top can do; it is all in the hands of the bottom. Therefore, implementation 
is all up to them. I think that these scholars fail to capture the fluidity of the process and 
the back and forth activity between the top and the bottom. In the Albanian case, 
inspectors (the bottom) are involved in the policy design process, in spite of their weak 
contribution. In addition, during the implementation and enforcement stage, inspectors 
contact desk officers when they need an interpretation or professional advice on certain 
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provisions, as in the case of food safety. Therefore, although the findings confirm the 
importance of street-level bureaucrats, the current study has approached the policy 
process from a different angle, so the aforementioned view seems quite narrow. To 
better understand the results of a policy in terms of implementation, the design stage 
and enforcement should be seen as considerably interrelated and as having a mutual 
impact on each other.  
The study aimed also to make a modest contribution in the debate regarding “old versus 
new” institutions. More specifically, as discussed in the literature review, there are 
different positions regarding the performance of newly established institutions, which 
do not “suffer” from previous institutional patterns, and already established (old) ones. 
In the Albanian context, this means that new institutions (the ACA and NFA) are more 
successful in designing and implementing policies. Built from scratch, they have 
managed to avoid some of the legacies and inherited routines that can often undermine 
attempts to generate change. However, it is very important to stress that the process of 
setting up these institutions was entirely co-guided and assisted by EU experts. 
Therefore, this is a key factor that needs to be included when discussing the above 
debate. 
The last important aspect where the current case can contribute is the type of 
governance that is developing in the country because of the EU’s role. Paradoxically, 
the EU’s presence and involvement, which helps the process in many respects, is also 
damaging the credibility of domestic institutions in terms of interaction with 
stakeholders, as shown by different policy experiences and participants' accounts. This 
exclusive type of governance, which establishes formal participation among domestic 
actors but not a substantial one, can foster even more mistrust and the “them and us” 
syndrome. EU assistance, as it is currently formatted, might be contributing to the 
consolidation of this exclusive further and eroding trust between policymakers and 
stakeholders, as the only time they cooperate properly is when the EU is moderating. 
As explained earlier, there has been little research on EU transposition and 
implementation in Albania, so this study brings some insights to the Albanian context 
by applying theories already tested in other countries and seeking to enrich in a modest 
manner the geography of policy implementation studies. However, many other areas 
and patterns need to be explored to obtain a more exhaustive picture of the policy 
process in the country. Some of the developments are still ongoing, so it is important to 
revisit the findings and conclusions of this study in a later stage of the accession 
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process. In addition, exploring other factors that influence the transposition and 
implementation of acquis can provide useful insight for better understanding the process 
in the Albanian case and drawing broader conclusions. 
 
9.4 Final considerations 
In my first fieldwork interview in 2012, the participant, Mr Bushati, an expert on 
European integration and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Albania since September 
2013, pointed out the main problem of coordination of acquis transposition in the 
country, according to him: understanding the process. With an understanding of the 
European integration process and EU legislation, transposition can also be the key to 
implementation. This is an important conclusion that connects the dots between 
administrative and coordination capacities and policy transposition and implementation. 
In this study, I explored the policy design process in Albania with the purpose of better 
understanding and explaining implementation challenges that the country faces in the 
EU integration process. More efforts are required in terms of building institutional 
capacities, coordination, and inclusiveness. Apart from the specific findings and 
conclusions of the study, there are some more general observations and considerations 
that can be a matter of discussion for the near future.  
Albania does not seem to have a proper internal political plan in terms of strategy and 
timeline for the accession process. In spite of transposition plans, which are not 
followed properly, the whole process seems to be guided by the EU and its pressure. 
Although there is general political support for the process, institutional mechanisms in 
charge of the process have not been functioning, so the speed of accession is slower 
than that of some countries in the region. The established coordination system, through 
the MEI, shows clear shortcomings and therefore rethinking the entire coordination 
framework is necessary.   
The EU integration agenda remains the most important strategic policy for Albania and 
countries in the region. Not only has it guaranteed stability and improved bilateral 
relations but it has also helped in building bridges of cooperation. Therefore, it is 
important to better understand this process and to improve it in terms of quality and 
speed. Albania is now a candidate country for membership and is aspiring to open 
accession negotiations once it fulfils the required conditions. A historical perspective of 
the process seems to indicate that it has not been able to consolidate and separate the 
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political consensus necessary for the reforms from the domestic daily political debates. 
The political culture, characterised by harsh debates and lack of cooperation, combined 
with an unstable public administration, is slowing down the process of transposing and 
implementing the acquis. A stronger commitment and better coordination are the only 
way to ensure the continuation of the process.  
Academia, civil society, and experts are helping and should continue to help keep the 
process on the right track by contributing through expertise and advocacy to avoid 
stalemates as it has happened in the recent past. One of the purposes of this study was to 
contribute to this constructive approach to inform and enrich the academic and public 
debate, especially among policymakers and actors of the area. The inclusion of all 
actors that can contribute to this process should be encouraged. Especially in the stage 
of accession negotiations, the poor administrative capacities that the country has 
inherited will need the cooperation of all the best resources of the country among non-
state actors.  
Last, the EU’s role in this process is crucial. Because of the high support for EU 
membership in Albania and its prestige and credibility in the country, its influence on 
domestic developments is greater than EU officials perceive. Although it is up to 
Albania to do the work and comply with required standards, a more active role of EU 
institutions can help the country get there faster. In a bad period with respect to 
enlargement feelings across member states, EU institutions need to keep up the pace and 
support Albania and other Balkan countries with their integration agendas as the only 
alternative for peace, stability, and development in the region.  
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APPENDIX 1 
List of interviewed participants and institutions represented 
Abeshi Pellumb, Policy Director, Ministry of Environment of Albania 
Avignon Antoine, EU Delegation in Albania 
Begaj Eranda, Head of Environment and Agriculture, Ministry of European Integration 
Begeuot Francois, EU Delegation in Albania 
Broka Koco, Direction board, Albanian Competition Authority 
Bushati Ditmir, MP, Head of Parliamentary Committee for European Integration 
Cuko Luljeta, Director, National Food Authority of Albania 
Ebejer Ivan, DG EcFin, EU Commission 
Gjika Gjergji, Albanian Business Association 
Hoxha Sajmir, Desk officer, Ministry of Environment of Albania 
Ikovic Azra, DG Enlargement, EU Commission  
Kontonis Charalambos, DG Enlargement, EU Commission 
Lati Lindita, Head of Albanian Competition Authority 
Lleshi Ramis, Head of Sector for Trade, Ministry of Economy of Albania 
Melani Pajtim, Director, Albanian Competition Authority 
Misha Arjana, Director for European Integration, Ministry of Agriculture of Albania 
Muco Ledia, EU Delegation in Albania 
Niafas Kostas, DG Enlargement, EU Commission 
Profkola Kristaq, Legal Director, Ministry of Agriculture of Albania 
Sejdarasi Bardhi, Business Albania (business association) 
Shytaj Jorida, Ministry of European Integration of Albania 
Sykja Bashkim, Director for Trade and Competition, Ministry of Economy of Albania 
Varfi Elona, Advisor to the Minister, Ministry of Agriculture of Albania 
Vejseli Alketa, Albanian Mission to EU 
Vuksani Angjelina, National Food Authority of Albania 
Zeqo Altin, Desk officer, Ministry of Agriculture of Albania 
 
29 other participants
52
 representing the following institutions or organisations: 
Ministry of Economy (four) 
Ministry of Agriculture (three) 
Ministry of Environment (three) 
Competition Authority (two) 
Inspectorate of Environment (three) 
National Food Authority (three) 
Konfindustria (business association) (one) 
Business representatives (four) 
EcoMovement (two) 
European Commission (three) 
Albanian Parliament (one) 
                                                 
52
 These participants asked not to be identified in the thesis or quoted directly by name. 
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APPENDIX 2 
Number of employees in European Integration Units in each ministry (2013) 
Ministry European Integration Unit (EIU) Number of employees  
Ministry of 
Education 
Directorate of Integration and Projects 7 
Ministry of 
Agriculture  
Directorate of European Integration  7 
Ministry of Justice Directorate of Integration and Projects 5 
Ministry of Energy 
and Industry  
Directorate of Integration and Projects 5 
Ministry of Finance Directorate of Integration and Projects 3 
Ministry of Culture Directorate of Integration and IPA Funds 
Management  
5 
Ministry of Defence Directorate of Integration and Projects 5 
Ministry of Welfare 
and Youth 
Directorate of Integration and Projects 8 
Ministry of 
Environment 
Directorate of Integration and Project 
Coordination 
7 
Ministry of Internal 
Affairs  
Directorate of Strategic Planning and Integration  
 
10 
Ministry of Health Directorate of Integration and Projects 6 
Ministry of 
Transport  
Directorate of Projects  
Directorate of  European Integration 
10 
6 
Ministry of 
Economic 
Development  
Directorate of  European Integration 5 
Ministry of Urban 
Development and 
Tourism 
Directorate of Integration, IPA Funds 
management and projects 
7 
Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 
Directorate for EU 7 
 Total employed 103 
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APPENDIX 3 
Macroeconomic indicators of Albania, in million Lek (2004-2013) 
  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Real GDP 
growth 
rate 
5.7% 5.7% 5.4% 5.9% 7.5% 3.3% 3.8% 3.1% 1.3% 0.7% 
Nominal 
GDP 
751,0
22 
814,7
97 
882,2
09 
967,6
70 
1,089,2
93 
1,148,1
00 
1,225,5
00 
1,297,7
00 
1,326,0
40 
1,358,0
40 
Trade 
flows 
298,1
93 
328,0
09 
376,5
52 
473,3
65 552,466 534,117 640,014 742,274 743,232 760,851 
Exports 
62,12
1 
65,81
8 
77,40
5 
97,17
1 112,572 103,012 160,995 197,377 213,426 246,335 
Imports 
236,0
72 
262,1
91 
299,1
47 
376,1
94 439,894 431,105 479,019 544,897 529,806 514,516 
Trade 
deficit 
173,9
51 
196,3
73 
221,7
42 
279,0
23 327,322 328,093 318,024 347,520 316,380 268,181 
Exports 
growth 14.0% 6.0% 17.6% 25.5% 15.8% -8.5% 56.3% 22.6% 8.1% 15.4% 
Imports 
growth 4.5% 11.1% 14.1% 25.8% 16.9% -2.3% 11.1% 13.8% -2.8% -2.9% 
Trade 
flows 
growth 6.3% 10.0% 14.8% 25.7% 16.7% -3.3% 19.8% 16.0% 0.1% 2.4% 
Openness 
index*** 39.7% 40.3% 42.7% 48.9% 50.7% 46.5% 52.2% 57.2% 56.0% 56.0% 
Trade 
deficit/G
DP 23.2% 24.1% 25.1% 28.8% 30.0% 28.6% 26.0% 26.8% 23.9% 19.7% 
Import/G
DP 31.4% 32.2% 33.9% 38.9% 40.4% 37.5% 39.1% 42.0% 40.0% 37.9% 
Export/G
DP 8.3% 8.1% 8.8% 10.0% 10.3% 9.0% 13.1% 15.2% 16.1% 18.1% 
Import 
coverage 
index 
(Ex/Imp) 
26.3% 25.1% 25.9% 25.8% 25.6% 23.9% 33.6% 36.2% 40.3% 47.9% 
Sources: ACIT, Ministry of Finance, General Directorate of Customs, INSTAT, Bank of Albania, IMF. 
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APPENDIX 4 
Tariff liberalisation scheme of Albanian agriculture products exported to the EU 
CN code Reference  Description Status in the IA 
0102, 0201 and 
0202 
Paragraph 1 of 
Article 27 of IA 
Baby-beef and 
bovine meat 
MFN treatment 
07 and 08 Paragraph 1 of 
Article 27 of IA 
Vegetables and 
fruits 
Only ad valorem duty is waived, while 
specific duty remains in force 
1701 and 1702 Paragraph 1 of 
Article 27 of IA 
Sugar  Tariff quota of 1,000 tons 
220410 and 220421 Annex I of Protocol 
3 of IA, p    
Wine sector: Quality 
sparkling wine and 
Wine of fresh grapes 
Exempted from duty within the quantity 
of 5,000 hl 
220429 Annex I of Protocol 
3 of IA, p    
Wine sector: Wine 
of fresh grapes 
Exempted from duty within the quantity 
of 2,000 hl 
CN codes of trout, 
carp, sea bream and 
sea bass from 
chapter 03 
16041311 
16041319 
16042050 
160416 
16042040 
Annex III of IA, p   Fishery: trout, carp, 
sea bream, sea bass, 
sardines, anchovies 
Duty free within 50 tons quota for trout  
Duty free within 20 tons quota for carp 
Duty free within 20 t quota for sea bream  
Duty free within 20 t quota for sea bass 
(reduction scale over quota for the above) 
6% of MFN for 100 tons of quota for 
sardines (MFN over quota) 
Duty free 1,000 tons of quota for 
anchovies with increasing quota next year 
up to 1,600 tons 
All agricultural products not mentioned above Duty free  
Source: ACIT 
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APPENDIX 5 
Tariff liberalisation scheme of EU agriculture products exported to Albania 
Source: ACIT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CN code Reference Description Status in the IA 
CN codes of 
agriculture chapters 
Annex II (a) of IA 701 tariff lines of primary 
agriculture products not 
considered sensitive for 
Albania 
Duty free 
CN codes of 
agriculture chapters 
Annex II (b) of IA 495 tariff lines of primary 
agriculture products 
considered as semi-sensitive 
for Albania 
Scaled reduction 
10019091 
10019099 
Annex II (c)  of IA Common wheat and muslin 
seed Spelt, common wheat 
and muslin (excl. seed) 
Duty free within 
tariff quota of 
20,000 tons 
CN codes of chapters 
05, 13, 14, 15, 17, 19, 
21, 29, 33, 35 and 38 
Annex II (a) of 
Protocol 2 of IA 
148 tariff lines of processed 
agricultural products not 
considered sensitive for 
Albania 
Duty free 
CN codes of chapter 22 Annex II (b) of 
Protocol 2 of IA 
Alcoholic spirits  Duty free 
CN codes of chapters 
07, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 
23 and 24 
Annex III (c) of 
Protocol 2 of IA 
103 tariff lines including 
vegetables, chocolates/cacao, 
flour products, prepared 
vegetables/fruits, sauces, 
waters, beer and tobacco 
Scaled reduction in 
five years 
CN codes of chapter 04 
and 21 
Annex II (d) of 
Protocol 2 of IA 
Milk and butter, ketchup MFN treatment 
220410 
220421 
 
Annex  I of 
Protocol 3 of IA 
Quality sparkling wine and 
Wine of fresh grapes 
Duty free within 
quota of 10,000 hl 
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APPENDIX 6 
Inventory of transposed acquis in the area of metrology 
EU acquis Alb 
legislation 
Lead institution Level of 
approximation 
Date of 
Adoption 
Entry 
into force 
Directive 71/316 
EEC  
Law no. 
9875  “On 
metrology” 
MEDTE/General 
Directorate of 
Metrology  
Partial 14.02.2008 15.03.2008 
Directive No 80/181 
EEC amended by 
85/1 EEC, 89/617/ 
EEC 
and1990/103/EEC 
CMD no.. 
1162 for 
other 
measurement 
units 
MEDTE/General 
Directorate of 
Metrology 
 
 
Full 
13.08.2008 02.09.2008 
Directive75/107/EEC CMD no. 
1161 date on 
bottles used 
as measuring 
containers  
MEDTE/General 
Directorate of 
Metrology 
Full 13.08.2008 02.09.2008 
Directive 
71/317/EEC 
CMD no. 
1351, on 
approval of 
regulation 
for technical 
and 
metrological 
requirements 
for legal 
controlled 
measurement 
instruments 
MEDTE/General 
Directorate of 
Metrology 
Full 03.10.2008 02.09.2008 
Directive74/148/EEC 
 
 
CMD no. 
1351, on 
approval of 
regulation 
for technical 
and 
metrological 
requirements 
for legal 
controlled 
measurement 
instruments 
MEDTE/General 
Directorate of 
Metrology 
Full 03.10.2008 29.10.2008 
Directive76/765 EEC 
 
CMD no. 
1351, on 
approval of 
regulation 
for technical 
and 
metrological 
requirements 
for legal 
controlled 
measurement 
instruments 
MEDTE/General 
Directorate of 
Metrology 
Full 03.10.2008 29.10.2008 
Directive76/766 EEC 
 
CMD no. 
1351, on 
approval of 
MEDTE/General 
Directorate of 
Metrology 
Full 03.10.2008 29.10.2008 
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regulation 
for technical 
and 
metrological 
requirements 
for legal 
controlled 
measurement 
instruments 
Directive 86/217 
EEC  
 
CMD no. 
1351, on 
approval of 
regulation 
for technical 
and 
metrological 
requirements 
for legal 
controlled 
measurement 
instruments 
MEDTE/General 
Directorate of 
Metrology 
Full 03.10.2008 29.10.2008 
Directive 71/347 
EEC 
CMD no. 
1351, on 
approval of 
regulation 
for technical 
and 
metrological 
requirements 
for legal 
controlled 
measurement 
instruments 
MEDTE/General 
Directorate of 
Metrology 
Full 03.10.2008 29.10.2008 
Directive 
76/211/EEC 
CMD no.. 
1352 on 
approval of 
regulation 
for pre-
packed 
products 
MEDTE/General 
Directorate of 
Metrology 
Full 03.10.2008 29.10.2008 
Directive 
75/106/EEC 
CMD no. 
1352 on 
approval of 
regulation 
for pre-
packed 
products 
MEDTE/General 
Directorate of 
Metrology 
Full 03.10.2008 29.10.2008 
Directive 
80/232/EEC 
 
CMD no. 
1352 on 
approval of 
regulation 
for 
prepacked 
products 
MEDTE/General 
Directorate of 
Metrology 
Full 03.10.2008 29.10.2008 
Directive 
71/316/EEC   
 
 
Order of 
Minister no. 
195, on 
initial and 
subsequent 
verification 
MEDTE/General 
Directorate of 
Metrology 
Partial 09.03.2009 15 days 
after its 
publishing 
in the 
Official 
Gazette 
204 
 
of legally 
controlled 
measurement 
instruments  
Directive 2009/23/ 
EEC  
 
CMD no. 77, 
date 
30.1.2013 
non-
automatic 
weighing 
instruments  
MEDTE/General 
Directorate of 
Metrology 
Full 30.1.2013 21.02.2013 
Source: National Plan for the Implementation of the SAA 2007-2013 
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APPENDIX 7 
Inventory of transposed acquis in the area of Competition 
EU acquis Albanian 
legislation 
Lead 
institution 
Level of 
approximation 
Date of 
Adoption  
Entry into 
force  
Articles 101-102 
TFEU 
 
 
Law No.9121, 
dated 
28.07.2003, 
“On 
Competition 
Protection”, 
amended 
Albanian 
Competition 
Authority 
Full 28.11.2003 01.12.2003 
Regulation (EC) 
No 1/2003  
 
 Law No. 9121, 
dated 
28.07.2003, 
“On 
Competition 
Protection”, 
amended 
Albanian 
Competition 
Authority 
Full 28.11.2003 01.12.2003 
Regulation (EC) 
No 773/2004  
 
 Law No. 9121, 
dated 28. 
07.2003, “On 
Competition 
Protection”, 
amended 
Albanian 
Competition 
Authority 
Full 28.11.2003 01.12.2003 
Commission 
Notice on the 
handling of 
complaints by 
the Commission 
under Articles 81 
and 82 of the EC 
Treaty 
 
 Law No. 9121, 
dated 
28.07.2003, 
“On 
Competition 
Protection”, 
amended 
Albanian 
Competition 
Authority 
Full 28.11.2003 01.12.2003 
Commission 
Notice on the 
definition of 
relevant market 
for the purposes 
of Community 
competition law 
 
 Law No. 9121, 
dated 
28.07.2003, 
“On 
Competition 
Protection”, 
amended 
Albanian 
Competition 
Authority 
full 28.11.2003 01.12.2003 
Commission 
Notice on 
Immunity from 
fines and 
reduction of 
fines in cartel  
 
 Law No. 9121, 
dated 
28.07.2003, 
“On 
Competition 
Protection”, 
amended 
Albanian 
Competition 
Authority 
Full 28.11.2003 01.12.2003 
Guidelines on 
the method of 
setting fines 
imposed 
pursuant to 
Article 23(2)(a) 
 Law No. 9121, 
dated 
28.07.2003, 
“On 
Competition 
Protection”, 
Albanian 
Competition 
Authority 
Full 28.11.2003 01.12.2003 
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of Regulation No 
1/2003 
amended 
Commission 
Notice on 
agreements of 
minor 
importance 
which do not 
appreciably 
restrict 
competition 
under Article 
81(1) of the 
Treaty 
establishing the 
European 
Community (de 
minimis) 
 Law No. 9121, 
dated 
28.07.2003, 
“On 
Competition 
Protection”, 
amended 
Albanian 
Competition 
Authority 
Full 28.11.2003 01.12.2003 
Regulation (EC) 
No 139/2004  
 
Law No. 9121, 
dated 
28.07.2003, 
“On 
Competition 
Protection”, 
amended 
Albanian 
Competition 
Authority 
Full 28.11.2003 01.12.2003 
Regulation “On 
implementation 
of the 
procedures of 
concentrations 
between 
undertakings” 
14.12.2010 Full 14.12.2010 14.12.2010 
Regulation (EU) 
No 1218/2010  
Regulation “On 
exemptions of 
the categories 
of 
specialisation 
agreements” 
Albanian 
Competition 
Authority 
full 
 
26.05.2011 26.05.2011 
Regulation (EU) 
No 1217/2010  
Regulation “On 
exemptions of 
the categories 
of research and 
development 
agreements” 
Albanian 
Competition 
Authority 
Full 03.05.2011 03.05.2011 
Regulation (EC) 
No 772/2004  
Regulation “On 
categories of 
technology 
transfer 
agreements” 
Albanian 
Competition 
Authority 
full 02.03.2011 02.03.2011 
Regulation (EC) 
No 1/2003  
Regulation “On 
investigative 
procedures of 
the Albanian 
Competition 
Authority” 
Albanian 
Competition 
Authority  
Full 24.02.2011 24.02.2011 
Commission 
Notice on 
agreements of 
minor 
importance 
Regulation “On 
agreements of 
minor 
importance, de 
minimis” 
Albanian 
Competition 
Authority 
Full 08.11.2011 08.11.2011 
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which do not 
appreciably 
restrict 
competition 
under Article 
81(1) of the 
Treaty 
establishing the 
European 
Community (de 
minimis) 
Commission 
Notice on 
Immunity from 
fines and 
reduction of 
fines in cartel 
cases  
Regulation “On 
fines and 
leniency” 
 
Albanian 
Competition 
Authority  
full  10.09.2009 10.09.2009 
Guidelines on 
the method of 
setting fines 
imposed 
pursuant to 
Article 23(2)(a) 
of Regulation No 
1/2003 
Regulation “On 
fines and 
leniency” 
 
Albanian 
Competition 
Authority 
Full 10.09.2009 10.09.2009 
Regulation (EU) 
No 330/2010  
Regulation “On 
the categories 
of vertical 
agreements and 
concerted 
practices”  
Albanian 
Competition 
Authority 
Full 19.07.2012 19.07.2012 
Regulation (EU) 
No 461/2010  
Regulation “On 
categories of 
agreements in 
the motor 
vehicle sector”  
Albanian 
Competition 
Authority 
Full  19.07.2012 19.07.2012 
Regulation (EU) 
No 267/2010  
Regulation “On 
categories of 
agreements in 
the insurance 
sector”  
Albanian 
Competition 
Authority 
full  18.03.2013 18.03.2013 
Regulation (EC) 
No 487/2009  
Regulation “On 
categories of 
agreements and 
concerted 
practices in the 
air transport 
sector” 
Albanian 
Competition 
Authority 
full  21.05.2013 21.05.2013 
Commission 
notice - 
Guidelines on 
Vertical 
Restraints 
Guideline “On 
the assessment 
of vertical 
restraints 
agreements”  
Albanian 
Competition 
Authority 
Full 
 
15.04.2010 15.04.2010 
Commission 
Notice — 
Guidelines on 
the applicability 
of Article 81 of 
the EC Treaty to 
Guideline “On 
the assessment 
of horizontal 
agreements”  
Albanian 
Competition 
Authority 
full  05.02.2010 05.02.2010 
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horizontal 
cooperation 
agreements  
Regulation (EC) 
No 139/2004  
 
Law No. 9121, 
dated 
28.07.2003, 
“On 
Competition 
Protection”, 
amended 
 
Albanian 
Competition 
Authority 
Full 28.11.2003 01.12.2003 
Regulation “On 
implementation 
of the 
procedures of 
concentrations 
between 
undertakings” 
14.12.2010 Full 14.12.2010 14.12.2010 
Regulation (EC) 
No 802/2004  
Guideline “On 
the form of 
concentration 
notification “ 
and also the 
respective 
articles I and II 
 
Albanian 
Competition 
Authority 
 
Full 
 
23.06.2008 
 
23.06.2008 
Guidelines on 
the assessment of 
horizontal 
mergers under 
the Council 
Regulation on 
the control of 
concentrations 
between 
undertakings; 
Guideline “On 
the assessment 
of horizontal 
mergers 
between 
undertakings” 
Albanian 
Competition 
Authority 
full  07.12.2009 07.12.2009 
Guidelines on 
the assessment of 
non-horizontal 
mergers under 
the Council 
Regulation on 
the control of 
concentrations 
between 
undertakings; 
Guideline “On 
the assessment 
of non-
horizontal 
mergers and 
conglomerate 
mergers 
between 
undertakings” 
 
Albanian 
Competition 
Authority 
Full 07.12.2009 07.12.2009 
Commission 
Notice on the 
definition of 
relevant market 
for the purposes 
of Community 
competition law 
Guideline “On 
market 
definition” 
 
Albanian 
Competition 
Authority 
Full 07.06.2008 07.06.2008 
Commission 
Consolidated 
Jurisdictional 
Notice under 
Council 
Regulation (EC) 
No 139/2004 on 
the control of 
Guideline “On 
control of 
concentrations” 
 
Albanian 
Competition 
Authority 
Full 19.07.2012 19.07.2012 
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concentrations 
between 
undertakings” 
(2008/C 95/01); 
Communication 
from the 
Commission — 
Guidelines on 
the applicability 
of Article 101 of 
the Treaty on the 
Functioning of 
the European 
Union to 
horizontal co-
operation 
agreements” 
Guideline “On 
assessment of  
horizontal 
agreements”  
Albanian 
Competition 
Authority 
Full  14.11.2013  14.11.2013  
Source: National Plan for the Implementation of the SAA 2007-2013 
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APPENDIX 8 
Inventory of transposed acquis in the area of Waste Management 
EU acquis Albanian  
legislation 
Lead 
institution 
Level of 
approximation 
Date of 
Adoption 
Entry into 
force 
Directive 
2008/98/EC 
Law No10463, 
dated 22.09.2011 
“On integrated 
waste management” 
Ministry of 
Environment 
Full 22.09.2011 
 
23.11.2011 
 
 DCM No 765 dated 
07.11.2012 “On 
approval of rules for 
separation 
collection and 
treatment of used 
oils”. 
Ministry of 
Environment 
Full 07.11.2012 22.11.2012 
Directive 
2000/76/EC 
DCM No178, dated 
06.03.2012 “On 
waste incineration”. 
Ministry of 
Environment  
Full 06.03.2012 11.04.2012 
Directive  
94/62/EC 
DCM No177, dated 
06.03.2012 “On 
packaging and 
packaging waste”. 
Ministry of 
Environment  
Full 06.03.2012 11.04.2012 
Directive 
1999/31/EC 
DCM No 452, dated 
11.07.2012 “On 
landfill of waste”. 
Ministry of 
Environment 
Full 11.07.2012 28.08.2012 
Directive 
2000/53/EC 
DCM No 705, dated 
10.10.2012 “On 
waste management 
of end of life 
vehicles”. 
Ministry of 
Environment 
Full 10.10.2012 06.11.2012 
Directive 
2006/66/EC 
DCM No 866, dated 
4.12.2012 “On 
batteries, 
accumulators and 
their waste”. 
Ministry of 
Environment 
Full 04.12.2012 27.12.2012 
Directive 
2002/96/EC 
DCM No 957, dated 
19.12.2012 “On 
waste electrical and 
electronic 
equipment”. 
Ministry of 
Environment 
Full 19.12.2012 December 
2012 
Directive 
2008/98/EC; 
 
 
DCM No 117, dated 
13.02.2013 “On 
main criteria 
defining when some 
sort of scrap metal 
cease to be waste”. 
Ministry of 
Environment 
Full 13.02.2013 01.03.2013 
Regulation 
No 
333/2011/EC 
DCM No 117, dated 
13.02.2013 “On 
main criteria 
defining when some 
sort of scrap metal 
cease to be waste”. 
Ministry of 
Environment 
Full 13.02.2013 01.03.2013 
Source: National Plan for the Implementation of the SAA 2007-2013 
 
